[C] [Wittrs] Wittgenstein and phenomenology
- From: J DeMouy <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2009 11:06:46 -0800 (PST)
AB,
I'm glad my suggestions were appreciated. Thank you.
Thanks as well for your helpful remarks.
Indeed, I do think that phenomenological (or at phenomenalist) language was
strongly considered - at least on occasion - as a means to "flesh out" the
objects of the _Tractatus_.
(I also think you're quite right about considerations of visual and geometrical
space reflecting Husserlian (or at least broadly Brentanian) influences.)
I definitely see this as the case with _Remarks_on_Logical_Form_ and
_Philosophical_Remarks_. I am less confident in supposing that this was the
view when he wrote TLP.
I hesitate to say that the solipsism "confirms" this view in the _Tractatus_.
It does provide a good deal of support for it however.
But the remarks on solipsism in the _Blue_Book_ as well as TLP suggest an
understanding of solipsism - of what the solipsist wants to say - very
different from the normal understanding of solipsism, thus my hesitation here.
We also know that Wittgenstein found fault with himself for supposing that the
nature of Tractarian objects could await further research. That suggests that
he may not have been committed to any one approach to them, at least prior to
1929.
So-called "private objects" play a role in a number of writers, Russell, in his
discussions of "Knowledge by Acquaintance", as well as Husserl. Wittgenstein's
remarks may be addressed to one, the other, or both approaches at different
points. (Sometimes as well to similar ideas in Gestalt psychologists like
Kohler.)
Where these discussions point more strongly to Brentano or even specifically
Husserl (I am using "Brentano" broadly to indicate various thinkers who show
his influence, Husserl but one among them, some of whom Wittgenstein may have
read or discussed.) is in "private ostensive definition" and in various "mental
acts" supposed to secure the reference of a term, in various areas where he
challenges talking of "pointing" mentally. Whether or not to something
"private". There's a strong concern with very Brentanian views of
"intentionality" in both the PI and in later writings on the philosophy of
psychology.
Another point of connection between Wittgenstein and Husserl is in philosophy
of mathematics, where Wittgenstein explores various senses of number as
quantity, distinguishing ways we grasp a group of objects as being, e.g. 3
objects, directly, i.e. without counting them, in contrast to acts of
correlation, acts of counting, and calculations from counting, e.g. rows and
columns. This sort of analysis, continues well beyond his temptations to
phenomenology as such, but I wonder whether Husserl influenced them.
JPDeMouy
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