[Wittrs] Re: [C] Avuncular v. Elitist Wittgenstein -- Part I
- From: John Phillip DeMouy <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 23 Apr 2011 04:39:34 -0400
I have never claimed to be a professor of philosophy and in fact
privately told you that I am not, when you'd mentioned crediting me on
some work you were doing, re: names and descriptions. (My knowledge of
that private exchange ought to dispel any doubts as to my being the same
individual, by the way.) I do not know who is responsible for the claim
on the wiki but it is mistaken. When you once speculated that I was a
professor of symbolic logic, I said that I'd been accused of far worse
and on better evidence. That's as close as I came to claiming any
credentials, i.e. not close at all.
As for my style being different, I cannot comment. I cannot help
wondering if this is an attempt to create some distraction. In any
case, I am not interested in such games. And my posts should stand or
fall on their content, not my posting history or my credentials.
Particularly since I have never claimed expertise, authority, or
insight.
Any insights I may have to offer deserve to be judged on the basis of
whether or not they actually are insights, not on any claim I might make
to being insightful. If they are insights, then it matters not whether
I am generally an insightful person or if my occasional insight is an
aberration, a fluke. And if they are not insights, then whether or not
I have a track record of being insightful will not redeem them. Of
course, whether or not they are insights is for others to decide, taking
or leaving whatever they see fit.
Whether or not I am regarded as insightful (or perhaps posing as someone
who had been so regarded, as your peculiar remarks seem to insinuate I
might be) is quite irrelevant to such discussions, as nothing I say
rests of any claim to any sort of special insight anyway.
As for the rest of your remarks, I'll agree to disagree.
The Wittgenstein quotations are all quite familiar to me, though I now
wonder about your position on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of quoting
Culture & Value. But no matter.
I am well aware that at various times, Wittgenstein drew out
similarities between his work and poetry. He also drew out similarities
between his work and anthropology, natural history, formal logic, art
criticism, psychotherapy, and other fields. Each of these sheds light
on different aspects of the work. I am also well aware that
Wittgenstein at various times reflected upon the difficulty of being
understood, commented on the role of the will and of other faculties, as
well as the intellect, in grasping new ideas. I have disputed none of
this.
I am furthermore aware that people on occasion speak in generalities
about the typical attitudes, aptitudes, and habits of thought of people
in various fields and so forth. And that some of such generalizations
are may be applicable in a great many cases. I would also note,
however, that in one of the remarks you quote, Wittgenstein places an
emphasis on training and practice, not talent. And having himself
trained early on to be a mathematician, he would hardly of suggested
that mathematicians were, simply in virtue of being mathematicians,
unsuited to the task.
How much of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics have you read?
How much of Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics? Surely, his
frequent use of formal argument cannot count as evidence that he was
incapable of such insights as you emphasize. So why the presumption
that others who emphasize formal argument must necessarily be lacking
some talent or gift? No doubt, some are. But the idea that using
formal methods, in and of itself, is evidence for this would call
Wittgenstein's own gifts into question as well.
Furthermore, formal methods are also deployed extensively in
Philosophical Grammar. You are on record as arguing, on the basis of
the "numbus of philosophy" quotation, against my position that this work
is part of what should still be called a transitional period in his
work. Since you regard this as being later Wittgenstein, what's with
the formalism? Assuming that a central point of the later Wittgenstein
is the rejection of formalism?
You are quite correct in observing that there is "no point" in your
raising the issue of the title of Wittgenstein's classes. His using
simply "Philosophy" for his classes but not for his work might have many
interpretations but the former choice in no way discredits his argument
for the latter one, viz. that his work is but a small fragment of
Philosophy.
In any event, my central point has nothing to do with avuncularity,
elitism, bedside manner, or any other such stylistic concerns. My
central point is that the plurality of methods in philosophy ought to be
respected and that, if a particular method is judged to be unsound, this
claim ought to be supported by means other than the presumption that
those who use them simply lack the ability to use better methods or
relying on lumping other methods together under some broad rubric that
fails to even make distinctions among them which would permit reasoned
critique.
Anyway, I do hope you actually will respond to the substance of my
remarks, rather than continuing to dwell on a handful of - perhaps
ill-chosen - words that bothered you. In particular, I'd appreciate
some real thought given to the issues I raised as to the receptiveness
of people who could be represented as different interlocutors in
Wittgenstein's dialectics.
And perhaps you might even consider that Gettier, whom you cited as an
example of "bad" philosophy, was in fact Wittgensteinian in his aim.
And that the problems he raised about the received account of
"knowledge" in fact served a role much like the second voice in the
three-voiced form, the voice that raises problems that trouble the
claims of the first voice, which in turn open the door to the sort of
clarification the third voice is then able to offer.
I believe this example - an example you once chose, ironically -
admirably illustrates my position as to the value of a plurality of
methods and the perniciousness of making assumptions about a thinker's
understanding solely based upon the methods they employ.
On Fri, 2011-04-22 at 19:50 -0700, Sean Wilson wrote:
>
> J:
>
> On this particular thread, we seem to have more agreement than not.
