[Wittrs] Re: Nominalism / Sean
- From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2009 22:38:33 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> ... I'm thoroughly confused.
>
> For me to be a "computational nominalist,"
> I would have to believe that my brain computes ... what?
Well now, one has to move slowly and carefully.
I didn't really say anything at all about what
the brain computes, I'm much more about the paradigm
case of how a computer computes. In fact, I'll say
again for the record, my major concern for which I have
dived into analytic philosophy, is to learn what it is
that a computer is really all about in the first place.
But I'll try to take your questions one at a time.
> My perception? Or that it computes my language use?
Computational nominalism is, like any other -ism, much
more a set of guidelines than a specific operating manual
for perception or the brain or even your language use.
So, I guess you can be a computational nominalist and
give any of a wide variety of answers to the above.
To some degree, I suppose it will eventually require that
you commit to the brain having something to do with
perception and language use, but the details after that
have a lot of degrees of freedom.
> Why does the cat on the mat present any issue
> whatsoever other than cereal-box sort of philosophy
> (that is, an irrelevant discourse about a false
> problem)?
Now I'm confused. Is the cat being on a mat a problem,
much less a false problem? You wanted to speak at the
level of examples. I began an example with the simplest
thing I could think of, in order to make a point that
even then, an example requires some explanation to even
be an example, and does not sweep away all issues magically.
>And if I didn't believe in computational nominalism,
> it would be different from not being Muslim, HOW?
I did not address the counterfactuals of either.
If you didn't believe in grizzly bears, that would
affect your life, how? Or, chocolate bars, or your feet?
I daresay there are consequences to any or all of these,
in the proper circumstances.
>And more to the point, are you saying that if I didn't
>agree with "computational nominalism," I would be in
>violation of some scientific theory about how the
>mind works? (At least this i could begin to see the
>relevance of).
We certainly hope it gets to that point someday,
we are attempting to put together such a theory,
such that someday you may have the subjunctive
opportunity to violate it.
I'm sorry, I really assumed that that was entirely
clear in the whole context. But, I guess not,
not in any and all contexts of concern with
Wittgenstein. It is pretty much a safe assumption
in any and all talk of computational - anything.
> The discussions about what are inside or outside
> the mind are irrelevant to philosophy.
I must disagree.
I know there are some who want philosophy to be free
of science, and lord knows there are scientists who feel
the same way about philosophy.
But, unless you want to entirely fulfil Wittgenstein's
saying about philosophy being just therapy, you are
going to have to reconcile with science, material
facts, and all sorts of other real stuff.
In fact, it's hard to see how you're going to make
any very good therapy without doing all that, too.
>They present no
> real issue whatsoever. If someone is an idealist,
> they is no more here than being protestant, and the same
> goes for the "realist," who is, I suppose, Catholic in the
>simile.
We're all blind men dealing with an elephant, I suppose,
though I'm not sure that really fits what you say here.
I'm just doing what I'm doing, too, and if and when I
throw around -isms, they are meant as shortcuts, with
attendant vagueness but still hopefully setting general
directions. And I hope to read any others doing so
the same way.
And I hope it goes without saying, but let me say it as
well, whether I hint at something or bang the table and
call the cat a bastard if he disagrees, it's always,
of course, in my humble opinion.
> The only thing that matters in anything is that an
> expression not violate a condition of assertability
>and that it be useful to the lexicon.
But what could that possibly mean? Is that even
Wittgenstein talk? I'm asking. I read that and nothing
in particular jumps out at me as actionable guidelines.
> Are you writing some kind of book or something?
Plan to start with some shorter stuff, but yeah.
> FWIW, I agree with the last paragraph here.
Kewl.
>But I don't consider myself to take any allegiance
>whosoever on inner and outer or talking meaninglessly
>about the form of life as though one can logic his or
>her way out of it. And I surely don't consider myself
>any sort of "nominalist" -- not because I am not, but
>because it is foolish to construct teams around the
>idea of what language does or what "reality" is in the
>form of life. Language is what it does.
>One merely needs to watch it and see.
I don't really accept that anyone can do that.
No, I mean, you can agree with a selected paragraph
without taking an oath and putting on a uniform, but
I would think it a good thing if, after a while, the
kinds of paragraphs you find yourself agreeing with,
suggest some kind of pattern.
As soon as you express any kind of theory, you're
bridging to a dozen commitments in all directions.
To pretend you're free-floating and able to see -or-
say things in some uncommitted manner is skeptical
to the point of nihilism. Again, if your goal is
poetry, or therapy, or nirvana, then you can make it
your project to let go of things. But you leave
behind western science and philosophy, if you don't
do this in the service of putting things back together
again at some point.
Letting go is not the only way to freedom, holding
onto things is part of it, too. Unless you're Janis
Joplin, I suppose.
("freedom's just another word for,
nothing left to lose")
> portion agreed with: "So, if you want to be
>something like a computational nominalist, when someone
>asks, "Is the cat on the mat?", you can give an answer,
>because you know, sufficient for the moment, what is
>meant, and what conditions are, and how to compose a
>response. You know how to play what games there are,
>you are not afraid that a use with a meaning is somehow
>beneath your dignity, or such a metaphysical
>problem that it should not be attempted."
Just to be clear again here,
if p then q. If you want to be a computational
nominalist, then you can say stuff like this.
If not p, if you don't want to be (are not) a computational
nominalist, I don't know what you can say or what you'd
want to say. Perhaps you can say the same stuff,
that is, if you'd want to. Perhaps you'll have a whole
different story of why you'd want to say such stuff,
and if so, I'd love to hear it.
My point is, I do want to say stuff like this,
and I'm trying to work out a way that I can,
and the label "computational nominalism" seems
to fit for a certain group of stories that go in that
direction.
Josh
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