[Wittrs] Re: A New Bizarre Claim
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 14 May 2010 00:42:41 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> both these sources are using 'conceptual truth' to mean 'analytical
> truth' --- 'true by definition'.
>
> are you claiming that Searle is claiming that 'syntax does not
> constitute semantics' is analytically true?
>
Searle says of the third premise that it is "conceptually true". By this it's
evident, from the standard use of "conceptually true" (see the sources I linked
to) and from his own statements made with that claim, that he means we can
discern the truth by examining the meaning denoted by the terms alone, i.e., by
unpacking the truth of the relation from the concepts themselves.
This is a variant of what it means to say of anything that it is true by
definition (though there is also a stipulative sense to claims of definitional
truth which is not relevant here and which I am not invoking).
> here is a better place to start your research into what is meant by
> conceptual analysis: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/
>
>
I'll leave the game of research-by-poring-through-standard-reference-works to
you. This isn't about sidling off into new arguments with only tangential
relation to the point at hand, in the current case, what "conceptual analysis"
means in the field of philosophy (or related fields). It's about determining
the basis for Searle's truth claim re: the third premise of his CRA; and he
provides that himself when he asserts that the third premise is "conceptually
true" (and says elsewhere that it is "trivially true").
It is certainly possible to develop a whole new line of dispute over what
analytical philosophy itself means to this or that philosopher, who accepts it
and who rejects it, who offers which explanation of what it is, what doing it
involves, etc. But that, I submit, will take us far afield to no real purpose
except to throw up yet another smokescreen here to obscure the points already
made in this discussion about the weaknesses of Searle's CRA and his case
against computationalism.
In passing, however, I want to note something of interest: Placing links to
other URLs on this list in the course of a discussion is not inappropriate but
it is how it is done that is relevant to whether it is actually helpful or a
hindrance.
When I have posted links, when I have a point to make from an off-list site on
the Internet, I make sure not only to provide a link to it but also what I take
to be the relevant text (i.e., the text that relates to my claim). The text, of
course, is to buttress whatever point I am making by ensuring that it is
readily accessible to the reader in the course of considering my claims.
The link is given to provide a source for the text so it can be checked for
accuracy in transposition, for the quality and basis of its source, and so that
the context can be viewed and examined so readers can be sure I have not taken
my excerpt out of context and thereby changed its meaning, etc. I don't
typically just place a link to some source or something someone else said,
especially if it is part of a claim I am making.
You, on the other hand, Joe, seem to like to post hanging links like the one
above with advice to others to go there and learn something which you are
presumably suggesting you are already knowledgeable about. Of course, what you
know (or think you know) is one thing, but what matters in discussions on lists
like these is what you SHOW you know by force of your own words. Oodles of
off-site links to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, or other similar
reference works, can never be a substitute for that.
SWM
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