> But there
> are a few issues that I attend to.
>
> 1. On your mention of Drury and the title of Wittgenstein's work,
> here's an
> opposite idea. When Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge to teach, they
> asked him
> what he wanted to call his very first course. He said, "The subject of
> the
> lectures would be philosophy. What else can be the title of the
> lectures but
> Philosophy." Ray Monk then states, "And, under this uniquely general
> title, they
> were so listed for the rest of Wittgenstein's lecturing career." (p.
> 289). No
> point here. Just FYI.
>
> 2. I wouldn't be impressed by one who professed something that I
> couldn't see,
> either. But the issue of whether you are seeing it is a function of
> whether it's
> understood. And that doesn't come through any other means other than
> being able
> to command the person's line of thought to his or her acceptance. And
> where that
> isn't happening, we can't go further with the idea. In fact, in such
> a
> situation, the other person would probably have a reciprocal
> impression.
>
> 3. On your latest defense of "assness," it is again a shallow idea. It
> would not
> all all be objectionable for a person to hold the view that analytic
> philosophers think differently than creative philosophers, while
> thinking they
> also had some creative aptitude. This happens all the time. People
> say, e.g.,
> that liberal arts majors think differently than engineers, and they
> say this
> while attributing the difference to themselves or others. Or, one says
> that
> poets think differently about the world compared to, say, bureaucrats,
> while
> ascribing to oneself the behavior of poetry. These are occupational
> statements.
> Think of one who says, "lawyers think a certain way," and this can be
> narrow.
> Or, one who says that conservative ideology has a different cognitive
> or
> neurological path -- e.g., insecurity -- while claiming himself not to
> be
> insecure.
>
> Indeed, your position here is extremely closed minded. It is about as
> stubborn
> and ass-borne of an idea that one could have. It's, as you say, "a
> stupid
> prejudice." And what it says is that certain ideas cause your thoughts
> to cease
> being intellectual. It's like a switch you are turning off. What I am
> trying to
> say is: don't turn it off.
>
> Let me say this very carefully to you. It isn't even arrogant, let
> alone
> "assful," for one to make an observation about how he or she behaves
> cognitively
> (or otherwise) compared to others. An intelligent person cannot help
> but see
> these things. These are not statements of greatness; they are
> aptitude
> statements. They are like these sorts of statements: "you like
> quantifying,
> remembering, reporting; I like comparing and contrast." "You are
> suited more for
> the concrete; me for the abstract."
>
> Finally, keep in mind that my proposition here is really an empirical
> matter.
> Imagine one day if a study revealed that doing analytic philosophy (or
> certain
> types of it) resulted in a different imaging than those who did, say,
> painting
> or inventing or "ideating" (or what not). And let's say one person
> would come
> along and completely blow away philosophy as a tradition -- put her to
> bed, so
> to speak. And let's say this person (Wittgenstein), while doing this,
> would have
> noted very peculiar things about the way he thought versus others.
> (NOTE: see
> quotes marked ** below!). Finally, let's assume an MRI would have
> validated it.
>
> If all of this were true, it would hardly be assful for those who
> "get
> Wittgenstein" to say: "yes, I see it." And it would hardly be
> problematic to say
> when comparing themselves to those who do not see it, that perhaps an
> aptitude
> of some sort was the result. And this is especially so where teaching
> has
> confirmed this general experience (of how minds work). And note that
> even if the
> hypothesis was WRONG, that's wouldn't make it "assful." It would make
> it a prop
> like any other.
>
> J -- make sure you read those Wittgenstein quotes below, ok?
>
> 4. Finally, J, keep in mind that there is a recurring problem here.
> You appear
> to believe that I have taken a position in here something like this:
> "I am more
> insightful than you; so therefore, I am right and you are dumb." I
> have never
> taken anything close to that position. I might have said to Walter,
> "you
> misunderstand." Or I have said, analytics tend not to be creative or
> insightful
> in thought. Neither of these things pose any problem whatsoever. As to
> what I
> believe about these issues, see here:
> http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrswhy/
>
> 5. FWIW, I do agree with you that pointing out things like the above
> (or
> comparing levels of insight) may, indeed, be pointless in that they
> "don't
> work." I also agree that it would not constitute "therapy." But there
> is another
> thing to consider here. This is a Wittgensteinian list. I created this
> space
> precisely so things like this could be freely said by
> Wittgensteinians, free of
> cultural, social-group and bar-stool prejudice. This list really isn't
> for
> analytics. In truth, we can't live together anyway. One reason why is
> that we
> exist in completely different frameworks. I'm not going to apologize
> for my
> framework or hold it back.
>
> 6. Why not tell us a little more about yourself. Why do you chose a
> pseudonym? I
> had assumed you to be a philosophy professor, but I think not now.
> Looks like
> the Wiki was wrong: http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs. I
> noticed
> your prior address was rocketmail. I have to tell you something: your
> recent
> posts don't seem like the ones from the rocketmail addy. And I am now
> wondering
> if you are "you." You are free to be here and be anonymous, either
> way. But it
> would be nice if you shared more with us.
>
> And, I have to tell you. This may not affect you at all: you may not
> even care.
