I don't know if anyone here would be interested in this but I came across a book which interested me as a student of Wittgenstein's thought whose complete text is available online. _Austrian_Philosophy:_The_Legacy_of_Fran_ Brentano_ by Barry Smith http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/ ; It is reviewed or summarized at several sites online, from various perspectives: http://www.jstor.org/pss/2953761 ; http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/1737/ ; http://mises.org/misesreview_detail.aspx?control=59 ; http://www.asiaing.com/austrian-philosophy-the-legacy-of-franz-brentano.html ; http://www.friesian.com/austrian.htm ; Why is it relevant? Apart from the obvious point, viz. Wittgenstein was Austrian, the book documents the milieu (or one of the milieus) in which Wittgenstein's thought developed. The influence of Russell and Frege, of the Vienna Circle, of Schopenhauer, and of Tolstoy are more or less well understood but most of us, but it is sometimes neglected that Wittgenstein, even while teaching at Cambridge, still spent much of his life in Austria. And he was acquainted with much of the discussion taking place there - and not just the Circle. His writings shortly after his return to philosophy, such as _Philosophical_Remarks_, are filled with references to "Phenomenology", but there are references again in late works like _Remarks_on_Colour_. I would suggest that much of the Philosophical Psychology of the post-Investigations work is more strongly influenced by confrontation with the ideas of many of the figures discussed in this book - figures whose ideas trace back to Brentano, such as the Phenomenologists and Gestalt psychologists - than by the "usual suspects" (Russell, Frege, Plato, Augustine, Descartes). This book is not about Wittgenstein, though he gets a few mentions, but it may help those of us who find ourselves asking, "To whom is this addressed?" or "Why is he making this point?" For those who've read _Wittgenstein's_Poker_, this elaborates on some of the shared background of Wittgenstein and Popper. Finally, for those interested in the history of Analytic Philosophy or in the divide between Analytic and "Continental" philosophy, this book makes in the compelling case for very distinct philosophical traditions in Austria (including the territory once covered by the greater Austro-Hungarian Empire) and Germany. I would add: rather than a divide between Anglophone and Continental philosophy, it is more helpful to think in terms of a divide between Austrian/English and German/French philosophy. J. DeMouy