[C] [Wittrs] Re: _Philosophical_Remarks_ and phenomenology (tying together threads)
- From: Anna Boncompagni <anna.boncompagni@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2009 18:06:04 +0100
Hello, I deeply agree with this interpretation of the transitional
Wittgenstein as it is shown in the Philosophical Remarks. The problem of the
synthetic a priori, which can be better understood as pointing to a
Husserlian rather than a Kantian solution, is only one of the reasons that
can lead us to focus on a "phenomenological Wittgenstein". Another reason I
suggest is the matter of "evidence", with which W. often deals, exspecially
if we think about the concept of visual space as opposed to geometric space.
Also, the PR can offer a good intuition to look at the world as iti is
described in the Tractatus. Though W. never tells us what the ultimate
elements of reality are, I think that in a certain period he thought of the
objects, substance of the world, as phenomenological entities. The
methaphisical solipsism of the last sections of the Tractatus can confirm
this view.
But I don't think that this perspective survives in the second and late
Wittgenstein. On the contrary, after the PR there is a quite violent
reaction against the phenomenological evidence: the Private language
argument and Wittgentein's denial of the "internal" or "private" object seem
to me to be a response to the troubles that phenomenology could lead to.
Thank you for the suggestions
Anna
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