Just thoughts (of course): but both Mike's and Eric's responses are by-the-by to the kind of "objectivist" view of art I would maybe defend (and ditto re their status re Popper's approach, which is "Kantian" but a big re-write). One question is reductionism and determinism: _if_ our aesthetic responses are open to _entirely_ reductive and determininistic explanation {whether it be DNA, emotional attachment etc.} then we have no genuinely aesthetic responses in a Kantian/Popn./Wittgensteinian sense. (Anymore than if our so-called "rational" behaviour can be so explained, can it ever be properly "rational"). But who can adequately defend this reductive/deterministic view? The mere fact that DNA and/or emotional attachment might be a _partial_, indeed _mostly important_, indeed _unavoidable_ explanation falls short. Unless they are reductively and deterministically true explanations. This is where it gets interesting. Because they are not reductively and deterministically true as explanations. Saying Mozart's DNA and emotions played an important, indeed vital, role in his work is saying very little unless you mean the greater claim that his work is _entirely_ due to either (or both). And that claim is false. Of course, neither Eric nor Mike suggested otherwise: but their comments fudge the issues and a proper approach to them (imho etc, etc). D Sceptical of trendy new branches and old deadwood Back to Popper Indeed maybe to Wittgenstein (insofar as he is taken to be on board the same train) ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html