[Wittrs] On Wittgenstein and Behaviorism
- From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2009 18:26:49 -0700 (PDT)
Glen:
1. All that you are doing is presenting an argument for reification that is
masquerading as a Wittgenstein notion. The idea would be that something would
have to be physically present for it to be spoken of. The latter Wittgenstein
would never entertain such an idea. You are going to have to shed the
reification talk if you ever want to be a black-belt Wittgensteinian. If
someone talked to Ludwig about "brain script," his first reaction would be to
conjugate the grammar (to see how the expression played against other ways of
talking in the lexicon). Note that this doesn't mean that cognitivists --
or behaviorists, for that matter -- don't have facile forms of expression, it
just means that we must "wait and see" how the usage works to obtain such an
answer, rather than have a rule for speaking.
You will note that latter-day Wittgenstein is against all sorts of philosophic
positions because they constitute false problems. He's against solipsism,
idealism, nominalism, etc. etc. -- not because he is FOR something else, but
because they don't really present any true problems. In this sense, he surely
would not be a proponent of "behaviorism." Throughout his life, he tried
to make clear that his positions were not "behaviorist." See. e.g., PI 307. The
reason why people might think he is has to do with the part of his labors that
go against folk psychology and phenomenology. Wittgenstein won't be joining any
of these false discussions.
You can't cherry-pick your way to Wittgenstein. All of ideas must fit together
in the head for one to "get it." So, in sum, it isn't only family resemblance
that you are up against. It is meaning as use, no true philosophic problems,
philosophy as therapy, the idea of grammar, and all of that mind stuff he talks
about here and there (especially toward the end of PI).
2. I often wonder if this "mereological fallacy" that you are speaking of isn't
itself a fallacy of some sort. They way it is being used, one might say it is a
language fallacy. You seem to think that only two language options are
available: to refer to something concretely, or to speak poetically. Hence, you
see the expression "my brain thinks,' as either nonsense or poetry. This is
quite clearly Wittgenstein I, not Wittgenstein II.
The idea of family resemblance is that when something is referred to, it
has any combination of properties from a shared array. Think of the array as a
"grab bag." Let's assume the bag has properties, a, b, c, d, e and f. So, term
X might mean properties a, b and c in one use; and in another use, it might
mean a, d and f. Because of the way language is, the bags themselves might
also work this way. This means that you cannot have a rule for speaking. You
can only wait to see what is being taken from the bag and put in play before
you can "add up" the confusion.
So, if someone says, "the brain learns," it isn't nonsense. One would need to
know what is meant here. And so long as identity is not being divided so that
the person's grammar would have us say "my brain is learning while I am away,"
we don't really have any trouble. All we are talking about is a different unit
of analysis of the person. Note that even this last use isn't nonsense; it is
simply metaphysics. We would never not allow a person to state metaphysics.
(Although, we might refer counseling if the person became anti-social).
3. My work on brain scripts is philosophical; it is not scientific. I have
invented a computer syntax that explain the problems of meaning as use and
grammar better than Wittgenstein did. In fact, I don't declare this issue -- I
show it. I show how language assertion can be mirrored or captured by
a computing syntax. Before my work will appear, we only have two methods
available for analyzing language use: we diagram sentences, or we use some sort
of symbolic logic (or modal logic). Rather than having only a syntax for logic
(symbolism) and for language's structure (diagramming sentences), I have
created a new analytical device: a computer script for the "thoughts" of
language. All that language thoughts are, are brain script. Rather than assert
this, I am showing it. I am laboring to finish the scripts and to therefore
show the confusions of philosophers, lawyers, political scientists --
behaviorists, the academy (you name it)
Language only ever means what it asks a brain to do.
Regards and thanks
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Redesigned Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
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