[lit-ideas] Re: Hitchens Arguably on John Brown
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2011 07:08:54 -0700
Donal,
I did wonder who else might possibly have been able to capture John Brown or
have been involved in his hanging. That is, the army’s forces especially at
that time were not huge and the names Hitchens mentions, Robert E. Lee,
Stonewall Jackson, and Jeb Stuart were prominent in the army before the war and
prominent on the side of the South during the Civil War. So they may have been
the most probable people to confront Brown and comprise no coincidence at all.
The presence of John Wilkes Booth seems less “probable” than the others.
The more provocative issue was Brown’s belief that God was willing that slavery
be abolished and that he, John Brown, was responding to God’s will (perhaps an
example of the “propensity for change” you mention below). The atheist
Hitchens was I’m sure dismissing event after event (as presented in Reynolds’s
book) as “natural” and not requiring God to explain them, but these two events,
the capture and trial of John Brown caused the hair on the back of his neck to
rise, striking him as being rather far from ordinary or natural.
This was just a short review so Hitchens didn’t develop any of his atheistic
themes. He merely states that John Brown’s capture of Harper’s Ferry did turn
out to be the initial (military) act that resulted in the Civil War that was
the mediate if not the ultimate cause of the freeing of the slaves.
Lawrence
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Donal McEvoy
Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2011 3:50 AM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Hitchens Arguably on John Brown
The probability of any event E (including an event that is a combination of two
or more events, or what we might sometimes term a 'coincidence'] will lie
somewhere between 0 (which denotes the event has zero probability and therefore
is impossible) and 1 (which denotes maximal probability and therefore that E is
certain).
The probability of any E over an almost infinity of time is vastly increased
compared to its probability over a relatively short period of time (unless we
bring in further assumptions, including ruling out E as impossible at any
time), and E may approach being almost certain (unless it is ruled out as
impossible) as any possible event may be thought to be almost certain to occur
given enough time, and infinite time is surely enough. We use this principle in
calculating the probability, say, of someone breaking their leg in the course
of their life as opposed to before the age of ten, knowing that this
probability generally increases over time because there are more opportunities
(as it were) for a leg-breaking E to occur. [It was therefore very significant
for researchers to find that the occurrence of depression in persons born after
the war was much greater than that in persons born at the beginning of the
century: this showed depression was both occurring earlier in individuals and
striking more often with those born later, a marked 'change in probabilities'
that therefore invites explanation].
This is enough to indicate that the 'probability of E' may vary in accordance
with other factors, like the parameters of time involved and the state of
affairs (or other events) against which that probability is measured: the
probability of a mass marketed home computer existing by 1990 would have varied
if the question were asked as if we were back in the year 1066, the year 1666,
the year 1966 and the year 1976: only in a certain form of determinism would we
say that it was always preordained that there would a mass marketed home
computer by 1990 and therefore this E was certain [with probability 1] at all
stages in history, and that it is simply because probability measures our
subjective lack of complete knowledge that this probability varies with changes
in our subjective lack of knowledge over the centuries.
When we speak of a coincidence, even a 'pure coincidence' or a 'staggering
coincidence', we are all either talking loosely or we are straying into an area
that requires understanding of probabilities and indeed the various
'philosophies' of probability. It is a further question how the logical
analysis of the 'probability of E' ties in with our psychological sense of the
liklihood or otherwise of E; but we need the logical analysis to put our
psychological intuitions into rational perspective.
For example, take an intuitively plausible claim like,"Coincidences ONLY exist
because of the miniscule chance of some things overlapping in the trillions of
things that happen in a given time period." For reasons indicated "a given time
period" may affect probabilities (and therefore "coincidences" where these are
seen as improbable occurrences), but it is nevertheless way too simple to say
coincidences or improbable events "ONLY exist because of the miniscule chance
of some things overlapping in the trillions of things that happen in a given
time period". It may be true that, if we are not determinists, then it is
probable over "a given time period" that some improbable events, even highly
improbable events, will occur: but this does not explain why these occur while
many more "improbable events" do not; or why these improbable events occur and
many probable events do not in fact occur [for every highly improbable event
that occurs, we might say, there must be at least one more-probable event that
has therefore not occurred]. We may say, almost by definition or a priori, that
it is probable that a greater percentage of highly probable events will occur
[relative to those that do not] than highly improbable events will occur
[relative to those that do not]. But this, even if true, does not explain
itself. Still less does it help explain why some highly improbable events occur
and some do not. Nor does it allow us to conclude they "ONLY exist because" of
anything.
In fact, it is unclear what theory or philosophy of probability the claim,
"Coincidences ONLY exist because of the miniscule chance of some things
overlapping in the trillions of things that happen in a given time period", is
meant to reflect or assert. This is a weakness in such a claim. If such a claim
is meant only to express a deterministic POV, such that events/coincidence only
appear improbable but in fact are not, then this may be discussed on its own
terms.
[At his death, in his nineties, probability theory was one of the topics Popper
was still working on btw, and he was defending an objectivist account of
probabilities as measures of underlying propensities in states-of-affairs for
changed states-of-affairs, as part of understanding the universe as involving
"changed propensities for change". Probability theory remains an intellectual
minefield even if we progress beyond our untutored intuitions.]
Donal
England
Where snow is falling like pieces of a snowman that had just stepped on a mine
in a minefield
_____
From: Eric Yost <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Tuesday, 18 October 2011, 7:17
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Hitchens Arguably on John Brown
Colin Bruce’s _Conned again, Watson!_ describes many of the perceptual biases
that people read into, hope for, or are manipulated by in daily probabilities.
He agrees with Paul.
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Paul Stone
Sent: Monday, October 17, 2011 9:06 PM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Hitchens Arguably on John Brown
No magic!
Paul
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