[Wittrs] Re: On Wittgenstein and Behaviorism
- From: Glen Sizemore <gmsizemore2@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2009 14:28:09 -0700 (PDT)
--- On Sun, 9/20/09, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: [Wittrs] On Wittgenstein and Behaviorism
> To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Date: Sunday, September 20, 2009, 9:26 PM
> Glen:
>
> 1. All that you are doing is presenting an argument for
> reification that is masquerading as a Wittgenstein notion.
> The idea would be that something would have to be physically
> present for it to be spoken of.
I suppose it is possible to maintain this interpretation of what I have written
- but that would entail misunderstanding, ignoring, or misrepresenting what I
wrote. Reification plays only a small role in what I wrote.
>The latter Wittgenstein
> would never entertain such an idea. You are going to have
> to shed the reification talk if you ever want to be a
> black-belt Wittgensteinian.
Wittgenstein did not rely on the claim of reification to trash the sorts of
notions that you, and others, hold so dear, and I did not rely on it either. As
far as the mereological fallacy, Wittgenstein would claim it is nonsense that
the brain "sees" or "thinks"," or "decides," etc. etc. etc. etc. etc., instead
he would claim that it is nonsense given how these terms are used in ordinary
speech. I think this is abundantly clear. Also, you did not address the related
issue of your "anything goes" approach to philosophically-acceptable usage. As
I said, just because a specialized segment of neurosciences have adopted the
"brain sees, brain thinks" etc. terminology does not somehow transform it into
a sensible set of statements. It isn't. I would comment on the issue of whether
or not I am shodan with respect to Wittgenstein, but since I am moderated, I
will forego comment.
>If someone talked to Ludwig
> about "brain script," his first reaction would be to
> conjugate the grammar (to see how the expression played
> against other ways of talking in the lexicon). Note that
> this doesn't mean that cognitivists -- or behaviorists,
> for that matter -- don't have facile forms of expression,
> it just means that we must "wait and see" how the usage
> works to obtain such an answer, rather than have a rule for
> speaking.
I can't agree. I think you have a convoluted view "conjugate the grammar,"
though I can't recall Wittgenstein using the term "conjugate," but I could be
wrong. I don't think Wittgenstein would "wait and see" concerning "brain
scripts." I think that he would call it nonsense.
>
> You will note that latter-day Wittgenstein is against all
> sorts of philosophic positions because they constitute false
> problems. He's against solipsism, idealism, nominalism, etc.
> etc. -- not because he is FOR something else, but because
> they don't really present any true problems. In this sense,
> he surely would not be a proponent of
> "behaviorism." Throughout his life, he tried to make clear
> that his positions were not "behaviorist." See. e.g., PI
> 307. The reason why people might think he is has to do with
> the part of his labors that go against folk psychology and
> phenomenology. Wittgenstein won't be joining any of these
> false discussions.
Whether or not Wittgenstein would claim allegience to behaviorism is totally
beside the point. What really matters is if he said things consistent with
behaviorism, in particular Skinnerian behaviorism. I have offerred a
peer-reviewed paper that lists 10 points of commonality among BFS and LW.
>
> You can't cherry-pick your way to Wittgenstein. All of
> ideas must fit together in the head for one to "get it."
Funny, I was going to admonish your views in the same way - except I think that
your view doesn't even pick cherries. Your philosophy is run-of-the-mill
cognitivism, and you interpret everything Wittgenstein says so that it appears
to endorse your view. By the way, isn't saying that "I" cherry-pick close to a
violation of the standards to which you want to hold others?
> So, in sum, it isn't only family resemblance that you are up
> against. It is meaning as use, no true philosophic
> problems, philosophy as therapy, the idea of grammar, and
> all of that mind stuff he talks about here and there
> (especially toward the end of PI).
Needless to say, I disagree. As I said, family-resemblance does not give one
license to profer anything and everything as useful philosophical/scientific
terminology. Chemical explosions bear a family resemblance to a person becoming
angry, and we say "Bill blew up when he found that Seamus thoroughly
misrepresented Wittgenstein" (haha), but no one is likely to think that
chemical explosions shed light on emotional behavior. But when one
metaphorically extends the fact that human (actors) "follow scripts" to "brains
follow scripts," many listeners are likely to be drawn into this nonsense.
