--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
> > It's just that the explanation of the mental events is as a system
> feature of a brain.
>
> Is exactly what makes no sense to me. Seems like two choices. One can
> start with the brain and try to derive mind. But mind can't be found in
> the brain.

That's why we seek NCCs (neuroilogical correlates of consciousness).

> Or one can start with the Person. A person has a mind and a
> brain.

In the ordinary sense of a separation of mind and brain like "The mind is to the brain as software is to hardware"? Or perhaps ontological subjectivity as in "In the real world there is first person subjectivity without the need to posit mental substances that are of some different ontological kind--that is, ontological subjectivity is wholly the result of the brain.

> So it is easy to relate the two. This starting point troubles
> folks who think that real science is only about material entities.

It doesn't trouble Searle in the least. He's all for phenomenology while insisting we can do better than _just_ that, both philosophically and scientifically. At the end of the day, assuming we get a good account of the brain's realizing ontological subjectivity, the phenomenology doesn't necessarily change--Searle leaves the world alone, just as a proper Wittgensteinian does.

But
> there are all kinds of scientific accounts, in the physical as well as
> the non-physical sciences, that aren't about stuff and its properties.

Some examples would be in order.

>
> > How else does one explain the ability to shift one's focus of
> attention within the unified field?
>
> How does one "explain" an ability?

Back up. The ability to shift focus implies focus. Focus implies a way that brains work which allows for focus. Focus implies (abductively at least) consciousness. So, how do brains realize consciousness seems a coherent question, pace Hacker and yourself.

> One walk, dance, sing, and so on
> because that's what humans do. How we do it, the means that allow for us
> to do it, can be explained, as long as one starts with a person doing
> something.
>
> bruce

Well, others think that we have what you have and can have more via a scientific account of ontological subjectivity without property dualism.

Explain to Stuart that nonreductive materialism is about the exact level of description of brains which accounts for ontological subjectivity while the concurrent assumption of causal reduction to neurons is not thought of as an eliminative materialism, or in conflict with bona fide ontological subjectivity.

We retain our phenomenology at the end of the day. Others insist that the vocabulary at the end of the day eliminates bona fide intentionality. But it is the nonreductive materialist who insists that it would be nutty to explain Intentionality by either saying "We have it, end of story (phenomenology)" or to explain Intentionality by explaining it away (eliminativism, or causal reduction without ontological subjectivity at the end of the day).

So I agree with the spirit of your view--there's nothing wrong with the phenomenology of walking and dancing because we can.

I also agree with the spirit of Stuart's view.

I also think both of you haven't really tried that hard to understand Searle.

I also think that we inherit traditional notions of mind which cause some (Bruce) to want to speak of the nonphysical. But then he qualifies it so it doesn't sound dualistic.

I think Searle does a better job explaining himself--but ya gotta try to understand him, rather than taking pot shots.

Cheers,
Budd

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