On Page 76 Taylor refers to "the kind of support that theories like Hare's prescriptivism derive from considerations about the logic of moral language. But once one thinks in this way in connection with, say, a theistic view, then one is heading towards a totally wrong picture of the situation, one which had some relevance to an earlier age, as I argued above, but has none to ours." That statement led me to the aforementioned reviewer whom you say is not misleading who wrote, "He [Hare] argues that claims are moral if and only if they take the form of universalizable prescriptions. They are universalizable in that an agent must be willing to apply them to all cases that are alike in all the relevant respects. They are prescriptive in that they provide guidance about how to act and they are necessarily connected to motivation." I hope we aren't going to get into one of our famous arguments that results in our being described as dogs, but I believe that I am being true to what the reviewer wrote. Explain to me why I am not. I see Kant's Categorical Imperative here - a truth that is to be universalized. I can say "thou shalt not murder" and intend this to be universalizable. It is prescriptive and a guide for moral behavior. I can also see Geary's "be kind" as universalizable within his framework. I haven't read Hare but don't see how he can hold the view that we must believe our moral choices to be universalizable prescriptions without the potential for evaluating consequent more actions. Jack was unkind to Jim. He violated Geary's universalized prescription; therefore in Geary's moral judgment Jack is guilty of moral turpitude. Also, if Mike truly believes that Rawls "be kind" is a universalizable prescription, then it is at least part of his Framework, if not the whole thing. Lawrence -----Original Message----- From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Robert Paul Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2006 7:29 PM To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: SOS - BA vs Hare's prescriptive Lawrence Helm wrote: > I don't think I am being misleading if you read what immediately > precedes the paragraph you quote from, namely "He [Hare] argues that > claims are moral if and only if they take the form of universalizable > prescriptions. They are universalizable in that an agent must be willing > to apply them to all cases that are alike in all the relevant respects. > They are prescriptive in that they provide guidance about how to act and > they are necessarily connected to motivation." This is certainly not misleading as far as it goes. But in what I'll quote again to you (which would seem to be your interpretation of the difference between Taylor and Hare) what you say either ignores or is inconsistent with this. One can see that Taylor (at least at this point) is taking a very different tack from Hare and yet I wonder if Hare doesn't have the truer hold on this matter. Do we really think as Taylor argues that we settle for the BA, Best Account? Or do we with Hare believe our framework is the truth and that it should be universalized. It is the last sentence that is misleading, and especially so as Hare is nowhere concerned with the truth of moral judgments or with the truth of frameworks, whatever that might mean. > This is fairly misleading. Hare isn't arguing that we first discover > > some moral 'truth' and then work to get it universalized (or > > universalised). He's arguing that something about the 'logic' of moral > > language requires that anything we put forward as a moral judgment must > > be universalizable: that if it's correct in such and such circumstances > > then it must be correct in any similar circumstances (no idiosyncratic > > judgments). Some have argued that this is trivially true with respect to > > any judgment. Robert Paul (again) ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html