[lit-ideas] Re: "Must We Mean What We Say?"

J. Krueger:
 
"I'm wondering if there are any science types out there who  could make a
comparison between the way the three words (inference, opinion,  observation)
are used in a philosophical context vs. a scientific  context.  That is, I
wonder if the area of science has a broadly  understood "special" definition
of those terms?" 
 
Don't think so. I think it was McEvoy's tri-partition. To me,  I don't think 
things can be tri-parted like that. 
 
"Opine" I don't use. It sounds too much like "charlatan" to  me. "An 
opinionated fellow". To opine is 'to think' but in a loud thinking kind  of 
way. 
 
"Observe" is a Latinism. God (or Loeb) knows what Aristotle  used for this. I 
prefer the term "perceive" -- there is too much of a load or  weight on 
_visual_ perception in 'observe' which I dislike. Early philosophers  of 
science 
did speak of 'observational' versus 'theoretical' terms, but  'operational' was 
found to do better than 'observation'. If it means 'visually  perceive', there 
is the further question whether it is a _factive_ or not. E.g.  "Macbeth 
_visually saw_ (the ghost of) Baquo". Yet Baquo was apparently not  there to be 
seen. To be a good observer is to observe things such as they exist.  Don't 
expect scientists to use words more carefully. They have to be careful  about 
not 
exploding their laboratories, not about the correct, Oxonian, use of  words.
 
"Inference" is perhaps my favourite of McEvoy's terms, but I  follow Grice to 
the _letter_ that 'everything is inferential'. The term,  'inferentia' is 
again a Latinism. Aristotle divided syllogisms into inductive  and deductive -- 
where both would involve some 'inference' of some kind. 
 
The cases start to mix when one thinks of the inference --  favoured by 
phenomenalists like the early Grice -- from sense-data  (sense-perceptions, 
observations) -- to a conclusion regarding material  objects.
 
Grice's favourite example was "Eddington's Table"
 
                   I perceive a bunch of atoms
             _____________________________
 
                  Therefore, there is a table before me.
 
In McEvoy's terms, both premise and conclusion would pertain  to the 
Observational, whereas for me an inference is taking place. Opinion, too,  in 
that if 
you ask for my opinion I would say that, say, 'the fact that there is  a table 
before me I infer from my perceiving a bunch of  atoms'.

Eddington famously thought that there were "two" tables: the mostly  vacuous, 
empty table of atomic theory, and the pretty solid one of common-sense.  That 
was because he lacked good instruments of measurement. 
 
Hume, before him, had been puzzled with inferences like:
 
        I smell an apple-smelling  thing
        I see red
        I touch soft apple-skin like  thing, round surface
        I munch apple-like piece of  thing
        etc.
         ---------------------------- 
       Therefore, there is an apple in my  hand.
 
Hume (or "Home" as I prefer to spell his Scots name) was cautious that the  
inference from sense-datum (what he called 'impressions') to statements of  
'substance' (like 'apple') was a chimaera that only non-Enlightened Scots or  
others would fall for. 
 
McEvoy was apparently insulted by my commentary on his exampl. 
 
(3) I bet you have a long way to go. 
 
I forgot to say that for Austin 'bet' was doubly nonsensical in  requiring 
for its fulfillment what he called the 'essential uptake' on the part  of the 
addressee. And I think he was right. 
 
Unless the utterer finds a testimony on the part of the addressee (such as  
"OK") then we would be very UNwilling to say 
 
(4) The utterer did bet the addressee that the addressee had a long way to  
go. 
 
No act of betting is performed unless it's conjunctional between utterer  and 
addresee, reciprocating parts. 
 
Cheers, 
 
J. L. Speranza
Buenos Aires, Argentina





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