[lit-ideas] Re: EP has left the building (Was: Saying an EP)
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2004 11:53:31 +0100 (BST)
--- Richard Henninge <Henninge@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Wittgenstein says:
2.0251 "Space, time, and colour..are forms of
> objects".
>
> Donal says: Ie. These MERE forms are NOT objects - objects are BEYOND these
> mere forms.
>
> I deny that (a) Wittgenstein would accept MERE as an adjective to modify
> these forms, (b) that these forms are NOT objects, and consequently (c)
> that
> these forms-which-are-objects are BEYOND these so-called mere forms.
This is already clear (at least to me): Richard, like St.Peter in a
regrettable moment afair, denies and denies and denies. This is of little
interest - being mere declamatory repetition.
But what does Richard back this up with...take a close look, as W might say.
> I show that Wittgenstein says that the "objects *are* the fixed form"
> (2.023).
Showing this does not, logically, support any of your denials.
>In other words, I want to prove that Donal is wrong to say that
> "forms are not objects" in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
Saying what you want to prove does not, obviously, prove it.
> I think Wittgenstein
> says that "forms *are* objects," but Donal refuses to allow the argument
> that Wittgenstein says both
It is not that I disallow any such argument it is rather a) W says no such
thing in terms ie. plain language b) I am curious as to the "argument" that
he must be taken as saying what he does not say.
Here is Richard's argument:
> (a) 2.0251 "Space, time, and colour..are forms of objects."
>
> and
>
> (b) 2.023 "Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form."
Now, correct me if I am wrong, but neither a) nor b) say that the way objects
constitute "unalterable form" shows that the way space etc. "are forms of
objects" *shows* that these "forms of objects" are themselves "objects".
I don't even see a scintilla of argument for this leap - a leap of faith as
it were.
As if hiding behind this inept leap, presented as if only the moronic (me)
would deny its validity (whereas I suggest only the gullible would accept its
validity on the evidence so far presented), Richard resorts to mere blather
as follows...
> I think as long as Donal can uphold his vision of form that is not objects
> and of objects that are beyond form we will not get very far in discussing
> Wittgenstein.
Oh, and look, he knows something about Plato too and that W was "famously
misunderstood" etc. That some people think this passes for argument is almost
beyond me...
>We might be able to have a simplistic discussion of Plato's
> ideal forms, but we won't ever get to what makes Wittgenstein interesting
> and worth discussing. Wittgenstein's Tractatus was famously misunderstood.
> If you've ever tried to discuss his thinking with Donal, you would know why
> the Tractatus has been misunderstood. I cannot even say that Wittgenstein's
> use of the same word, "form," to talk about space, time and color and
> objects indicates that he links form and object without having Donal
>
> (a) fail to "feel the weight of this argument,"
> (b) feel that it is "an argument open to easy abuse" and that
> (c) "its thrust here" is "specious."
>
> If these three theses can be levied against my "argument" that Wittgenstein
> is using the word "form," i.e. the same word twice within the space of a
> couple pages, to refer to the same "thing," and therefore to indicate that
> Wittgenstein *rather* believes that form is object and object form and NOT
> (as Donal suggests) that "forms are not objects" and that "objects are
> beyond these . . . forms," I guess I might as well give up.
>
> Sometimes you encounter people who never "feel the weight" of your
> arguments.
How true.
>Perhaps Donal can cite something from Wittgenstein that
> indicates
> that what he says is the case, instead of just asking questions and
> questioning answers.
But a) W is none too clear in the sense that simple citation is liable to
settle certain issues b) given a), this challenge is rather like trying to
reverse the natural burden of proof - according to which if, as Richard
suggests, W thought the "forms of objects" were "objects", why did he not
bother to say so?
Donal
That this post of Richard's is so complacently written and badly argued tends
to confirm my suspicion that those who use the "It is a not an accident of
language" type-argument should be viewed with the same suspicion as
fortune-tellers and self-styled authorities who draw definite readings from
obscure texts (which they claim only those with a deficiency will deny).
The arrogance is breathtaking!
> > It is not an accident of language that the plural "forms of
> > objects" referring to "space, time, and colour" is the same "form" as in
> the
> > "objects are 'the unalterable form' (2.023)."
> >
> > *I am not sure I feel the weight of this argument from
> > 'same term can't be just an accident', which seems to me
> > an argument open to easy abuse and its thrust here specious.
>
> Richard Henninge
> University of Mainz
>
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