[lit-ideas] Re: Realism/Geary on Unreal Temperature

  • From: carol kirschenbaum <carolkir@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2010 15:21:07 -0700

Ya take the table to the guy who took your wife, when you said, "Take my


On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 2:25 PM, Mike Geary

> Or as Lenny says:
> "…I’ve got a couple of friends of mine, we often sit around the Ritz Bar
> having a few liqueurs, and they’re always saying things like that, you know,
> things like: Take a table, take it. All right I say, take it, take a table,
> but once you’ve taken it, what you going to do with it? Once you’ve got hold
> of it, where are you going to take it?"
> Mike Geary
> Memphis
> On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 9:27 AM, Donal McEvoy 
> <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>> Clarifying what may in any case remain unclear:-
>> > when I see a table, the content of
>> > what I see is not an actual table but my perception of a
>> > table. [Try setting down supper on the content of what I see
>> > and you'll see Kant's point].
>> >
>> > But surely even if we accept this, it leaves open the
>> > question of whether that content accurately corresponds to
>> > some non-p R that lies beyond it?
>> >
>> > If so, we may accept "one can’t perceive R" without
>> > having to accept the view that 'One can never compare p with
>> > R, for there is no way of perceiving R.’
>> Though the quotations are lifted from RP's post, given the distinction
>> drawn between pR (the aspects of Reality that are perceived) and non-pR (the
>> aspects of Reality that lie beyond or outside of what exists in perception),
>> it should be emphasised that in the paragraph above the meaning of R is
>> "non-pR" - for clearly we can and do perceive what exists as a matter of our
>> perception e.g. what is presented to me now as my visual field is something
>> that exists as a presented visual field and so is part of pR which can be
>> perceived.
>> Amplified further:- the contention of the above paragraph is that, from
>> the assumption that we cannot perceive non-pR, it does not follow that we
>> cannot compare [or contrast] the content of p with a [conjectured] non-pR.
>> For example, while my senses may deceive me that the table I am writing at
>> is a certain colour in its 'non-pR' ding-an-sich state, they may be on
>> better ground in telling me that its solidity is such that it would hurt my
>> forehead more than writing this post were I to smash my head down on it.
>> Whether we regard this as a definitional truism or a truth of substantive
>> metaphysics may be left aside for the moment.
>> Donal
>> Shropshire
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