[Wittrs] Re: [C] Re: Free Will and Wittgenstein
- From: John Phillip DeMouy <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2011 02:16:55 -0400
On Sun, 2011-04-17 at 22:12 -0700, Sean Wilson wrote:
>
> there are a couple of mistakes here.
Indeed. And not just the typo in the first paragraph that had me saying
the opposite of what I'd intended... though no doubt, context made my
intention clear enough.
>
> 1. You write, "And he certainly would not have stigmatized the patient
> rather
> than trying to ascertain the roots of the difficulty." I would not
> take this as
> being accurate historically, if that is the way you meant it ... So I
> can't accept your
> statement here as an historical one, if, in fact, you meant it that
> way.
Indeed, you make good points. There are numerous historical
counter-examples to such a broad claim as I'd made. I spoke in haste.
Nevertheless, do read the essay by Richter on this matter.
>
> One could read you, however, as saying this: a Wittgensteinian who had
> learnt
> the craft of philosophic therapy would have to have an appropriate bed
> side
> manner to do it.
That would salvage my remarks. But it is too charitable. More accurate
would be to say that I spoke thoughtlessly and in haste than to try to
tease out what legitimate point I might have intended.
Still, what you say is closer to what I believe, when I reflect on the
matter. An idealized Wittgenstein, one who had managed to be consistent
in his practice, would not have been dismissive in that way.
The flesh and blood Wittgenstein though...
Somewhat apropos, another remark from Culture & Value:
To treat well somebody who does not like you requires not just great
good nature but great tact too.
MS 153a 29v: 1931
> This would be an interesting line of discussion. We've never
> had that topic in here. If Wittgenstein is right about philosophy, is
> he,
> himself, the wrong sort of person to dispense craft of therapy? Very
> interesting
> question indeed.
One I've considered on occasion, though I then recall a sentiment along
the lines of Wittgenstein's recriminations concerning his thoughts on
Paul.
"But a fair rejoinder to that would be: What business is that of yours?
Look after making yourself more decent! In
your present state, you are quite incapable of understanding what may be
the truth here."
A better question, less presumptuous, is simply to reflect on how much
we ought to be guided by the practice as demonstrated in the historical
record and how much by the practice as recommended in his most
considered reflections?
>
> 2. It's not at all clear to me that "the free will debate" in
> philosophy
> actually helps, rather than confuses, the physicist who thinks about
> freedom and
> quantum mechanics; or the child born of rape. These are interesting
> empirical
> questions. Do scientists and clinical therapists consult analytic
> philosophy for
> this?
Actually, some do. On both counts. I know of both scientists and
psycho-therapists who take an interest in Analytic Philosophy.
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy has strong links to Analytic Philosophy and
there is a long history of physicists taking an interest in
philosophical analysis.
> Do parents? Does it make it better? You know, I've been an extremely
> good
> father, as my daughter would attest. There have (and continue to be)
> very
> important moments when I counsel her about very important things. If
> there is
> need to comfort a child, or any weak (young) mind, metaphysics tends
> to make for
> the best medicine.
Hmmm. I wonder about that.
>
> Could you imagine an idealist trying to comfort in the situations you
> suggest?
> ("It's all in your mind.") "Here, let me help you by giving you my
> theory of
> freedom."
Ah, perhaps.
And in fact, I'd say that certain utterances in Buddhism, which students
of "Comparative Philosophy" are sometimes quick to find parallel to
things said by Idealists, but which often function very differently and
are very much part of a religious way of life, might connect with what
you suggest. But one must be very careful here.
(Recall again the quote I'd shared about paying attention to one's
nonsense but not being afraid to talk nonsense.)
>
> 3. I think you are going down the wrong path by quoting from Culture
> and Value
> with respect to Wittgenstein's view on metaphysics and spirituality.
I think the fact that he took seriously the significance that one's
views on such matters might have in one's life is clear, wherever the
remarks were published. I was offering an illustration of his attitude,
not a characterization of his philosophical method. And clearly, it was
not his attitude to just say, "What difference does it make?" without
further ado. He was not so contemptuous of such questions, though he
was contemptuous of certain approaches to them.
> It really
> seems like sand in the face, to me.
I am not getting this simile.
> I've always accept those positions
> wholeheartedly. I use them often (and with my daughter).
Predestination?
>
>
> The simple fact is that my position on the pointlessness of the "free
> will
> debate" never infringed upon my humble acquiescence of the unknowable,
> and the
> silent beauty that I can see in God stories and in the things science
> "can't
> see." Wittgensteinians like myself wholeheartedly accept these things.
> What
> Walter did not understand is that the "Carnapians" and
> Wittgensteinians dismiss
> things for completely opposite reasons, using completely different
> means.
Their reasons are not so very different actually. Wittgenstein is
slower to dismiss.
In addition to the Richter paper, Hacker's "Wittgenstein, Carnap and the
new American Wittgensteinians" and some of the subsequent literature is
quite relevant to the conceptions of "nonsense" found in these two
thinkers.
> And I
> said before, Wittgenstein was an incredibly, incredibly dismissive
> individual --
> one who did so from an extremely lofty perch, I might add.
He also constantly berated himself for vanity and egotism. Something
those who would emulate him might do well to consider.
Now, a few passing remarks on Wittgensteinian therapy:
Notice how often, in Philosophical Investigations, the dialectical
involves three voices. Most typically - though not always - a first
voice asserts some dogma. A second voices raises difficulties with the
assertions made by the first voice. And only then is the voice of
clarity able to show wherein the puzzlement and confusion arises.
Have you ever asked, "To whom is therapy being addressed? Who is to
benefit from the remarks of the third voice, the first or the second
interlocutor?"?
Is there a method of addressing someone who simply makes dogmatic
metaphysical claims that is consistent with the Wittgensteinian
principle of not putting forth theses?
Therapy addresses puzzlement, confusion. But the person making
pronouncements is not confused. Or not aware of it at any rate.
Must the Wittgensteinian engage in a non-Wittgensteinian manner, viz.
the manner of the "second interlocutor" in order to make the first
receptive to therapy?
Or is therapy only suited to those in the position of the second
interlocutor?
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