... ok. I've got it now. You want to have a scientific view that comes along to defends your view of nominalism. Since we can't seem to get the answer with "computational nominalism" -- the bun is still in the oven -- let's try it with the label that you do like, and that are already "birthed." Can you give me an example of someone being a "nominalist" with their behavior versus not being one? Let's say an Idealist and a nominalist encounter a tree. What is the difference? Isn't it purely a matter of allegiance and not fact? In fact, isn't it purely a matter of speaking? And let's say I say, "nominalism isn't true." Or let's say someone says, "realism is true." What would one do with these statements other than commit them to either irrelevance, faith, decoration or allegiance? One would no more set about to convert any position on these matters than they would make them root for another football team. Regards. Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Assistant Professor Wright State University Redesigned Website: http://seanwilson.org SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860 Twitter: http://twitter.com/seanwilsonorg Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/seanwilsonorg New Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html