Walter O. wrote: "In other words, rightness is internally related to belief. Nothing in the world decides the rightness or wrongness of a moral claim - only rational belief can do that. On this constructivist (anti-realist) conception, what makes slavery, for example, morally wrong, is that not all persons affected by a maxim of slavery could agree to it, believe it to be justifiable. The moral wrongness of slavery has nothing to do with any 'intrinsic' or 'worldly' or 'empirical' feature of human beings that fails to be recognized by a maxim of slavery." I wonder about this. It seems to me that Walter is both correct and mistaken in his comments here. The universalizability of moral maxims is certainly part of our understanding slavery as morally wrong. However, it seems to me a mistake to claim that the moral wrongness of slavery has nothing to do some other feature of human beings. Let me use the analogy of laws to tease out the mistake. In a liberal democracy, what makes an act a crime, that is legally prohibited, are laws passed by representatives of the citizens. Because the laws come from a representative body, the laws are understood as the universalization of a general will. The lawfulness of these laws comes from the fact that all citizens could accept themselves as legislators and subjects of these laws. However, that Canada has the laws it has, and the U.S. the laws it has, is a consequence of the experiences of Canadians and Americans, so that the laws of Canada are different from that of the U.S. The Canadian experience of becoming a nation was different from that of the U.S. and so there are differences in Constitutions and laws. The lawfulness of laws - that all citizens could accept themselves as legislators and subjects of these laws - in both Canada and the U.S. are necessarily identical. The legal systems and laws in Canada and the U.S. are necessarily different. So long as we are talking about the lawfulness of laws - or the rightness/wrongness of actions - then I agree with Walter that this "has nothing to do with any 'intrinsic' or 'worldly' or 'empirical' feature of human beings". Borrowing from Kant, this talk belongs to pure practical reason. However, if we begin to talk about the morality of specific actions, like slavery, then we move, to some degree, into the realm of experience, and with it, empirical features of human beings. Just as the Canadian and U.S. legal systems differ as a result of differing historical contingencies, so also will there be different moral judgments on the points of slavery. It is possible to assert that "what makes slavery, for example, morally wrong, is that not all persons affected by a maxim of slavery could agree to it, believe it to be justifiable" - this is its moral wrongness - and still differ about the moral wrongness of slavery in Canada or the U.S. The empirical contexts within which we assert the moral wrongness of slavery is crucial for making moral judgments in a manner that is analogous to the debates surrounding the legislation of laws. If, then, we are talking about the lawfulness of slavery - or the rightness/wrongness of slavery - then I think Walter is mistaken. Suggesting that "the moral wrongness of slavery has nothing to do with any 'intrinsic' or 'worldly' or 'empirical' feature of human beings that fails to be recognized by a maxim of slavery" is akin to suggesting that the legislation of laws concerning slavery, by democratically elected representatives, has nothing to do with any 'worldly' or 'empirical' will or wishes of citizens that can't be found in the laws of Canada or the U.S. Put more simply, it seems to me that an analogy to Walter's argument would be to claim that all we need to know about the illegality of slavery in the U.S. is to study the current laws on the books now. However, this synchronic approach to moral judgments or laws ignores the fact that moral judgments and laws have histories. The specifics surrounding our judgments concerning slavery - what is slavery? what makes slavery wrong? who is a slave? - have changed over time as have the laws of the U.S. It is this historical, contextual quality of moral judgments that Walter ignores when he claims that the moral wrongness of aspects of experience have nothing to with, well, experience. Again, in one sense, that of the lawfulness of laws, Walter is correct. The moral rightness or wrongness of moral judgments do not depend on any aspect of experience. However, when we are considering either the wrongness or illegality of slavery in the U.S., it is a mistake to think that all there is to say on the subject is what we can find in the categorical imperative or in law books. Slavery belongs to experience and so any moral judgment regarding slavery will be, in some sense, dependent on the worldly and empirical features of human beings. The wrongness of slavery is, therefore, both a result of necessity and contingency Both necessarily and contingently, Phil Enns Indonesia ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html