[lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online - amplification re PI
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 14 Apr 2012 10:19:57 +0100 (BST)
________________________________
From: Richard Henninge <RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>Pace my correctors, Messieurs Ritchie and McEvoy,
respectively, re weaponry, the petard has already exploded before the hoisting
begins and, re grammar, when concluded, one has been hoisted, not hoist, on
one's own petard.>
Though Richard is mistaken that I am one of his "correctors" on grammar here,
it may be noted that "hoist" is simply English of Shakespeare's time for
"hoisted" [the expression comes from 'Hamlet']: so Richard's grammatical
distinction is a 'distinction without a difference' as lawyers are apt to say.
On the substance of Richard's reply, something for now:-
>I, or a computer, receive the
instruction, which is also a statement of the rule--"take a number, add 2 to
it,
and then add 2 to the number so generated"--and the computer and I do just
that:
Have I not stated "a 'rule' so that its sense is _said_ in what is stated,"
i.e.
--"take a number, add 2 to it, and then add 2 to the number so
generated.">
Here seems to be Richard's attempt to state a "rule" whose sense is _said_ in
what is stated. Has Richard succeeded? The answer is no, according to W - here
one has not stated a "rule" so its sense is _said_ in what is stated: what you
have done in the case of a computer is give physical instruction [in code] to
perform a certain calculation, but that instruction does not _say_ what is the
_sense_ of the calculation. This instruction no more _'says'_ the sense of the
"rule" than the sense of the "rule" is _said_ by what we have chalked if we
chalk a "rule" on a blackboard [which chalking might also operate as an
instruction].
Richard does not seem to take the short point that his pointing to "rules"
processed by computers is facile and misconceived as some attempted refutation
of W [of course, the "W" of my view], who does not deny that such "rules" may
have sense but does deny their sense is _said_ in their statement. To
understand the sense of a "rule", whether in a computer or on a blackboard or
uttered by a human, we need to understand more than what is _said_ in any of
these cases. This is key for W.
As computers and blackboards do not understand any more than what is 'said' via
them, and probably not even that, they do not understand the _sense_ of what
they are used to process. Yet Richard thinks this POV is "grasping at straws"
and rests on something "definitional".
>He is also grasping at straws when he puts so much
emphasis on the word "grasping," as if to exclude what a computer does when it
"grasps" the game of chess. This is all just "definitional," but that is the
point of the exercise when understanding Wittgenstein. If you can deny that a
computer "grasps" the sense of chess even though it can play chess perfectly
according to the rules, you can as easily deny that any individual grasps the
sense of chess even though he or she can play chess perfectly according to the
rules.>
This last conclusion does not follow at all: we can deny computers "grasp" the
sense of chess just as we can deny they "grasp" the sense of "Hamlet", even
though they can play chess and play [via a suitable programme] "Hamlet"; it
just does not follow that we can just "as easily deny that any individual
grasps the sense of chess" [or "Hamlet"]. That Richard thinks it does follow
shows how facile his thinking is here. Of course, facile 'philosophical'
thinking was one of the main targets of W's later writings, and he referred to
such philosophers as like "slum landlords" and his aim was to clear the slums.
Of course, any "good lawyer" [Richard's term] may tell you that slum landlords
will put up much more resistance than you might think productive.
Donal
Salop
Other related posts:
