[C] [Wittrs] PI 128, was Wittgenstein on Religious Belief
- From: "J" <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 03 Dec 2009 21:56:48 -0000
I wrote, in re:a paper by Michael Martin:
> > Perhaps Martin ought to read and really consider, take seriously, PI
> > 89-133, especially
> >
> > 128. If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be
> > possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.
a comment to which SWM replied:
> I've actually always wondered just what Wittgenstein was really trying to say
> with such a remark. After all, isn't it the case that philosophers advance
> theses all the time and always seem to disagree?
Indeed.
Let us suppose that Wittgenstein was claiming that philosophers never put
forward theses or that when they do, no one debates those theses.
It's damned odd, isn't it?
Why would he say something so completely and utterly absurd?
Did he believe that? Perhaps when he attended meetings of the Vienna Circle,
he just zoned out during their debates, like reciting Rabindrath Tagore while
facing the wall. Was he possibly that autistic, that he was completely
oblivious to the fact that they were debating theses left and right? Was he
oblivious to Waismann's book _Theses_, a book that started out as a
collaboration between Waismann and himself? And likewise with debates that
surrounded him at Cambridge?
Or perhaps not autism but dementia. Had all of the debates he had witnessed
simply slipped his mind when he wrote that? And rewrote it? (A similar remark
occurs at several points in the Nachlass.)
How does one make that sort of mistake?
Does it help matters to say that he was not confused but "merely disingenuous",
as you later put it? Is "disingenuous" the right word here?
Isn't telling other philosophers that philosophers don't put forth theses or
debate them like the man whose wife catches him naked in bed with another woman
and asks, "Are you going to believe me or your lying eyes?"?
Isn't it worse in fact, because it's not that any one incident would prove him
a liar? Wouldn't a philosopher's entire educational and teaching career would
lead him to reject such a claim as completely fatuous?
To read him in that way don't we have to see him as not just "confused" but
completely out of touch with reality? Or as not just deceptive but as a brazen
liar?
So what's the alternative? You suggested an alternative usage of "theses", but
what possible usage could that be? (Isn't this unlike his alternative usage of
"grammar", where the usage in various contexts makes it clear enough how he's
using it and why?)
If we deny that he's using "theses" in very much the sense you mention "...as
when an Idealist disagrees about some statement about the world with a
Realist..." or again in very much the sense that Waismann used "theses", then
what special sense is at work here? Why doesn't he spell it out? And what is
his purpose in saying something that seems so absurd but isn't so long as we
somehow glean how he's using "theses"?
The surrounding context may help. It should be noted that PI 128 takes place
within a larger section wherein Wittgenstein has shifted from apparent
conversation between different "voices" to speaking with a single voice. One
may then suppose that these remarks unambiguously reflect Wittgenstein's own
views. And one could reasonably say that these are views on the nature of
philosophy, the nature of its problems and how they are best addressed.
And obviously, he's not writing the history of philosophy. It ought to go
without saying that he is not primarily presenting a description of how various
philosophers have proceeded (except where he obviously is!) but of how he has
found it fruitful to proceed.
It makes sense that in discussing "philosophy" as a source of problems and as a
way of dealing with those problems, there may be some ambiguity in how
"philosophy" is used. There is a descriptive sense, describing how
philosophers have been led into various muddles, and a prescriptive sense, how
philosophy ought to be done in order to deal with such muddles.
An example of the latter:
"119. The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of
plain nonsense and of bumps
that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of
language. These bumps make us see the
value of the discovery."
I take it as obvious that this cannot be meant as a description of all or even
most philosophical work.
And here, "may" makes clear that the point is a normative one:
"124. Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it
can in the end only describe it.
For it cannot give it any foundation either.
It leaves everything as it is.
It also leaves mathematics as it is, and no mathematical discovery can
advance it. A 'leading problem of
mathematical logic' is for us a problem of mathematics like any other."
But the transition to "can" and the supporting "for it cannot..." also demand
close reading. As well, "...for us..." is important.
Reading these passages requires very close attention.
Again "It is the business of philosophy..." (PI 125) is prescriptive.
"One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible before all new
discoveries and inventions." (PI 126)
And immediately prior to the remark we're considering:
"127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a
particular purpose.'
Doesn't it make sense to read "theses" as being contrasted with "assembling
reminders"?
And subsequently:
"129. The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because
of their simplicity and
familiarity. (One is unable to notice something--because it is always before
one's eyes.) The real foundations of his
enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck
him.--And this means: we fail to be struck
by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful."
Isn't it natural to read the "reminders" to be "assembled" as reminders of
things "hidden because of their simplicity and
familiarity"?
Doesn't it make sense then to read PI 128 as an aside in this train of thought,
viz. if we tried to present these reminders of simple and familiar truths
always before our eyes as "theses", i.e. as claims to be advanced, supported by
argument, defended against counter-arguments ("theses" in a perfectly ordinary
sense of the word), it would be absurd. No one would argue with such reminders!
Now, it is a legitimate to ask whether Wittgenstein was consistent, whether he
didn't really limit himself to reminding us of simple and familiar truths. And
many philosophers and exegetes have debated this point.
But for our present purposes, it isn't necessary to show that Wittgenstein
never advanced controversial theses, that what appear to be controversial
theses are really no such thing. It is sufficient to show that a reading that
is "noncontroversial" is not a bad thing in Wittgenstein's case. Being
noncontroversial is a virtue by his lights, because it is consistent with the
idea of assembling reminders of simple and familiar truths.
So, when Martin rejects readings that have Wittgenstein saying things that are
"noncontroversial" or "not very interesting," when he rejects a straightforward
reading by saying, "few people would
deny this," or asking, "But who would deny that this is true...?" and
"Who would want to deny the thesis...?" he is making a mistake!
If what Wittgenstein says is something no one would deny, then he is being true
to his word. Attempts to extract broader conclusions, especially highly
dubious ones, are misguided if the only claim that can be made for the approach
is that otherwise Wittgenstein is being "noncontroversial" - as if that were an
obviously bad thing!
J.DeMouy
> P.S. I am on record, by the way, as thinking that Martin's assessment of
> Wittgenstein's position on religion is fairly astute and does point up some
> real problems in his approach, by the way. (Another possible subject for
> detailed discussion!)
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