[Wittrs] Re: Nominalism / Sean
- From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 05 Sep 2009 04:24:45 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> Josh:
>
> I'm not really into the name dropping ...
Sean, I am attempting to answer your questions,
but there is certainly a disconnect.
I thought I had answered, and we were clear, as
far as we could be. You said:
http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs/browse_thread/thread/4618dd3dc0d46104/f8c6dc54e607ceea?lnk=gst&q=chasing+a+scientifi
c+theory#f8c6dc54e607ceea
> Whenever you can figure it out, tell me what a
> "computational nominalist" says about the tree.
...
> If, however, you are chasing a scientific theory, then
> the matter would be different. You wouldn't have
> an example to give about the tree; you would have
> some sort of brain-process argument that exists as a
> theory in some research program that has
> such-and-such data to support the journalism.
> I don't have any issue with that.
I don't really understand that, but it sounded like
what I was doing, and that you understood it.
Not? Well, then I will try again, at length,
but at the same time let me please
ask for a clarification, if this "cereal-box
philosophy" bit is based on Wittgenstein, please point me
at the relevant quotes, and if it's not in one of
the major books, maybe some actual text.
I'm going to assume there really is some further point to
this, and that it will benefit you and/or me and/or some
other reader/lurker. Let's see.
> To illustrate the point rather than declare it, ...
(I stopped reading analytic quite a while ago, if you have a
pointer to a discussion you believe is a model, I would
appreciate a pointer to that as well.)
The tree bit sounds completely category error
to me, but let's take it slow.
Let me try to talk this out to myself.
You are asking, "what is the grammar" (in LW's terms)
"that comprises CN"?
"Why would you say, 'I believe in CN', as
opposed to 'I believe in 'XY'?"
"Why don't you just say, 'When I encounter a
tree, I do 'CN', as an 'XY' person would not?"
But Sean, I can only barely see ANY way to answer
this question. If John believes in a flat earth,
and Jane believes in a round earth, and you ask
John, "What do you do when you encounter a tree,
and if you can't answer that, isn't your 'flat earth'
theory simply a cereal-box philosophy?", then really,
does this make any sense at all? What could John
say at that point, to differentiate himself from
Jane? Yet, do they not hold different theories
that, in some other situations, might matter?
John might say, "I see the tree is on the same
plane with my feet". Jane might say, "I see the
tree is on the same sphere with my feet".
Well, OK. Does that fit your grammar?
Where I would like to go with CN is that nominalism is part -
a critical part - of a naturalized theory about why
computers are useful as computers, and the paint on Searle's
wall is not.
So, when I as a CN encounter a tree, and write a program
about it, and say:
declare t type tree;
t = new tree('this tree');
store t in mydatabase;
end;
I can then elaborate a long text on why this works.
The problem is, if Joe the Realist encounters a tree,
the observable results will look the same, except for
some explanatory linguistics.
Say Joe decides to write a program about it too,
being a good sport about this exercise,
let's say for the moment he will write exactly
the same program.
He would then elaborate a different text on why that works.
So, bottom line, on encountering a tree, no difference
that I think you would care about. (Did you care about
the John and Jane example?)
Now, it may be that, downstream, theories have
consequences. THAT is what makes them theories.
But sometimes the proof is a long time in coming,
and endlessly debatable even then. At least that is
the boat we are in regarding philosophies of mind,
computational theories of mind, and even my
very own computational theories of computation.
Let's take some established (certainly not "finished")
theories and see how it goes.
Take the evolutionary theories of Dawkins and Gould,
they disagree(d) violently on some fine details of
theory, yet if you asked each of them, "What do you
do when you encounter a tree?", I doubt you would get
any satisfaction, but would you really want to tell
them that their theories were thereby "cereal-box
philosophies", whatever that means? Dawkins would
say, "This tree evolved by chance", and Gould would
say, "This tree evolved by chance with exaptations".
Does that fit your model?
Following that, the CN could say (avoiding
the words 'computational' and 'nominalism'),
"This program works because it affects the
proper contingent, causal linguistics",
while the realist will say (avoiding the
word 'real'), "This program works because
of the correspondence between
program and tree."
In any case, the CN and the realist would have
different stories about the program about
the tree.
But, like the Dawkins/Gould case,
these are not going to be immediately judged any
further, at the tree.
I think that is the *kind* of claim you want to
hear, but does it really satisfy you?
--
Now, if you ask instead, what does the CN
do differently from the realist, when confronted
with the problem of building an AI? I'd say
the CN builds it, and the realist laughs.
But is that an answer that clarifies anything?
I'd think not.
All you're going to do is demand to see the AI.
I suppose, by some lights, you should.
But, what sort of equivalent demand would you
make of Dawkins and Gould, and how would that
work out? Poorly, I think.
That is perhaps why you suggested that
scientific theories and word games, are just not
facilitated by the same kinds of examples.
But then, I'm not sure there is any real
dividing line, and that brings us where
we are now, with me still pretty mystified
about what you could possibly be asking for.
Would you really demand of Dawkins and Gould,
"Prove your particular flavor of evolutionary
theory right here and now, or else stop using
any descriptive label for it?"
I would not.
> I had originally tried to get an example from you about "computational
> nominalism," but instead received your scientific
theory. I had then tried to get you to see that any scientific theory that
would be accurate could not also show that "nominalism wins," because there is
nothing to win in this language game.
Um, I don't think you are going to be able to show me that.
Would you want to discuss it?
> All that it is about is which aesthetic is preferred to celebrate experience
> within the form of life. It's about window dressing. Instead of hearing your
> denials of this, I had actually wanted you to discuss the example I raised.
> So if you ever do want to engage in a discussion about "who wins" when a tree
> is seen by an idealist and realist and so forth, I am always here for such
> therapy.
I keep rereading this, and each time the sense turns around.
You did not want my denials that "it is about ... which aesthetic ..."?
Lost me.
Is the therapy supposed to convince me that no scientific theory wins,
because they are all language games?
> As to the matters that you do talk about when you respond to me, I'm not up
> for them.
Don't know that I did any better for you this time,
or that it's possible to do any better.
Wittgenstein and Turing never "found a common grammar",
I suppose one might say, paradoxically. Doesn't necessarily
make one right and one wrong, could just be different games.
Though I rather favor Turing, where any choices must be made.
Vienna Circle tried to take some of Wittgenstein's ideas
into science, and that didn't really work out all that well,
but I'm not sure Wittgenstein ever proposed an alternative.
I mean other than therapy.
My computational nominalism is based on the linguistic turn,
as was Turing's OCN. I will continue to look to Wittgenstein
for hints on how that should go, and to the chasm between
Wittgenstein and Turing for how not to go.
Not sure you're interested in any of that, not sure anyone
is but me, and maybe from an orthogonal perspective, Shanker.
Though, eventually, maybe I can make it interesting to various
people, possibly even including you.
Meanwhile I appreciate the chance to trot this out on your forum,
in case anybody else makes the association from Turing
computation to Wittgenstein and comes here looking.
Josh
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