> But I'm not really open to discussions in here that aren't
> intellectual. And if
> you are going to continue with the "pompous ass" thing, I'm probably
> going to
> have to boot you. I hope that doesn't happen, J. You've had the most
> potential
> in here of anyone to have intellectual discussions with. I'd hate to
> lose you.
> But that would be just the way it goes.
>
> Regards and thanks.
>
> (P.S. -- I'll get to your substantive issues tomorrow)
>
> **WITTGENSTEIN QUOTES:
> =======================
>
> “I just took some apples out of a paper bag where they had been lying
> for a long
> time. I had to cut half off many of them and throw it away. Afterwards
> when I
> was copying out a sentence I had written, the second half of which was
> bad, I at
> once saw it as a half-rotten apple. And that’s how it always is with
> me.
> Everything that comes my way becomes a picture for me of what I am
> thinking
> about at the time. (Is there something feminine about this way of
> thinking?)” CV
> 1937, p.31
>
> “If I am thinking about a topic just for myself and not with a view to
> writing a
> book, I jump about all round it; that is the only way of thinking that
> comes
> naturally to me. Forcing my thoughts into an ordered sequence is a
> torment for
> me. Is it even worth attempting now? CV, 1937, 28.
>
> "I think I summed my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy
> ought really
> to be written as a POETIC COMPOSITION. It must, as it seems to me, be
> possible
> to gather from this how far my thinking belongs to the present, future
> or past.
> For I was thereby revealing myself as someone who cannot quite do what
> he would
> like to be able to do." from Culture and Value, 1933-34, page 24 ...
>
> Getting hold of the difficult DEEP DOWN is what is hard.
> Because if it is grasped near the surface it simply remains the
> difficulty it
> was. It has to be pulled out by the roots; and that involves our
> beginning to
> think about these things in a new way. The change is as decisive as,
> for
> example, that from the alchemical to the chemical way of thinking. The
> new way
> of thinking is what is so hard to establish.
> Once the new way of thinking has been established, the old problems
> vanish;
> indeed they become hard to recapture. For they go with our way of
> expressing
> ourselves and, if we clothe ourselves in a new form of expression, the
> old
> problems are discarded along with the old garment. CV, 1946 at 48.
>
> “People sometimes say they cannot make any judgment about this or that
> because
> they have not studied philosophy. This is irritating nonsense, because
> the
> pretence is that philosophy is some sort of science. People speak of
> it almost
> as they might speak of medicine. – On the other hand we may say that
> people who
> have never carried out an investigation of a philosophical kind, like,
> for
> instance, most mathematicians, are not equipped with the right visual
> organs for
> this type of investigation or scrutiny. Almost in the way a man who is
> not used
> to searching in the forest for flowers, berries, or plants will not
> find any
> because his eyes are not trained to see them and he does not know
> where you have
> to be particularly on the lookout for them. Similarly, someone
> unpracticed in
> philosophy passes by all the spots where difficulties are hidden in
> the grass,
> whereas someone who has had practice will pause and sense that there
> is a
> difficulty close by even though he cannot see it yet. – And this is no
> wonder
> for someone who knows how long even the man with practice, who
> realizes there is
> a difficulty, will have to search before he finds it.
>
> When something is well hidden it is hard to find.” CV, 1937. 29
>
> “Philosophers use a language that is already deformed as though by
> shoes that
> are too tight.” CV 1941. 41e
>
> “Philosophers often behave like little children who scribble some
> marks on a
> piece of paper at random and then ask the grown-up “What’s that?” – It
> happened
> like this: the grown-up had drawn pictures for the child several times
> and said:
> “this is a man,” “this is a house,” etc. And then the child makes some
> marks too
> and asks: what’s THIS then? (CV, 1931 p. 17). [allcaps substituted for
> italics
> --sw]
>
> “If in life we are surrounded by death, so too in the health of our
> intellect we
> are surrounded by madness.” CV, 1944. 44
>
> “Wanting to think is one thing; having a talent for thinking another.”
> CV,
> 1944. 44
>
> You could attach prices to thoughts. Some cost a lot, some a little.
> And how
> does one pay for thoughts? The answer, I think, is: with courage.
> 1946. CV 52
>
> “Every idea that costs a lot carries in its train a host of cheap
> ones; among
> these are even some that are useful.” CV 1947 58
>
> “Sometimes you see ideas in the way an astronomer sees starts in the
> far
> distance (Or it seems like that anyway).” CV 1947” 58
>
> “A teacher may get good, even astounding, results from his pupils
> while he is
> reaching them and yet not be a good teacher; because it may be that,
> while his
> pupils are directly under his influence, he raises them to a height
> which is not
> natural to them, without fostering their own capacities for work at
> this level,
> so that they immediately decline again as soon as the teacher leaves
> the
> classroom. Perhaps this is how it is with me; I have sometimes thought
> so.” CV,
> 1940, p. 38
>
>
> Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
> [spoiler]Assistant Professor
> Wright State University
> Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
> SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
> Wittgenstein Discussion:
> http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs[/spoiler]
>
>
>
>
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