Hood was never given enough troops to enable him to fight on an equal footing with his Northern enemies. The Southern Draft never worked properly and at some point no more troops were forthcoming. So a ?draw? for Hood was not the same as a ?draw? for Sherman?s generals. Sherman could replace his troops. Hood could not. Had Hood been able to replace his troops as Thomas or Schofield did, he would certainly have fared better. I don?t believe that everything has been said about the Civil War. It is a historian?s stock in trade to find overlooked matters to write about. Wiley Sword took a strongly anti-Hood stance in his Confederacy?s Last Hurrah, Spring Hill, Franklin, & Nashville, but Sword generalizes about Hood based on his performance at a time when he couldn?t get adequate support. His fiancé Sally Preston preyed that he wouldn?t be put in charge of the Western army because it was widely believed in Richmond that the Southern cause was lost and that the best the Confederate armies could do at that point was fight with honor and delay the end. The Confederate states by that time refused to support the war. That is, no state was sending more than token new recruits to the army and large numbers of soldiers were deserting and return to their home states. To evaluate Hood?s overall performance one needs to look at his whole history and not just the period when he with one leg, one arm and an inadequate number of troops was drinking the last dregs of a losing cause. The reason he advanced so quickly in his career was that he was very good at his job. He kept winning. He was a ?fighting? general in the midst of too much (according to the historians as well as Southern Leaders) caution. Lincoln you will recall dismissed his earlier generals because they were too cautious. He finally settled upon Grant because he was willing to fight. Lincoln probably would have loved Hood. As to what the Civil War generals learned at West Point, Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson go into that in some detail, looking at the Civil War manuals, those written by Scott, Hardee & others. The tactics of Jomini had not been significantly improved upon. The bayonet was still the favored weapon. Running out of ammunition was no excuse for not charging the enemy. When the rifled barrel replaced the smooth all that did for tactics was to urge that the attacking forces moved slightly faster so they could more quickly get in bayonet range. And the preferred weapon of the cavalry was the sabre. From our vantage point we think a bayonet charge against an entrenched position suicide, but everyone who fought in the Mexican War (which includes some of the biggest names in the Civil War) believed that tactic the only one that assured success. It wasn?t that Hood?s tactics were faulty when he sent his troops against entrenched positions at Franklin and Nashville. It was that he hadn?t been given enough men by Richmond to fight those battles. We might try to fault Hood for fighting at Franklin and Nashville with inadequate forces but he had no reason to think he was going to fail. His opponent, Thomas, was fearful he might succeed. In the typical battle between the North and South, the North far outnumbered the South, sometimes as much as two to one, and the North didn?t always win. Thomas ?retreated? before Hood when Thomas?s troops were no more numerous than Hoods, but as Thomas retreated he got more and more reinforcements. Lincoln and Grant were critical of Thomas for his retreats and Hood can be excused, perhaps, for thinking Thomas was afraid of him, but by the time Thomas reached Nashville he had overwhelming numbers and before Thomas? replacement (he was being fired by Grant for not attacking Hood) reached him he attacked Hood and defeated him. In pitting Sherman against Hood in one?s imagination, one shouldn?t forget that Sherman never won a major battle whereas Hood did. Sherman?s success came later when he conducted campaigns and commanded generals who won battles. Lawrence