[lit-ideas] Re: Meta-Philosophy
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 22 Aug 2004 15:14:43 EDT
In a message dated 8/22/2004 2:40:23 PM Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
I don't see how this addresses Pop's demarcation criterion argument -
according to which if the answer is not falsifiable/testable by observation
then it is not scientific and is then, ipso facto, metaphysical/philosophical
- even if if is not _quality_ metaphysl./philosl, as per above answer.
Btw, among other errors, I did earlier mean to say that scientists agree
with
the norms Popper proposes, not "opposes" as I in fact wrote.
----
Actually, I thought your 'opposes' ran (oh so) very smoothly:
[McEvoy name-drops scientists here: Hawking, Medawar, Eccles]
and added
>[These people] agree with the norms that Popper
>is opposing even though one might argue (wrongly)
>these norms are refuted by
>actual scientific practice.
Since we were recently discussing the 'ought/can' paradoxes, I thought
McEvoy was trying to say that Popper proposes something that _opposes_ what
scientists (like Hawkin, Medawar, Eccles) are doing (as a sort of
counterfactual).
Regarding my apropos comments on art (which McDevoy qualifies as "load of
crap"), he writes:
>[In any case] I don't see how your ramblings address Pop's demarcation
criterion argument -
>according to which if the answer is not falsifiable/testable by observation
>then it is not scientific and is then, ipso facto,
metaphysical/philosophical
>- even if if is not _quality
--- I have little respect for what Popper says about philosophy. Note that
he never held a post _related_ to 'philosophy'. (He was "professor of
scientific method" in London -- a big paradox seeing that he himself was no
scientific
method).
In a way, it's very reminiscent of what the Israeli Bar-Hillel said about
'pragmatics', being the trash bag (or dustbin) of linguistics (until pragmatics
struck back with a vengeance -- see L. Horn, 'Intro' to Handbook of
Pragmatics, Blackwell).
Popper is just saying that if a question cannot be answered scientifically,
then it _may_ (for all it's worth) be answered philosophically. He goes on to
confuse (in a grand manner) 'philosophy' with 'metaphysics'.
Philosophy is -- for Heidegger, etc. -- wisdom of love (or knowledge of
eros, if you wish -- see Phaedrus). Metaphysics is the general structure of
ontology. Two separate fields of inquiry (or one a subset of the other, if you
like).
If by 'philosophical'/'metaphysical' answer, Popper means plain 'normative',
then he should say _it_. Given his negative view of philosophy and
metaphysics, it is understandable he would regard all metaphysicians and
philosophers
as deceiving people somewhat sneakily propounding an
"x is y"
definition for something which is, rather, of the logical form
"x SHOULD be y"
-- but not all philosophers or metaphysicians are like that, as Popper did
not care to know.
Cheers,
JL
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