[lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online - amplification re PI
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 14 Apr 2012 14:40:45 +0100 (BST)
________________________________
From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
>The issue of whether computers "grasp" the game of chess is rather
>complicated. They do "grasp" the rules, if that is what is meant...>
What is meant?
How do they "grasp" the rules? Why is it not correct to say they do not "grasp"
the rules at all but are simply programmed with coded instructions that they
carry out in accordance with the rules [for the coded instructions are such
that they act in accordance with the rules]. The same applies to "strategy".
They do not grasp strategy but may carry out a programme that reflects a
strategic understanding [on the part of the designer of the programme]. They no
more "grasp" any of this than the kind of computer (or proto-computer) designed
by Babbage. Would you suggest that his "Difference Engine" grasps the
principles that it works according to and by which it 'calculates'? Would you
further suggest that a building grasps the principles in accordance to which it
is built, or that a construction designed to move to achieve certain effects
(like a suspension bridge, or a vehicle) understands or grasps the principles
that it 'moves' in accordance with?
I think W would be appalled at the kind of false worship of science that he
would suspect lies behind this kind of thinking. No one sensible looks at the
Difference Engine and is amazed that it grasps the principles according to
which it calculates (they know it does not), but build a machine that does this
with micro-chips and electronics and suddenly some must credit the machine with
an intelligence - or "grasp" - it simply does not have. Telling us a kind of
scientistic fairy-tale.
But the issue of whether computers "grasp" rules must still be distinguished
from the issue of whether the sense of any "rule" is _said_ in its statement.
The only kind of computer, that _might_ show that the sense of a "rule" is
_said_ in its statement, is a computer that _understands_ 'obeying the rule'
and 'going against it' in actual cases. But that computers may act as if
'obeying a rule' does not mean they _understand_ 'obeying a rule' in W's sense
- an understanding they could only have if they also _understood_ what would be
'going against' the rule. They obey the rule not because they understand it but
because they are programmed to obey the rule. If I programme a computer
attached to a firing device to open fire with the attached weapon when an
identifiable person enters a room, and as a result the computer identifies and
kills the person so entering, I do not conclude that the computer "grasped" or
_understood_ what it was doing. I conclude it
only did what it was programmed to do.
It is almost unbelievable that anyone educated could suggest otherwise. But
since that must be believed, perhaps we need be less incredulous when even
'Wittgensteinians' appear to suggest otherwise.
D
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