[lit-ideas] Re: Try a Logic Problem

  • From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 08 Jul 2006 14:50:09 -0700

 Walter quotes Phil:

 Finally, how is a correspondence between a linguistic phenomenon,
the 'statement', and a presumably non-linguistic entity, the 'fact',
possible? I would suggest that this is not a helpful approach to a
"theory of truth".

and says

I think Phil's question is a very astute one. I wish I had an answer. Or:
perhaps I shouldn't wish for an answer since there is not, and cannot be, an
answer. (Note that philosopers are much more interested in in the latter sort
of claim than in the former.) Perhaps the only way to show that a belief or
statement is true is through its relation(s) to other beliefs or statements.
This is of course Richard Rorty's position.

That there 'is not and cannot be an answer' to how a correspondence is possible between statements (sentences, propositions, judgments) and an alleged 'non-linguistic entity,' viz., in the ordinary language of detectives, lawyers, various parties to various disputes and negotiations, a fact, seems to fly in the face of plain facts, to use an expression on which philosophers do not hold the copyright.

'You say that you were in Pittsburgh when Smith was murdered, but this does not correspond to the facts,' says Inspector Quine. 'He claims that he was born in Majorca,' but this does not accord with the facts as we know them,' says the investigative reporter. And so on. If it's argued that such expressions are misleading then in light of the fact that people understand them perfectly well it would seem to be up to those who think they are misleading (or somehow puzzling) to show just how and why they are. 'I don't see how x is possible, therefore it isn't,' is no argument.

Wittgenstein, in the /Tractatus/, puts forward a theory of how propositions correspond to facts, or states of affairs, the so-called 'picture theory,' and whatever its defects simply to ignore it in a discussion of how statements may or may not fit the world is somewhat disingenuous. One might as well wonder how it is possible for a statement (etc.) to refer to the world, e.g., how it's possible, simply by means of some 'linguistic entity' to refer to Thelonius Monk or the Rock of Gibraltar. 'When I said, "One of the authors of the Port-Royal Logic was French," I meant Arnauld.' If there is a puzzle about how statements (etc.) correspond to facts (states of affairs in the world) then there ought to be a puzzle about how in saying '...I meant Arnauld...' my words could possibly correspond to anything, to any person. There are of course differences of opinion about how this is possible, about how referring expressions and names refer, but all of them begin with the assumption that one is doing something with language in such a way that a bit of language engages with something other than itself, although clearly language can refer to itself in many interesting ways.

And why, for that matter, isn't there a similar puzzle about inter-linguistic correspondence?

'Die Katze ist auf der Matte' corresponds to 'The cat is on the mat.' But of course the physical makeup one sentence does not correspond to that of the other. 'You don't understand. It isn't /that/ kind of correspondence I meant.' And the same for 'zed' and 'zero,' no doubt. Then what kind of mysterious correspondence are you looking for? 'The same meaning'?

Are there problems about flat maps corresponding to mountainous terrain? It's strange that people could get along at all before the advent of metaphysical semantics. I think I'm with Donal here.

Robert Paul
The Reed Institute

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