[Wittrs] [C] Re: Free Will and Wittgenstein (for Stuart)
- From: "SWM" <swmaerske@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 03 May 2011 22:26:46 -0000
See my responses to this and the posting that followed from you on Analytic. It
really doesn't pay to repeat everything three times, especially where you're
concerned.
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, John Phillip DeMouy <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart,
>
> > Zettel is rather early in Wittgensteinian terms.
>
> That is patently and demonstrably false. The vast majority of Zettel is
> from typescripts dictated after the Second World War. The remarks in
> question, from Zettel 608-611, correspond to Remarks on the Philosophy
> of Psychology (also, without question, a late work) 903-906.
>
> Your insistence on attempting to dismiss Wittgenstein's remarks with
> which you have a problem on the basis of their provenance or date
> wouldn't be nearly so insufferable were it not for the fact that you so
> often get these things wrong, even while presenting your claims
> authoritatively.
>
> > I find myself thinking (still without having looked at the text in
> > context) that Wittgenstein would not have made such a remark later on
> > in his career or in material he was preparing for publication.
>
> The group of remarks recurs repeatedly, in various forms and polished to
> varying degrees, in material preparatory for Part II of Philosophical
> Investigations.
>
> > It's too loose, too sloppy a thought, at least
> > as it appears in isolation from whatever else surrounded it.
>
> Apparently, your aesthetic judgments are not a reliable guide in such
> matters. Do remember that in the future.
>
> Incidentally, correcting this bit of misinformation led me to take a
> second look at the posts preceding it.
>
> You early remarked
>
> "I don't know the context of that Wittgenstein excerpt (it's apparently
> not from the PI -- I just checked) but, aside from the fact that it
> recognizes that there is no logical necessity inherent in the
> physicalist view of minds, it is completely out of sync with what we do
> believe we know today about how minds come about and how they work, as
> the second amply quote demonstrates. Absent the context I am loath to
> judge Wittgenstein's comment but, taken in terms of today's knowledge,
> it looks remarkably wrong."
>
> Taking the physicalist view of minds as a matter of "logical necessity"
> would be a complete muddle, so it would be remarkable if he didn't
> recognize that. But from the context, I am not quite sure that's what
> you meant to say.
>
> And the second quotation, to which you refer...
>
> > Modern psychology takes completely for granted that behavior and
> > neural function are perfectly correlated, that one is completely
> > caused by the other. There is no separate soul or lifeforce to stick a
> > finger into the brain now and then and make neural cells do what they
> > would not otherwise. Actually, of course, this is a working assumption
> > only. ... It is quite conceivable that someday the assumption will
> > have to be rejected. But it is important also to see that we have not
> > reached that day yet: the working assumption is a necessary one and
> > there is no real evidence opposed to it. Our failure to solve a
> > problem so far does not make it insoluble. One cannot logically be a
> > determinist in physics and biology, and a mystic in psychology. --
> > D.O. Hebb, "Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory",
> > 1949
>
> ...doesn't even support what you're saying.
>
> "Actually, of course, this is a working assumption only. ... It is quite
> conceivable that someday the assumption will have to be rejected."
>
> Confusing what is "taken for granted" or "assumed" with what is "known"
> is a muddle. And one that ignores some of the lessons of On Certainty.
>
> I do hope (though it would at least make sense of the remark you made
> about "logical necessity") that you aren't confusing a assumption being
> necessary for one's work with the idea that what is assumed is a
> necessary truth. And that you aren't confusing the logical
> incompatibility of determinism in physics and non-determinism in
> psychology (I avoid following the author's use of "mysticism", since
> some mystics actually are determinists.) with idea that determinism is a
> logical truth.
>
Other related posts:
