Ya take the table to the guy who took your wife, when you said, "Take my wife...please!" ck On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 2:25 PM, Mike Geary <jejunejesuit.geary2@xxxxxxxxx>wrote: > Or as Lenny says: > "…I’ve got a couple of friends of mine, we often sit around the Ritz Bar > having a few liqueurs, and they’re always saying things like that, you know, > things like: Take a table, take it. All right I say, take it, take a table, > but once you’ve taken it, what you going to do with it? Once you’ve got hold > of it, where are you going to take it?" > > Mike Geary > Memphis > > > On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 9:27 AM, Donal McEvoy > <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote: > >> Clarifying what may in any case remain unclear:- >> >> > when I see a table, the content of >> > what I see is not an actual table but my perception of a >> > table. [Try setting down supper on the content of what I see >> > and you'll see Kant's point]. >> > >> > But surely even if we accept this, it leaves open the >> > question of whether that content accurately corresponds to >> > some non-p R that lies beyond it? >> > >> > If so, we may accept "one can’t perceive R" without >> > having to accept the view that 'One can never compare p with >> > R, for there is no way of perceiving R.’ >> >> Though the quotations are lifted from RP's post, given the distinction >> drawn between pR (the aspects of Reality that are perceived) and non-pR (the >> aspects of Reality that lie beyond or outside of what exists in perception), >> it should be emphasised that in the paragraph above the meaning of R is >> "non-pR" - for clearly we can and do perceive what exists as a matter of our >> perception e.g. what is presented to me now as my visual field is something >> that exists as a presented visual field and so is part of pR which can be >> perceived. >> >> Amplified further:- the contention of the above paragraph is that, from >> the assumption that we cannot perceive non-pR, it does not follow that we >> cannot compare [or contrast] the content of p with a [conjectured] non-pR. >> For example, while my senses may deceive me that the table I am writing at >> is a certain colour in its 'non-pR' ding-an-sich state, they may be on >> better ground in telling me that its solidity is such that it would hurt my >> forehead more than writing this post were I to smash my head down on it. >> >> Whether we regard this as a definitional truism or a truth of substantive >> metaphysics may be left aside for the moment. >> >> >> Donal >> Shropshire >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------ >> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, >> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html >> > >