In the first part of chapter 3, Taylor develops the idea (not unlike Collingwood's) that we develop our BA, Best Account, Moral Framework. We don't necessarily believe it absolutely. That is, we aren't willing to insist that it is the absolute truth, but we have lived and developed and adhere to a Framework that is best able to account for the implications of our experiences and studies. We hope we aren't engaged in subjective projectivism, that is, projecting a subjective view as an overlay to account for the external world as we see it, and that is a danger. Perhaps something in our childhood caused us to fear something and as time went on we projected an image upon reality that resolves that fear into something we need no longer be afraid of. Perhaps we were raised as a Catholic and feared afterlife punishment, but if we can do away with the afterlife and God, then we need no longer entertain that particular fear. But, as we reexamine the transition that we lived through from Catholic to atheist, are we sure that we were persuaded by scientific arguments that there is no afterlife or God? Or could we have sought out that solution because of subjective fear? Taylor argues that we must be moved by our convictions. Our transitions are experiences that move us toward a more elaborate or perhaps a different framework. We cannot prescind from our background confidence, i.e., our framework. We cannot be "objective," because we are moved by the transitions and so adhere to our framework. As a consequence we cannot reason with someone who adheres to a radically different framework. We may have grown into atheism in our teens and discovered additional reasons for out atheism as we grew, but if in our adult life we meet our village priest, we shall not be able to reason with him because he holds a radically different framework. Furthermore he is probably as moved by his as we are by our atheistic framework. Our conception of reason is to convince him that his belief (framework) is wrong and that atheism is the correct view. His conception will probably be come, let us reason together, though your sins be as scarlet, I will wash them white as snow. On page 75 Taylor writes, "As long as the wrong, external model of practical reason holds sway, the very notion of giving a reason smacks of offering some external considerations, not anchored in our moral intuitions, which can somehow show that certain moral practices and allegiances are correct. An external consideration in this sense is one which could convince someone who was quite unmoved by a certain vision of the good that he ought to adopt it, or at least act according to its prescriptions. This is the kind of reasons which a naturalistic picture of human life might seem to offer utilitarianism or some ethic 'material' welfare; or the kind of support that theories like Hare's prescriptivism derive from considerations about the logic of moral language." I looked up the reference and it was to Hare's Freedom and Reason. I checked the reviews on Amazon.com and one of them had the following: "The book opens with a section summarizing Hare's purely formal account of moral language. He argues that claims are moral if and only if they take the form of universalizable prescriptions. They are universalizable in that an agent must be willing to apply them to all cases that are alike in all the relevant respects. They are prescriptive in that they provide guidance about how to act and they are necessarily connected to motivation." One can see that Taylor (at least at this point) is taking a very different tack from Hare and yet I wonder if Hare doesn't have the truer hold on this matter. Do we really think as Taylor argues that we settle for the BA, Best Account? Or do we with Hare believe our framework is the truth and that it should be universalized. I can recall several years ago when I was heavily into Collingwood attempting to get some with opposing political views to examine with me our mutually exclusive "constellations of absolute presuppositions." I got no takers because, I gathered, my opponents were not willing to consider their views as anything other than univeralizable; whereas I was willing, at least for the sake of discussion, to consider both views, theirs and mine, as Best Accounts in order to examine how we got to wherever we were. Lawrence