[C] [Wittrs] Digest Number 87

  • From: WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: 28 Dec 2009 10:42:58 -0000

Title: WittrsAMR

Messages In This Digest (19 Messages)

Messages

1.1.

Re: Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "Cayuse" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 2:57 am (PST)



Joseph Polanik wrote:
> Cayuse wrote:
>> Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>> if this philosophical self that I am states "I am this philosophical
>>> self"; then, I am self-referencing.
>
>> No, the philosophical self doesn't DO anything (in this particular
>> case, that means that it doesn't "make statements" such as "I am
>> this philosophical self"). All statements (including the statement
>> that "I am this philosophical self") are part of what appears
>> /within/ (or what is emcompassed by) the philosophical self.
>> Statements are attributable to *physical organisms*.
>
> if the physical organism states 'I am this philosophical self' then it
> is mistaken.

The statement is neither true nor false, but nonsensical.

> that would mean that your interpretation of LW is based on the
> assumption that TLP 5.63 is false. not just wrong, false.

TLP 5.63 is nonsensical, just as LW acknowledges in TLP 6.54.
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1.2.

Re: Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "Cayuse" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 2:59 am (PST)



gabuddabout wrote:
> "Cayuse" wrote:
>> Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>> if this philosophical self that I am states "I am this
>>> philosophical self"; then, I am self-referencing.
>>> do you agree?
>>
>> No, the philosophical self doesn't DO anything
>> (in this particular case, that means that it doesn't
>> "make statements" such as "I am this philosophical self").
>> All statements (including the statement that "I am this
>> philosophical self") are part of what appears /within/
>> (or what is emcompassed by) the philosophical self.
>> Statements are attributable to *physical organisms*.
>
> So the nonphilosophical self does things like make philosophical
> statements about how the philosophical self does nothing?

It is the physical organism that /does/ things, including the
making of statements, and those statements can be misguided
owing to the physical organism's "bewitchment by language".

> Cayuse, doesn't Searle just get it pretty much right in his paper
> "Why I AM Not a Property Dualist?"
>
> Google Searle's homepage and have a read and tell me what you think.
> I already heard how Stuart liked the paper but is too full of it to
> understand Searle's CRA as well as his ten-year-later APA Address.

I too liked Searle's paper, though I had certain reservations.
I'll read it again and present those reservations in due course.
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1.3.

Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "Joseph Polanik" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 6:59 am (PST)



Cayuse wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>Cayuse wrote:

>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>>>if this philosophical self that I am states "I am this philosophical
>>>>self"; then, I am self-referencing.

>>>No, the philosophical self doesn't DO anything (in this particular
>>>case, that means that it doesn't "make statements" such as "I am this
>>>philosophical self"). All statements (including the statement that "I
>>>am this philosophical self") are part of what appears /within/ (or
>>>what is emcompassed by) the philosophical self.
>>>Statements are attributable to *physical organisms*.

>>if the physical organism states 'I am this philosophical self' then it
>>is mistaken.

>The statement is neither true nor false, but nonsensical.

>>that would mean that your interpretation of LW is based on the
>>assumption that TLP 5.63 is false. not just wrong, false.

>TLP 5.63 is nonsensical, just as LW acknowledges in TLP 6.54.

TLP 6.54 indicates that you are supposed to learn or unlearn something
or obtain some insight from a proposition before recognizing it as
nonsensical.

what was that insight, what did you learn/unlearn from 5.63?

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

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1.4.

Re: Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "Cayuse" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 10:24 am (PST)



gabuddabout wrote:
> Cayuse, doesn't Searle just get it pretty much right
> in his paper "Why I AM Not a Property Dualist?"

http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/searle-final.pdf

It becomes clear that Searle's use of the word "consciousness" is consistent
with a picture of the world as divided into the categories of "private"
(or "internal" or "subjective") and "public" (or "external" or "objective").
If one accepts the private/public distinction as Searle implies it, then
what he goes on to say might seem plausible, but I feel it misrepresents an
important use of the word "consciousness". That use pertains to what we
might call the /entire/ "stream of experience", encompassing all conceptual
distinctions like the private/public, the internal/external, and the
subjective/objective distinctions. So Searle is confining his use of the
word "consciousness" to a subset of the use of that word that is of
particular interest. Just as the idea of a "stream of experience" appears as
part of the content of that stream, so too there appears therein the idea
that the stream is associated with a particular physical person in a world
populated by other physical people. And there lies the ground for the idea
that these other people are also similarly associated with "streams of
experience" -- i.e. that they are conscious too.

Searle:
"We live in exactly one world and there are as many different ways of
dividing it as you like. In addition to electromagnetism, consciousness, and
gravitational attraction, there are declines in interest rates, points
scored in football games, reasons for being suspicious of quantified modal
logic, and election results in Florida [...] At the most fundamental level,
consciousness is a biological phenomenon in the sense that it is caused by
biological processes, is itself a biological process, and interacts with
other biological processes. Consciousness is a biological process like
digestion, photosynthesis, or the secretion of bile".

The reservation I have with the above is that whereas "electromagnetism,
gravitational attraction, declines in interest rates, points scored in
football games, reasons for being suspicious of quantified modal logic, and
election results in Florida", along with "digestion, photosynthesis, and the
secretion of bile", are all observed phenomena in the world, or useful
fictions conceived to account for observed phenomena in the world,
consciousness is neither an observed phenomenon in the world nor a useful
fiction conceived to account for any observed phenomenon in the world.
Searle is not comparing like with like.

Searle:
"I say consciousness is a feature of the brain. The property dualist says
consciousness is a feature of the brain. This creates the illusion that we
are saying the same thing. But we are not, as I hope my response to points
1 and 2 makes clear. The property dualist means that /in addition to/ all
the neurobiological features of the brain, there is an extra, distinct, non
physical feature of the brain; whereas I mean that consciousness is a state
the brain can be in, in the way that liquidity and solidity are states that
water can be in."

Again, liquidity and solidity in water are observed phenomena in the world,
and consciousness is not. And if all we mean by "consciousness" is the state
that a physical system is in, then that would make even the most simple of
compound physical systems "conscious" and this would be inconsistent with
his use of the word "consciousness" that he describes earlier and later in
his paper as "experiential", "phenomenological", "qualitative", and
"subjective".

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1.5.

Re: Is There a Self that Philosophers may Talk About?

Posted by: "Cayuse" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 10:24 am (PST)



Joseph Polanik wrote:
> Cayuse wrote:
>> Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>> if the physical organism states 'I am this philosophical self' then
>>> it is mistaken.
>
>> The statement is neither true nor false, but nonsensical.
>
>>> that would mean that your interpretation of LW is based on the
>>> assumption that TLP 5.63 is false. not just wrong, false.
>
>> TLP 5.63 is nonsensical, just as LW acknowledges in TLP 6.54.
>
> TLP 6.54 indicates that you are supposed to learn or unlearn something
> or obtain some insight from a proposition before recognizing it as
> nonsensical.
>
> what was that insight, what did you learn/unlearn from 5.63?

In 5.63 thru to 5.641 LW is alluding to what is at the limits of language
-- i.e. the philosophical self. Language survived in the process of natural
selection because it has utility in helping our species to negotiate their
environment, but any talk of the philosophical self contributes nothing to
that utility (i.e. it has no application) since the philosophical self has
nothing to do with the physical organism's environment. That is to say
that, in the case the philosophical self, the word 'self' has no 'sense'
-- it is 'nonsensical' -- but this is not meant as a disparaging comment.
LW draws our attention to the philosophical self, and to the mess we get
ourselves into by virtue of our linguistic ability to refer to it as though
it were legitimate subject matter for language. And, in doing so, he gives
us the ability to stop asking the silly metaphysical questions that follow
hot on the heels of the linguistically-induced and ill-conceived reification
of the philosophical self. Such metaphysical problems are never "solved",
but rather they evaporate away when we "see the world aright".

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2.

"Collapsing the Wave Function" and Consciousness (for Joe P.)

Posted by: "SWM" swmaerske@xxxxxxxxx   swmaerske

Sun Dec 27, 2009 4:23 am (PST)



Joe Polanik made an interesting point in this debate about whether consciousness (or subjectness, or being a subject, etc.) can be explained in purely physical terms (as being derived from or the product of purely physical phenomena) if von Neumann's point about "collapsing the wave function" is true. Now I am no physicist but if Joe's point is that in order for physical theory to fully account for the universe as we know it, it must include a feature which is not itself physical or physically derived then he is apparently making an argument about physics.

Aside from the fact that this is a question for physicists and that the von Neumann view, as Joe presents it, is hardly an accepted fact, which are not issues we can address satisfactorily on a list like this, there is at least one issue that we can address, namely what does it mean to assert that "collapsing the wave function" is an essential feature of consciousness without which consciousness is not explainable, not recognizable as what we mean by consciousness?

Nearby I posed this question to Joe:

"If you want to assert that 'collapsing the wave function' is the missing link which is 1) a critical feature of consciousness [without which consciousness cannot be fully explained] and 2) irreducible to the phenomena of physics, then the onus is on you to describe this collapse of the wave function as a feature of our minds, point out to us where we will find it, and explain how it is irreducible as you say."

I think Joe's claim is an interesting one in that, if it can be sustained, it would imply that consciousness cannot be fully described in terms of physical phenomena. But Joe has to do more than simply assert it. Although this is a Wittgensteinian list, with many participants who are not interested in arguing per se but ino developing and exploring insights into how we think, using Wittgensteinian techniques, it is an open and eclectic list as I understand it, driven by the notion that anything goes so long as Wittgenstein's insights are respected and their application to these discussions recognized.

So I want to reiterate to Joe that I would like to see him answer the questions I have posed so we can explore the force of his assertion that von Neumann's claim (as Joe interprets it), that consciousness "collapses the wave function", is significant for the question of what we mean by consciousness and, if true, means that consciousness cannot be explained in physicalist terms (as already described above). Bringing a little Wittgenstein to bear here, it is now important to find out just what Joe means by his terms ("collapsing the wave function") and how what he means relates to the debate about what consciousness is.

SWM


3.

Fundamental philosophical questions

Posted by: "void" rgoteti@xxxxxxxxx   rgoteti

Sun Dec 27, 2009 6:05 am (PST)



* What is the meaning of life?
* Do we even exist?
* Does God exist?
* Do we have free will?
* Do we have a soul?



* How can we know when something is true?
* How is a priori knowledge possible?
* The problem of universals.
* What is beauty?
* What is consciousness?



* What is freedom?
* What is good? What is evil?
* What is just?
* What is real?
* What is valuable?
* What are time and space?

thank you
sekhar

4a.

Re: Josh's Physicalism

Posted by: "void" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 1:50 pm (PST)




>
> it seems pretty clear that your physicalist theory of mind is that there
> is no mind, only the brain. if so, your theory would be in conflict with
> the von Neumann interpretation of QM which requires that there be
> something non physical to collapse the wave function.
>
> Joe
>
> Often, statements of "belief" mean that the speaker predicts something that will prove to be useful or successful in some sense?perhaps the speaker might "believe in" his or her favorite football team. This is not the kind of belief usually addressed within epistemology. The kind that is dealt with is when "to believe something" simply means any cognitive content held as true. For example, to believe that the sky is blue is to think that the proposition "The sky is blue" is true.

Knowledge entails belief, so the statement, "I know the sky is blue, but I don't believe it", is self-contradictory. On the other hand, knowledge about a belief does not necessarily entail an endorsement of its truth. For example, "I know about astrology, but I don't believe in it" is consistent. It is also possible that someone believes in astrology but knows very little about it (it would be paradoxical to believe in something of which one knows absolutely nothing).

Belief is a subjective personal basis for individual behavior, while truth is an objective state independent of the individual.[

Golden dictionary
Belief

thank you
sekhar
> --
>
> Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
>
> @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
> http://what-am-i.net
> @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
>
>
> ==========================================
>
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>

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4b.

Re: Josh's Physicalism

Posted by: "jrstern" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 4:35 pm (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> it seems pretty clear that your physicalist theory of mind is that
> there is no mind, only the brain. if so, your theory would be in
> conflict with the von Neumann interpretation of QM which requires
> that there be something non physical to collapse the wave function.

If you say so.

If so, watch out, Johnny, but I am not aware that von Neumann specifies that the observer cannot be physical.

Even you say "physicists are divided" about it.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/message/3582

Certainly my theory is not that there is no mind, but that the mind
is atoms like X doing Y. There is no Firefox until certain atoms
like X do Y, would you assert that Firefox is an immaterial entity?

Josh

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5a.

[C] Re: help the math teachers?

Posted by: "kirby_urner" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 2:20 pm (PST)





I already replied to this once, howevr after a hiatus I have some
more thoughts, so I'll jump in again... Somewhat lengthy...

--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "J" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> Kirby,
>
> (During our exchanges, I find myself picturing the videogame
character "Kirby" bouncing around tetrahedra - though that's not how
the game looked. I hope that observation doesn't offend. It's on no
way meant to trivialize your points.)
>

There is a Nintendo character named Kirby, whom I reference in my
slides at http://www.myspace.com/4dstudios

No offense taken, I'm happy to be associated with something other
than a vacuum cleaner for a change (Kirby's are famously sold door
to door, a high pressure gig -- they tried to sell one to me in
fact, and I'm embarrassed to admit how close I came to succumbing).

> >
> > I think you were clear, and I'm encouraged you would spend
> > some energy
> > on this thread.
>
> I find the subject interesting, certainly. You've indicated that
I've been able to help and I don't feel I'm wasting my time as can
sometimes happen in these threads.
>

That's good.

I do think we're looking at real philosophy of mathematics here, and
that Wittgenstein's approach is undervalued. What is this approach?
We've talked about "assembling reminders".

"Triggering perceptual shifts that restore clarity" might be one way
of characterizing it. That's part of the inherent difficulty too, as
once in the realm of perceptual shifts, gestalts, how does one know
if this "triggering" has occurred?

"An ability to continue in some language game in accordance with its
rules (grammar)" might be construed as evidence (of understanding).

We're in familiar PI territory at this point.

> > You point out that a tabular arrangement of rows and
> > columns is easy
> > to read, whereas a grid of triangles is less familiar,
> > more
> > problematic, even if it provides a logically consistent
> > model of
> > multiplying lengths to get area. In making the
> > transition, one is
> > likely to slip up, make mistakes.
>
> There are mistakes one can imagine, such as failing to see that the
bowling pin arrangement doesn't fit what we're meant to do here, but
I wouldn't quite say that such mistakes are my principal concern.
>
> How "easy to read" one representations is compared to another is
closer to the point, but it might be closer to say that I'm not sure
how to read one as I would the other. Or that they don't say the
same things.

Yes, I understand your concerns. It helps me to regard you as a
delegate from the math teaching community (a kind of role playing)
and wondering if interjecting this particular language game is really
a good idea. You'll get these pedagogical concerns, that exposure to
an unfamiliar model of area and volume, not based on right angles,
will only interfere with student comprehension of traditional content.

The challenge as I see it is to phase in some of this new thinking in
a way that bolsters teaching what's already on the books. Teachers
feel on the ropes, in the trenches, beleaguered. Here's something
novel suggesting opportunities for more artistic treatment
(claymation?). Build your portfolio of original works why not?

Do we teach this in art schools? In some maybe.

A part of meeting this challenge, though maybe not the most important
part, is to be clear that we're not breaking any deep rules of
mathematics. We're exploring our freedoms, our heritage, and thereby
gaining more insights into what mathematics is all about. There's
room for diversity.

You could see this as countering some unexpressed view that "math is
fascist" in the sense of "my way or the highway".

From the point of view of struggling students, sometimes finding math
oppressive, a little novelty might go a long way towards forestalling
a disconnect. I see premature disconnect is one of the chief
challenges to overcome, am hopeful that the new mnemonics, our little
package, will prove life supportive and forestall that sense of
suffocation and/or claustrophobia that students feel when the math
goes over their heads too quickly.

That's the thing though: mathematics as we teach it in schools is
conservative, change-averse. We might think of it as the one
discipline least likely to change. This has to do with math's
reputation for dealing with eternal verities, with nothing new under
the sun, at least where primitive geometry is concerned.

On the other hand, math teaching has already gone through many
changes in my lifetime, starting with New Math in the 1960s, followed
by the introduction of more calculators, some use of computer
languages (Logo, BASIC), followed by a lot of canned software since
the PC revolution, then the Internet, then open source... some
schools have adapted more than others to these changes.

What might be next? More spatial geometry thanks to more computer
power? A more sophisticated approach to spatial geometry? This is
what I've been anticipating, but then I thought we'd be somewhat
further along by now. That may be because we don't have enough
people attuned to the big picture. That's why I say math teachers
need help from philosophers, especially those in the Wittgenstein
camp, given their pragmatic operationalism (meaning through use).

>
> As an approach to length and area, the concerns I've raised are not
a problem at all, as far as I can see. If we are approaching this as
"magnitudes" rather than "multitudes", the differences between the
two uses of "n x n" are less significant. But the background of why
one might be more inclined to accept the squares as a picture of n x
n (multitudes), why this picture better reflects different aspects of
the calculation, might be something to acknowledge up front, to
emphasize the differences so that there is no charge of "sleight of
hand" or "sophistry".
>
> (Apart from the mission of educating teachers, encouraging the
students to think of different ways we use pictures, to think about
concepts like "grouping" and "correlation", would be beneficial.)
>

Going back to my volumes table, I'm suggesting what's novel is our
ability to interject more whole number volumes and simple fractions
than previously, even though we're introducing such non-rectilinear
concepts as the rhombic dodecahedron, a space-filler. We assign it
a volume of six, slice and dice it to come up with a corresponding
cube, octahedron and tetrahedron of 1/2, 2/3 and 1/6 the volume
respectively (i.e. 3, 4 and 1) -- the beginning of a language game,
with more pieces to come later.

Having this more sophisticated visual vocabulary coupled with less
intimidating, more memorable whole number relationships, is something
new (since the 1960s). It's new because our Roman and Greek
forebearers considered right angles "normal" even though squares
have no inherent structural stability. When you do post and lintel
architecture, rest cross-beams atop columns, you get used to thinking
of structure as rectilinear. The tetrahedron (tetra for four),
although the minimum wire-frame enclosure, more primal than the cube,
didn't get as much focus in the early days of western civ. Those
mental habits are difficult to counter to this day. Yet what better
example of challenging a dominant paradigm? Math teachers need help.

However since the invention of microscopy, other more powerful
instrumentation, it has become apparent that nature is more
triangulated in her designs. Our more sophisticated visual vocabulary
is going to help us down the road, as future biologists, chemists,
engineers. The world of sphere packing, of lattices, will be more
front and center, thanks to our more 60-degree based approach.
Stabilize what we have, trail blaze new material. It's an exciting
time to be a math teacher.

That's the PR anyway.

In other words, we're hoping to excite teachers about these
developments, not trigger a "let's not rock the boat" backlash right
from the get go. Given widespread frustration with the current
fare and a paucity of polyhedra to begin with, it's not like we're
facing much organized competition. "Unconscious inertia" would seem
closer to what's in our path. We could use some help from philosophy
to at least turn unconscious inetia into conscious debate, which is
where Wittgenstein's "therapies" enter in.

Also, as soon as one touts something as "better" or "new and
improved", there's some resulting anxiety about introducing the
change, undermining the existing "music of authority" in some way.
This may account for why this material is still unfamiliar and not
widely discussed, even after a half century. There's an underlying
defensiveness perhaps?

People in my camp (which includes some math teachers) could benefit
from the focused attention of a few philosophers, especially those
trained to add clarity, reduce confusions.

> It isn't just a question of practicality. What I hope to convey is
that what the "90-degree-based conventions" show as a picture of
arithmetic operations is different. Yes, there is an analogous
"input" and "output" with the triangular case, but not all of the
same transformations.
>
> "Seeing as" is important here. An n x n square can be seen as n
columns or as n rows. And each column (or row) is the same
arrangement (squares in a lined up or stacked) making their grouping
perspicuous. Being the same in this sense, the connection between
multiplication and addition is clarified: n x n is a stack of n
height (or in a line, n length), n times ("times" as literal
repetition: the same again). And that they are the same is not just
a matter of their having the same arrangement (grouping) but their
lining up (correlation).
>
> What corresponds to grouping, to correlation, or to "the same
again" with the triangles?
>

I've been giving this more thought.

Maybe the following cartoon would serve:

Any square, subdivided into smaller squares, may be skewed (tilted)
to form a rhombus. Each smaller square then becomes a rhombus as
well. Each of these may be cut in half with a diagonal, to form
two equilateral triangles.

We will use this n x n rhombus (of n x n sub-rhombi) to display
area in the usual fashion, as an array of colored-in rhombi. 3 x 4
= 12 would be shown as the usual three by four array.

However, because each of the 12 rhombi is already subdivided into
two triangles, it's easy to simply take one triangle from each rhombus
and say this would be the area in an "alternative currency" where
little triangles are unit (a different "coin of the realm"). We
start thinking "exchange rate".

I'm seeing lesson plans with tessellations piling up in this region.
What shapes tile a surface? What complementary shapes? If we take
shape A as our unit, and know the ratio A:B, then this polygon of so
many As and so many Bs, has what area?

Portland's Math Learning Center already has some of this material
developed I'm pretty sure. Some of our public schools use it.
Tessellations (tilings) have been an important aspect of elementary
school, could be revisited in high school.

In volume or 3D or space, you have space-filling as a topic, using
either the same shape (e.g. rhombic dodecahedron) or complementary
shapes (e.g. tetrahedron + octahedron). As tessellations are to
area, so space-filling is to volume.

A point of these lessons is we're free to take any of these areal
or volumetric shapes as our unit. At that point, it's the fixed
ratio between our unit and other shapes that will allow us to compute
a specific area or volume made from these shapes (or fractional
parts thereof).

For example, this shape would have a volume of 2 in our canonical
system, as it's made from the volume 4 octahedron, less what we call
A-modules, six per each face (6 x 8 = 48, 48 * (1/24) = 2, 4 - 2 = 2).

http://www.flickr.com/photos/17157315@N00/4207163375/in/set-72157622797118549/

The analogy with currencies, other units of measure, is apropos. We
might speak of conversion factors, going from dollars to yen, or
from acres to hectares.

I've not given myself a lot of time to work on these kinds of lessons.
My focus has been the end goal, a volumes table that triggers new
gestalts, new ways of looking, mainly by streamlining and
concentrating information into newly memorable forms (what a well
designed curriculum is supposed to do).

If the philosophers think what we're doing is OK, i.e. passes enough
tests for being coherent, not breaking the rules, then math teachers
might feel comfortable enough to develop a lot more bridging
exercises. This means unleashing their creativity and going to town
(idiom) on some interesting material. But we won't get much of this
help without buy in.

I'm not certain that philosophy is the bottleneck here, but it might
be. The philosophy of mathematics intersects with the history of
ideas. Lots of ideas connect here. I'd argue it's difficult to tell
the story of recent intellectual history without touching on these
threads. Hugh Kenner's 'The Pound Era' is a case in point, a work in
the humanities connecting writers around Ezra Pound. Norman O. Brown
also patches in here. Both authors admire and quote Bucky Fuller.
Actually, Hugh wrote a whole biography ('Bucky') plus 'Geodesic Math
and How to Use It'. The recent 'King of Infinite Space' by Siobhan
Roberts advances the narrative further. I think we're talking about
somewhat unavoidable content for many brands of literature majors.
This will likely make waves in philosophy too then (already has).

Of course this all might be a complete misreading of the intellectual
landscape on my part. That's another conversation I yearn to have
with history of ideas people, even here on this list. Let's compare
notes and see what holds water...

FYI here's a Youtube showing some action:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWANBOvq8kw

The theme here is going from 90-degree to 60-degree based modeling
based on the analogy of 90 and 60 degree clock relationships, like
going from 3 o'clock (90) to 2 o'clock (60).

> Also, with squares, we also have the ability to form rectangles, n
x m, which obey the same rule of multiplication and exhibit the other
aspects mentioned above. What is an "n x m" triangle, where n does
not equal m? And can n x m still be multiplied?
>
> One of the colored graphics you showed previously does show how
this works, but it is not really analogous to the "n x n" triangle in
the way that the n x m rectangle is analogous to the n x n square.
>

It sort of is if you think of a parallelogram and how it has the
same triangular area on both sides of a diagonal. We have two
transformations to consider: slanting a rectangle, slicing off one
of the mirror images. This is our "currency conversion" operation
(slant, slice).

> To put it in your terms (?), the "n x n" when speaking of triangles
belongs to a different "namespace". Or rather, the relationship
between the arithmetic operation and the pictures is not the same
here as it is with the square. That's not because the later is the
"correct" picture or because the triangles are "sophistry", as your
Midwestern interlocutor might have it, but just because the
connection between the operation and the square involves more than
just the fact that you can count the squares along each edge and
multiply them to arrive at the same total as counting all of the
squares within the larger square.
>
> He is right to object to "it means the same here", though he offers
no clear grounds that I can see.
>

What I hear you saying is it's important to acknowledge a "change in
meaning" here and not simply say "these two pictures communicate the
same thing". Neither picture makes the other wrong, it's possible to
go back and forth, and mathematics is open to both.

Your use of "namespace" seems apropos to me, is how I would use it
as well. These are different namespaces, like different countries,
and we'll want to keep them distinct, somewhat apart. Trying to
play by both sets of rules at the same time is unnecessarily
confusing.

Your advise matches my own intuitions and explains why I've recently
chosen to package my volumes table as "Martian Mathematics" (i.e.
math from Mars). That's supposed to add to the fun quotient, but not
in a cheap and silly way. We've identified some good reasons to put
some distance between the paradigms.

Speaking of which, another aspect of recent intellectual history is
all this talk of "paradigms" (since Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of
Scientific Revolutions' especially). One could argue that having
these two "paradigms" (or "namespaces") smack dab in the middle of
some math classes is going to give students better purchase, an
easier handle on, the cultural discourse of our day.

Does this sound like a lot of empty hype I wonder? To me it's like
a no brainer that this is true.

> But if I've helped you see what would be good grounds for that
objection, perhaps by pointing out the differences as well as the
similarities, such conflicts can be averted.
>
> I have no objection, provided
> > we're free to
> > establish / explore a logically permitted alternative in
> > some
> > lessons. We want to keep using that concentric
> > hierarchy with its
> > volumes table.
>
> Certainly! I have no objections to any of this!
> >
>
> JPDeMouy
>

Kirby

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6.1.

Re: SWM: our 4 options

Posted by: "BruceD" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 4:10 pm (PST)




Version:1.0 StartHTML:0000000105 EndHTML:0000006582
StartFragment:0000002328 EndFragment:0000006546
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:

> I am not arguing for physicalism though I acknowledge that I accept a
physicalist viewpoint de facto

which amounts to the same thing, i..e, you take it for granted...

> that this way of thinking about the universe seems to work all
right...

because you identify physicalism with physics, I don't. I read physics
as making no ontological claim about any primary or unitary substance,
and THAT is what works for me. Do you see the distinction between an
ontological physicalism (the claim that the universe consists of X and
only X vs the position that certain descriptions prove their work.

> I see no mind-body problem,

But you recognize that others do, of course, You think that the problem
is an artifact for "unfortunate" thinking So you claim...

> if mind can be understood as an outcome of what is physical and I
think it can. The problem only occurs if we believe it cannot..

Of course. You believe it can be understood of an outcome of the
physical, as physicalists have for centuries and I, along with lots of
others of various persuasions feel you cannot defend your claim. In a
nutshell, that's the B/M problem. Your solution is ontological
physicalism, Chalmer's is Dualism -- which I find misguided because it
treats the B/M problem as if it were empirical, he posits another
natural force. In a sense, Chalmer's Dualism is a variation of
physicalism, just an added principle. My solution is sufficiently
different that is it difficult to compare with physicalism and Dualism.
Let's see if I can show you where my thinking diverges. For starters,
I'm a stickler for stating the problem as clearly as possible.

> If we are studying the universe in terms of the phenomena it contains,
then minds are among such phenomena...

Mind, as such, on its own, isn't a phenomena, the way rocks and water
are. The phenomena are "a person thinking or behaving."

> it is sensible...to ask (and try to answer) how it is minds come
about.

Re-worded. It's sensible to ask under what conditions a person becomes
conscious, thinks, is in pain, etc.

> But this isn't about our learning what words mean ...

Yes and No. The above questions are not about what words mean but how
people work. But to ask the same question while leaving out the critical
term "person", is about recalling how we learned to use the phrase
"become aware", etc.

> the question about brains' relations to minds is manifestly empirical.

Yes and No. The empirical questions concern the conditions for a person
to think, etc. The conceptual question is whether we can give a strictly
causal account, i.e., without reference to an intentional person who
mediates the causation. You try to avoid this intentional agent. You
write?

> We associate certain words with certain experiences beCAUSE

> we learn to do that in learning the language. That's one kind of
"cause".

But "because" is not a scientific cause. I write to you because
you have an interesting mind. But there is no causation here. I need
not. Also, you write "we associate"?You've placed an
intentional agent in a causal chain. Not cricket.

> There are lots of uses for "cause"

Yes. And in doing so we can inadvertently mix strict causes with
intentional reasons.

Physics can't tolerate that, not to speak of physicalism.

So, in a sense, I agree with you that the B/M problem is an artifact.
Whereas you seem to think it is due a failure to stick with an empirical
physical account, I think it is due to forcing a certain time of
empirical account, causal, on a area of study that wouldn't tolerate it.

bruce

6.2.

Re: SWM: our 4 options

Posted by: "SWM" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 6:44 pm (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:

>
> Version:1.0 StartHTML:0000000105 EndHTML:0000006582
> StartFragment:0000002328 EndFragment:0000006546
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > I am not arguing for physicalism though I acknowledge that I accept a
> physicalist viewpoint de facto
>
> which amounts to the same thing, i..e, you take it for granted...
>

Not the same thing at all because the argument for this view of consciousness is not an argument FOR physicalism but only for an account of mind that is consistent with physicalism. Since I view the metaphysical position of physicalism (or any other metaphysical position) as beyond reslolution by argument (at best we can show, philosophically, what our underlying metaphysical stances are), it is a mistake to confuse my argument about how consciousness can be understood with an argument about the nature of the world, the universe and everything.

Moreover it should be obvious that, even IF consciousness can be accounted for in physicalistic terms, as I believe it can THAT would still be NO argument that physicalism is, itself, right. Nor have I claimed it would be.

> > that this way of thinking about the universe seems to work all
> right...
>
> because yo identify physicalism with physics, I don't. I read physics
> as making no ontological claim about any primary or unitary substance,

Neither do I. If you think I do, you are mistaking my view for a metaphysical thesis of physicalism. Note that I distinguish my view as a stance, not a thesis, because I do not claim to be able to present a rational and arguable account that makes the case for physicalism (nor do I think anyone else can). It is just one way we have of seeing the world and, from my experience, it is the best way until proven otherwise. And by "proven otherwise" I have in mind empirical information which is not in accord with a physicalist stance.

Note that, as I've said numerous times, I can conceive of circumstances in which a dualist or even an idealist account would do a better job but they all involve situations where the world acts somewhat differently than anything that has currently been demonstrated to be the case, e.g., the occurrence of free floating minds, the failure of physical phenomena to act as they are expected to act given our ordinary expectations, etc.

> ontological physicalism (the claim that the universe consists of X and
> only X vs the position that certain descriptions prove their work.
>

And yet you persist in supposing that the mental is another order of existence?

> > I see no mind-body problem,
>
> But you recognize that others do, of course, You think that the problem
> is an artifact for "unfortunate" thinking So you claim...
>

Yes.

> > if mind can be understood as an outcome of what is physical and I
> think it can. The problem only occurs if we believe it cannot..
>
> Of course. You believe it can be understood of an outcome of the
> physical,

Yes.

>as physicalists have for centuries

No, as Dennett's model lays out which is rather new. Philosophers of a metaphysical bent have made lots of claims over the centuries. But Dennett's view should not be confused with that because he is not making a metaphysical claim.

> and I, along with lots of
> others of various persuasions feel you cannot defend your claim.

Yes. If we took a vote on this or other lists we have both posted on I'm sure I would get far fewer votes than a view like yours. (The anecdotal evidence is already in on that!) But, of course, being right or wrong on matters like this is not a function of polling.

> In a
> nutshell, that's the B/M problem.

I didn't say some people, maybe even the majority of philosophically inclined people, don't believe there is a mind-body problem. They manifestly do. I am just saying that they do so out of a certain amount of confusion (because, as I have frequently said) they are seduced by one of the intuitions we have, i.e., that minds are fundamentally different and apart from the physical reality of our world. As with all such issues, the matter of being right or being clear isn't resolved by taking a vote!

> Your solution is ontological
> physicalism,

No. My solution is to ignore the ontological arguments and focus on the conceptual issue of what we mean when we use words like "consciousness", "mind," "subjective", etc.

> Chalmer's is Dualism -- which I find misguided because it
> treats the B/M problem as if it were empirical, he posits another
> natural force.

You know, he could be right. It's just that there is no evidence for it and no reason to look for evidence of such a force BECAUSE the "hard problem" he posits as its basis is dependent on the mind-body problem and, if THAT can be dissolved, as I think it can, there is no longer a "hard problem"! Of course, I have been arguing for a way to see consciousness that does dissolve the mind-body problem!

>In a sense, Chalmer's Dualism is a variation of
> physicalism, just an added principle.

Well he does consider himself a naturalistic dualist, aiming to place his additional principle in the context of everything else needed to account for the world as we find it.

> My solution is sufficiently
> different that is it difficult to compare with physicalism and Dualism.

Yes, yours is to claim it's simply unintelligible to attempt to talk about the existential dependence of minds on brains but that, itself, I submit, is what is unintelligible and the very intelligible work of people like Dehaene demonstrates that. After all, if Dehaene's work is intelligible, what you claim is unintelligible cannot be so.

> Let's see if I can show you where my thinking diverges. For starters,
> I'm a stickler for stating the problem as clearly as possible.
>

Good for you. Me too!

> > If we are studying the universe in terms of the phenomena it contains,
> then minds are among such phenomena...
>
> Mind, as such, on its own, isn't a phenomena, the way rocks and water
> are. The phenomena are "a person thinking or behaving."
>

I didn't say they were "phenomena" in the same way. They are phenomena the way cities are phenomena, and baseball games and thoughts and intentional actions. Note that I have made it a point of saying that I am NOT talking about anything that is entity-like the way such things as rocks and trees and their various physical properties are entity-like. But there are many phenomena in the universe that we would not call an entity. A hurricane is a phenomenon. So is an electromagnetic field. And so forth.

I have made the point that we have to recognize that language must be seen to operate differently in different spheres. Yet you seem to forget the many times I've said that!

> > it is sensible...to ask (and try to answer) how it is minds come
> about.
>
> Re-worded. It's sensible to ask under what conditions a person becomes
> conscious, thinks, is in pain, etc.
>

I can live with that. But the underlying issues remain the same.

> > But this isn't about our learning what words mean ...
>
> Yes and No. The above questions are not about what words mean but how
> people work.

Right, including how brains do what they do to produce some of the features we recognize as being part of what it means to be a person.

> But to ask the same question while leaving out the critical
> term "person", is about recalling how we learned to use the phrase
> "become aware", etc.
>

I never left it out. My question simply addresses the issue of how what it is we call a person comes to be in a physical body. A corpse is not a person after all but it is still a physical body! You seem to feel more comfortable restricting our talk to talk about persons and this is fine on one level, I suppose, maybe on the level of the kind of psychology you are engaged in. But not everyone has such a limited interest. Dehaene, for instance, isn't interested in discovering how persons make persons but how brains do what they do to produce what it is we call persons and so he naturally has to look further, beyond your kind of psychology.

> > the question about brains' relations to minds is manifestly empirical.
>
>
>
> Yes and No. The empirical questions concern the conditions for a person
> to think, etc.

I suspect you are broadly construing "conditions" which I think is misleading, even to yourself. It makes it seem like you are denying the existentially dependent relation minds have to brains and yet, when push comes to shove, you don't want to deny the value of research like Dehaene's as you have already told us.

So you somehow manage to convince yourself that you have come up with a DIFFERENT relation, one that isn't, shall we say (with Searle), "causal". But that is just to play around with your terms. In the end, if you recognize the value and point of what Dehaene is engaged in, then it doesn't matter whether you embrace the term "causal" or want to call it "conditions" except insofar as you and those reading you are likely to confuse that use of "conditions" with the one that talks about, say, a clear day with a strong wind as being the right set of conditions for sailing!

Would you want to say the brain is to the features we call consciousness as a clear day with a good wind are to sailing? And if you do think you can make such a claim, think about the uses more carefully. The cause of the sailing is that the sailor decided to take advantage of the clement weather to put out to sea, etc. Where is the sailor who decides to be conscious when the brain's "weather" is right?

> The conceptual question is whether we can give a strictly
> causal account, i.e., without reference to an intentional person who
> mediates the causation. You try to avoid this intentional agent. You
> write?
>

Intentional causation is not the same as physical causation. Think about the missing sailor here!

> > We associate certain words with certain experiences beCAUSE
>
> > we learn to do that in learning the language. That's one kind of
> "cause".
>
>
>
> But "because" is not a scientific cause.

I didn't say it was. I gave you an example of how "cause" gets used in a multiplicity of ways, in keeping with Wittgenstein's notion to look to our uses.

> I write to you because
> you have an interesting mind. But there is no causation here. I need
> not.

Or you write because you decide to, so you are the cause the message I am responding to has shown up on the Internet and is now accessible by me for reading and answering!

>Also, you write "we associate"?You've placed an
> intentional agent in a causal chain. Not cricket.
>

What use of "associate" troubles you? Can you give us the precise context in which you say I used the term?

>
>
> > There are lots of uses for "cause"
>
>
>
> Yes. And in doing so we can inadvertently mix strict causes with
> intentional reasons.
>

And I am saying you mix up your "causes" continuously, arguing that to speak of cause must be to speak of events like those that occur on the billiard table and totally disregarding my point about the wetness of water and how science certainly can give an account of the wetness as being caused by the phenomena we have frequently talked about here! "Cause" does not have just one application, one use, in our lexicon. Why do you insist on treating it that way?

> Physics can't tolerate that, not to speak of physicalism.
>

I am not speaking of physicalism which isn't germane to the argument about the ways we can conceive of consciousness.

>
>
>
> So, in a sense, I agree with you that the B/M problem is an artifact.
> Whereas you seem to think it is due a failure to stick with an empirical
> physical account,

No, I think it is due to a failure to see that one doesn't need to posit anything special, anything non-physical at bottom, to account for the occurrence of mind.

> I think it is due to forcing a certain time of
> empirical account, causal, on a area of study that wouldn't tolerate it.
>
>
>
>
> bruce
>

So Dehaene isn't engaged in an empirical research project? Perhaps you want to make THAT case? Or be the one to tell him?

SWM

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7a.

Re: Oh! So It's Common Ground You Want?

Posted by: "BruceD" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 4:26 pm (PST)




--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:

> My only point is that, if consciousness CAN be explained in a way that
is consistent with a physicalist account of the way things are,

To say: That C can be explained in a way consistent with physics (a
position I inhabit) is not to say that C can be explained, in its
entirety, by physical laws ( a position I reject). Simply put, there is
enough room in my philosophy for different kinds of accounts.

> the fact that there is consciousness does not require a rejection of
physicalism

If you hold to the physical generation of consciousness. As you say...

> Dennett does NOT deny experience, he only explains it, via reduction,
to something else (something physical).

But the only examples we have of reduction (Dehaene) are co-relational,
not causal; and, as I've repeatedly point out, you insert an intentional
agent in the middle of the causation--- just listen to this phrase.

> questions of how brains do minds.

Do brains do minds the way we do lunch?

bruce

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7b.

Oh! So It's Common Ground You Want?

Posted by: "Joseph Polanik" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 4:29 pm (PST)



SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>SWM wrote:

>>>My only point is that, if consciousness CAN be explained in a way
>>>that is consistent with a physicalist account of the way things are,
>>>then there is no reason to suppose a different account of the way
>>>things are is needed because consciousness is present in the
>>>universe.

>>your position assumes that there is one and only one physicalist
>>account of the way things are; and, that assumption is false.

>It does not make any such assumption. It merely makes a proposal based
>on any of a number of possible related physicalist accounts. It is not
>dependent on some particular variation because it is not dependent on
>any such account at all.

>I will try this again: THE PROPOSAL IS ONLY ABOUT HOW CONSCIOUSNESS
>MIGHT WORK IN A WAY THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH A PHYSICALIST ACCOUNT.

I will also try this again: there is more than one physicalist account.

they all make the same predictions for currently performable physics
experiments; but, they make different claims about wave-function
collapse and consciousness. consequently, it is appropriate to ask
whether your account of consciousness is consistent with an
interpretation of QM that makes claims (about wave-function collapse and
consciousness) with which your theory of consciousness is compatible.

>I really don't know how to make this point any clearer. You are arguing
>the wrong issue with me insofar as you want to insist that this is
>about whether physicalism in some form is a true account or not.

as long as we let physicists define physicalism, it is clear that
physicalism in some form is true. the problem is that we don't know
which version is true.

>>>My argument that we can account for it hinges on examining the
>>>various features we recognize as part of what it means to be
>>>conscious and determining to what extent they are explicable as
>>>operations performed by physical processes

>>your argument is, therefore, falsifiable by finding at least one
>>'feature' of consciousness that can not be explained as an operation
>>performed by physical processes.

>Yes indeed, and I have always said so.

>>the crucial feature for the physics of consciousness is the ability
>>(if there is such an ability) to collapse the wave function. if
>>consciousness is required to collapse the wave function; then,
>>consciousness can not be an operation performed by a physical process
>>because (according to the von Neumann Interpretation) something
>>non-physical is required to collapse the wave function.

>If you want to assert that "collapsing the wave function" is the
>missing link which is 1) a critical feature of consciousness and 2)
>irreducible to the phenomena of physics, then the onus is on you to
>describe this collapse of the wave function as a feature of our minds,
>point out to us where we will find it, and explain how it is
>irreducible as you say.

in between measurements, quantum particles do not have definite values
for those properties that are called dynamic properties. the act of
measurement forces the particle to take on a single definite value for
the property being measured.

in between measurements, no one can say what the value will be if
measured at any particular moment; the math only predicts the
probability of the various possible outcomes. these probabilities are
represented by a wave function. so the act of measurement is said to
collapse the wave function from a range of possible outcomes to a single
definite outcome --- the value actually observed.

>I would, indeed, be most interested to read your response to these
>questions as this is an intriguing challenge to the possibillity of
>Dennett's model.

>Note, however, that the issue we're now addressing is not whether
>physicalism (or some form of it) is true or not (which you wrongly
>raise above) but whether some feature that IS present in the universe
>AND IS CONNECTED WITH WHAT IT MEANS TO BE CONSCIOUS is such that it is
>outside all the rest of the phenomena of the physical universe and so
>cannot be reduced to any other phenomenon or feature of the universe.

von Neumann showed that dividing the physical universe into a classical
and a quantum component is completely arbitrary. he showed that you
could subject the entire physical universe to the Schrodinger equation
and it would still accurately predict the results of any physicsts
experiment.

but you would need something not subject to the Schrodinger equation (ie
something non-physical) to collapse the wave function.

von Neumann postulated that the collapse was accomplished by the
'abstraktes Ich' --- the experimenter's abstract 'I'.

it is this postulate of the von Neumann Interpretation of QM that is
incompatible with physicalist accounts of consciousness.

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

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7c.

Re: SWM on multiple causation and tangible effects.

Posted by: "BruceD" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 4:55 pm (PST)




CAUSATION

Single vs. Multiple brain areas: My critique of the causal model of conscious is not addressed by claiming that not one brain area.
That consciousness is supported by multiple areas, and the specific areas be shown is a significant neurological contribution, as in Dehaene's work, but irrelevant to my critique.

Alarm clock rings. Brain reacts, causally. That reaction is correlated with "I becoming conscious." The brain reaction can cause "that entity over there to physically move, make noises, etc. but the brain cant cause me to become conscious. Why?

1. There is no "me" in the causal chain.
2. The brain reaction is simultaneous with "I become conscious." No separate cause and effect.

#1 and #2 hold no matter how many brain sites are involved.

Tangibility: You say I'm mistakenly asking for a tangle effect. Consciousness is intangible. But...

1. Scientific concept of causation demands tangible effects in order to demonstrate causation. The effect must be objectively detectable. And consciousness can be objectified for study. Alarm clock scenario.

Rings. The person stirs. Observers can detect awakening. The awakening subject can be questioned. Responses can be graded for wakefulness. All this is tangible. But what is causally related to what?

We have the same problem as above. The alarm is causally related to the brain changes through a material medium but "awakening"is what a person does and there is no where to place the person in the causal chain.

Studies of deep meditation has shown how some subjects can react on the brain level to sound but not on the physiological one. That a person is not equivalent to his brain does mean that he is a spirit over and above his brain. Rather, it shows that what we mean by person can't be reduced to any set of physical events.

Again, an example of an emergent account.

bruce

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7d.

Re: SWM on multiple causation and tangible effects.

Posted by: "J" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 6:30 pm (PST)



BD,

This is a muddle. (So is much else in this thread but this muddle may be more briefly addressed.)

> Studies of deep meditation has shown how some subjects can
> react on the brain level to sound but not on the
> physiological one.

Does the brain not count as "physiology"? Surely, we do speak of "neurophysiology".

I take it you are referring to various studies of alpha blocking and habituation phenomena in meditation subjects. The studies of this nature that I've encountered describe different patterns of activation in different parts of the brain. Notably, a response of disturbance followed by "tuning out" in non meditators was contrasted with one of continued passive awareness. But this was correlated with activity in different parts of the brain, all of which are rightly counted as subjects for physiology.

JPDeMouy

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7e.

Re: Oh! So It's Common Ground You Want?

Posted by: "SWM" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 6:59 pm (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:

>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > My only point is that, if consciousness CAN be explained in a way that
> is consistent with a physicalist account of the way things are,
>
> To say: That C can be explained in a way consistent with physics (a
> position I inhabit) is not to say that C can be explained, in its
> entirety, by physical laws ( a position I reject). Simply put, there is
> enough room in my philosophy for different kinds of accounts.
>

I agree that it is possible to conceive of consciousness in more than one way and that not all the ways are necessarily going to be consistent with physical laws. (After all, I am on record as saying some form of dualism could be true.) But I am arguing that as long as we CAN conceive of consciousness as consistent with physical laws as we currently understand them, there is no reason to posit anything else in order to account for it.

> > the fact that there is consciousness does not require a rejection of
> physicalism
>
> If you hold to the physical generation of consciousness. As you say...
>

> > Dennett does NOT deny experience, he only explains it, via reduction,
> to something else (something physical).
>

> But the only examples we have of reduction (Dehaene) are co-relational,
> not causal;

Go back and read what he wrote again. (No, I am NOT going to post it yet again.) Assuming that at some point you will grasp that by "cause" I do not mean one physical event producing another physical event, you may yet get the point!

> and, as I've repeatedly point out, you insert an intentional
> agent in the middle of the causation--- just listen to this phrase.
>
> > questions of how brains do minds.
>
> Do brains do minds the way we do lunch?
>
> bruce

Dear, dear, dear Bruce. You don't like it when I say "cause", you don't like it when I say "produce" and you don't want to agree to my point that it's just about an existentially dependent relation of minds on brains (a much more complex locution). So naturally I try other terms. And just as naturally you deny them, too. In essence you are arguing for your beloved claim of "unintelligibility" by stipluating it since you will not accept any locution in any context with any explanation. Of course, if you simply pronounce no usages adequate, then by default you have made all "unintelligible". But unintelligibility doesn't come from stipulations. It must be shown that what is being said can make no sense. Nor can you show this by simple declaration either.

How are we to know then when anything really is "unintelligible"? Well, sometimes we know because we can all agree ("t'was brillig in the slithy tove") but sometimes we don't agree and then it comes down to seeing it I suppose. But to a certain extent we can give evidence of intelligibility or its lack. For instance, it isn't hard to understand what Dehaene is talking about or what his project entails. So he is not being unintelligible when he says that the global interactions of various parts of the brain performing certain functions in tandem and in a linked way just IS what he thinks consciousness (awareness in this case since, note, he is speaking of access consciousness explicitly) is. But if you think he is being unintelligible can you make a case for it beyond asserting your own lack of comprehension (assuming you want to say you don't understand what he is saying)?

SWM

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7f.

Re: Oh! So It's Common Ground You Want?

Posted by: "SWM" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 7:16 pm (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>

>
> >I will try this again: THE PROPOSAL IS ONLY ABOUT HOW CONSCIOUSNESS
> >MIGHT WORK IN A WAY THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH A PHYSICALIST ACCOUNT.
>
> I will also try this again: there is more than one physicalist account.
>
> they all make the same predictions for currently performable physics
> experiments; but, they make different claims about wave-function
> collapse and consciousness. consequently, it is appropriate to ask
> whether your account of consciousness is consistent with an
> interpretation of QM that makes claims (about wave-function collapse and
> consciousness) with which your theory of consciousness is compatible.
>

And my point has nothing to do with how many physicalist theories there are. It has to do with whether one can offer a comprehensive comprehensible account of consciousness as physically derived. It is not to make ANY kind of case FOR physicalism but only to make the case that one CAN account for consciousness in physicalist terms. There is a huge difference here between what you are arguing against above and what I am saying.

However, elsewhere I believe you have raised a related but more significant issue and I have asked for your further elucidation. That is, IF you think it can be shown that there is a feature of consciousness that is what you call "collapsing the wave function", you need to show what it is and just what you mean. If you can show that there is some feature of consciousness that is essential to an account of consciousness but is not explainable as physically derived, then you COULD make your case. But now the ball is in your court.

What is this "collapsing the wave function" you are alluding to, where is it to be found among the features of consciousness and why is it irreducible to anything physical?