>
> 2. I often wonder if this "mereological fallacy" that you
> are speaking of isn't itself a fallacy of some sort. They
> way it is being used, one might say it is a language
> fallacy. You seem to think that only two language options
> are available: to refer to something concretely, or to speak
> poetically. Hence, you see the expression "my
> brain thinks,' as either nonsense or poetry. This is quite
> clearly Wittgenstein I, not Wittgenstein II.
Needless to say, I disagree. And I don't see it as "poetry," I see at as
obvious nonsense, and I think latter Wittgenstein would too, and so does Hacker
(for what that's worth), but I suppose we can dismiss that by saying, "He's not
a black-belt Wittgensteinian."
>
> The idea of family resemblance is that when something is
> referred to, it has any combination of properties from a
> shared array. Think of the array as a "grab bag." Let's
> assume the bag has properties, a, b, c, d, e and f. So,
> term X might mean properties a, b and c in one use; and in
> another use, it might mean a, d and f. Because of the way
> language is, the bags themselves might also work this way.
> This means that you cannot have a rule for speaking. You
> can only wait to see what is being taken from the bag and
> put in play before you can "add up" the confusion.
The mistake here is that what is important is not how or why there are
metaphorical extensions - there are - but whether or not that somehow justifies
nonsensical locutions. Again, we say that "Bill blew up..." when we see that
Bill has become angry - and this is fine for ordinary speech - but this hardly
justifies the notion that metaphors based on chemical explosions are
philosophically/scientifically useful for an analysis of emotion. They are not.
>
> So, if someone says, "the brain learns," it isn't nonsense.
Needless to say, I disagree for reasons I have already outlined.
> One would need to know what is meant here. And so long as
> identity is not being divided so that the person's grammar
> would have us say "my brain is learning while I am away," we
> don't really have any trouble.
You mean "'you' don't have any trouble." I do, and I assert that Wittgenstein
would have a problem as well. If "Johnny's brain learned to read" and "Johnny
learned to read," were identical, why the locution involving Johnny's brain?
Why would that ever arise? Why has that locution suddenly become popular? Do we
say that "Johnny's arm hit a drop shot"? Or, "Johnny's legs walked to the
store"? Or Johnny's right foot kicked a goal"? No, we do not. My fervant hope
is that you will ask youself these questions, but I am equally certain that you
will not. I think the reason is that your philosophical position is mainstream
cognitivism and, because of the prestige afforded Wittgenstein, you will force
anything he said into the mold of mainstream cognitivism. My view is that this
is exactly what you do, and you do it with great regularity.
>All we are talking about is a
> different unit of analysis of the person.
No, you are talking about the persons parts in the same language that you talk
about the whole person.
>Note that even
> this last use isn't nonsense; it is simply metaphysics.
No, it is mainstream cognitive nonsense.
>We
> would never not allow a person to state metaphysics.
> (Although, we might refer counseling if the person became
> anti-social).
Sorry, I don't "get" this.
>
> 3. My work on brain scripts is philosophical; it is not
> scientific.
Science is not as divorced from philosophy as you seem to claim. I offerred
another peer-reviewed paper that makes this point, but you have ignored it, as
you have ignored the peer-reviewed paper that points out similarities between
BFS and LW. I can understand that yet, in later postings, you offer papers that
you, apparently, wish for others to read!
>I have invented a computer syntax that explain
> the problems of meaning as use and grammar better than
> Wittgenstein did. In fact, I don't declare this issue -- I
> show it. I show how language assertion can be mirrored or
> captured by a computing syntax. Before my work will
> appear, we only have two methods available for analyzing
> language use: we diagram sentences, or we use some sort of
> symbolic logic (or modal logic).
What?!?!? Diagramming sentences and symbolic logic are about "language use"?
And...wait...you are going to tell me that that view is somehow consistent with
later Wittgenstein?!?!?
> Rather than having only a
> syntax for logic (symbolism) and for language's structure
> (diagramming sentences), I have created a new analytical
> device: a computer script for the "thoughts" of language.
> All that language thoughts are, are brain script. Rather
> than assert this, I am showing it. I am laboring to finish
> the scripts and to therefore show the confusions of
> philosophers, lawyers, political scientists -- behaviorists,
> the academy (you name it)
>
> Language only ever means what it asks a brain to do.
So if I ask someone for a glass of water, I am really "asking their brain"? And
you assert that this is somehow consistent with later Wittgenstein?
Arrrghhh,
Glen
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