> >I really don't know how to make this point any clearer. You are arguing
> >the wrong issue with me insofar as you want to insist that this is
> >about whether physicalism in some form is a true account or not.
>
> as long as we let physicists define physicalism, it is clear that
> physicalism in some form is true. the problem is that we don't know
> which version is true.
>

My point has nothing to do with which, if any, are true. It's only about a way of conceiving of consciousness. It's purely a conceptual question. (In Wittgensteinian terms, it's about how we use words like "consciousness", "mind", etc.)

<snip>
>
> >If you want to assert that "collapsing the wave function" is the
> >missing link which is 1) a critical feature of consciousness and 2)
> >irreducible to the phenomena of physics, then the onus is on you to
> >describe this collapse of the wave function as a feature of our minds,
> >point out to us where we will find it, and explain how it is
> >irreducible as you say.
>

> in between measurements, quantum particles do not have definite values
> for those properties that are called dynamic properties. the act of
> measurement forces the particle to take on a single definite value for
> the property being measured.
>

> in between measurements, no one can say what the value will be if
> measured at any particular moment; the math only predicts the
> probability of the various possible outcomes.

Yes, I'm familiar with this part. How does this become relevant to a claim about consciousness, i.e., a measuring subject? Why should a measuring subject not be a function of physical behavior of brains even if there is uncertainty in measuring on a quantum level?

> these probabilities are
> represented by a wave function. so the act of measurement is said to
> collapse the wave function from a range of possible outcomes to a single
> definite outcome --- the value actually observed.
>

So far so good. Now say why this means that a measuring agent, a consciousness, cannot be physically derived, even absent the ability to obtain precise measurements on a quantum level?

> >I would, indeed, be most interested to read your response to these
> >questions as this is an intriguing challenge to the possibillity of
> >Dennett's model.
>
> >Note, however, that the issue we're now addressing is not whether
> >physicalism (or some form of it) is true or not (which you wrongly
> >raise above) but whether some feature that IS present in the universe
> >AND IS CONNECTED WITH WHAT IT MEANS TO BE CONSCIOUS is such that it is
> >outside all the rest of the phenomena of the physical universe and so
> >cannot be reduced to any other phenomenon or feature of the universe.
>

> von Neumann showed that dividing the physical universe into a classical
> and a quantum component is completely arbitrary. he showed that you
> could subject the entire physical universe to the Schrodinger equation
> and it would still accurately predict the results of any physicsts
> experiment.
>

Describe the Schrodinger equation please.


> but you would need something not subject to the Schrodinger equation (ie
> something non-physical) to collapse the wave function.
>

So the Schrodinger equation is your key? In that case you need to explain how this equation works and why it is relevant to a question of whether consciousness can be physically derived from the behavior of brains?


> von Neumann postulated that the collapse was accomplished by the
> 'abstraktes Ich' --- the experimenter's abstract 'I'.
>

And what is an "abstract I"? I know what I mean by "I" in a variety of cases. What do you or von Neumann mean by an "abstract I" and how does it differ from any other "I"?

> it is this postulate of the von Neumann Interpretation of QM that is
> incompatible with physicalist accounts of consciousness.
>
> Joe
>

Yes, I have seen this before but you have to do more than simply repeat this particular claim. You have to show why in your view, or von Neumann's, it "is incompatible". You can't expect me, a non-physicist to take it on faith can you? If this is meaningful it can be translated into ordinary language so that the ideas can be considered here. It is very easy to offer claims in a kind of insulated language (a specialized jargon, say), but that does not get at the issue which is to convey the meaning of your points in order to make your case.

I hope you are willing to take this to the next level as I think you've presented the beginnings of an interesting challenge to the Dennettian model and I would like to see how that model stands up to such criticism. Thanks.

SWM

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7g.

Re: SWM on multiple causation and tangible effects.

Posted by: "SWM" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sun Dec 27, 2009 7:31 pm (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:

>
> CAUSATION
>
> Single vs. Multiple brain areas: My critique of the causal model of conscious is not addressed by claiming that not one brain area.
> That consciousness is supported by multiple areas, and the specific areas be shown is a significant neurological contribution, as in Dehaene's work, but irrelevant to my critique.
>

> Alarm clock rings. Brain reacts, causally. That reaction is correlated with "I becoming conscious." The brain reaction can cause "that entity over there to physically move, make noises, etc. but the brain cant cause me to become conscious. Why?
>
> 1. There is no "me" in the causal chain.

Different use of "cause". See the wetness-of-water model.

> 2. The brain reaction is simultaneous with "I become conscious." No separate cause and effect.
>

That you can discern, eh? But even neuroscientists like Dehaene recognize there are minute delays in brain operations which are too small for us to be aware of. Hawkins also notes that brains take a much longer time than computers to accomplish their tasks. So the similtaneity you are alluding to may be (and probably is) no more than an artifact. On the Dennett model it is reasonable to suppose that consciousness scales up with increasing involvement of different systems, hence the idea that consciousness, even wthin an individual, happens on a kind of contimuum.

> #1 and #2 hold no matter how many brain sites are involved.
>

See above.

> Tangibility: You say I'm mistakenly asking for a tangle effect. Consciousness is intangible. But...
>

> 1. Scientific concept of causation demands tangible effects in order to demonstrate causation. The effect must be objectively detectable. And consciousness can be objectified for study. Alarm clock scenario.
>

Behaviors of persons and of their brains plus reports all amount to tangible effects, though they are tangible in somewhat different ways (in keeping with the two-sides-of-the-same-coin model). And, of course, when I was referring to "tangible" it was in relation to the use of a term like "properties" and thus meant something else, i.e., certain kinds of physical characteristics or features like color, texture, shape, mass, extension, etc. The initial confusion in your use that I was noting had to do with the way you were using "properties" (or it might have had to do with the way Joe was, and you picked up on it -- at this point I am not quite sure). Bottom line though, you are now using "tangible" in different ways than I was using it when I first invoked that term.

This is how we go round and round in circles! One usage slides into another and pretty soon we're talking about different things! It's a wonder philosophy ever manages to get anything done.

> Rings. The person stirs. Observers can detect awakening. The awakening subject can be questioned. Responses can be graded for wakefulness. All this is tangible. But what is causally related to what?
>

The causal relation I am referring to, and have been for all this time, is the fact that persons don't respond if their brains don't act in certain ways. In simple terms, the behavior of his or her brain leads to the behavior of the person.

> We have the same problem as above. The alarm is causally related to the brain changes through a material medium but "awakening"is what a person does and there is no where to place the person in the causal chain.
>

If the brain doesn't act in a certain way the person doesn't awaken. This is pretty rudimentary I should think.

> Studies of deep meditation has shown how some subjects can react on the brain level to sound but not on the physiological one. That a person is not equivalent to his brain does mean that he is a spirit over and above his brain.

I presume you mean "does not"?

>Rather, it shows that what we mean by person can't be reduced to any set of physical events.
>

Your example above about studies of deep meditation certainly shows no such thing. What is there about it that would lead you to draw such a shaky conclusion?

> Again, an example of an emergent account.
>
> bruce
>
>

You mean as wetness emerges on our level of observation from the behavior of the molecules of water on an atomic level under certain ambient conditions?

You really can't let go of this picture of minds and brains as separate, albeit in a fashion you think cannot be linguistically characterized, can you?

SWM

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