[lit-ideas] EP has left the building (Was: Saying an EP)
- From: Henninge@xxxxxxxxxxx (Richard Henninge)
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2004 03:51:20 +0200
----- Original Message -----
From: "Donal McEvoy" <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Saturday, April 17, 2004 12:55 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Saying an EP
> >If Donal wants to suggest
> > "Blue here" as an elementary proposition, he will encounter no problems
> > with
> > Wittgenstein.
>
> Robert Paul suggested 'blue here' as an EP: I did not. Nor do I know where
W
> suggested it.
>
> The problem is whether a. blue is simple or complex - if blue can be
analysed
> in terms of statements of velocity it might seem it is *not* an EP or
> elementary name. b. is 'here' an EP - or can the space-time point it
points
> to be further broken down in terms of more specific 'heres' [here in my
room
> can be broken down in the many points of 'here' in my room].
>
> And is there a specifiable end to this breaking down where we arrive an
some
> sayable EPs?
>
> My hunch is no.
First of all, read the quotes provided by JL from the OED to clear up the
misconceptions you have about EPs. The "problem" is not "whether . . . blue
is simple or complex" or "if blue can be analysed" further in any terms. The
"problem" is only whether the EP can be further analyzed logically. It
cannot contain conjunctions. It cannot contain logical terms. "This spot is
blue" contains no conjunctions nor logical terms. It expresses or speaks of
a state of affairs. The world should be completely describable by EPs such
as this. "Robert Paul's cat Gödel (Get You Ten, Bad'll Get You Life) is on
the mat in front of his desk" is no less of an EP than "This spot is blue"
referring to a part of Robert Paul's visual field corresponding to a part of
that same cat's left eye. As long as no logical contradiction arises in
these propositions, or better, between these propositions and other
"would-be" elementary propositions, everything is hunky-dory in EP-land.
1962 M. CRANSTON tr. Hartnack's Wittgenstein & Mod. Philos. ii. 13 A
â?~state
of affairsâ?T is a fact that in itself does not consist of facts... A state
of
affairs is a combination of possible facts. Ibid. 14 If an elementary
sentence,
or, better, an elementary proposition is true, then the state of affairs
which
is spoken of exists.
[Just a comment on this last statement: Would Wittgenstein have spoken so
often and so casually of "the state of affairs . . . spoken of" in an
"elementary proposition" if he thought for a moment that one could not
"speak" of such a "state of affairs"? I think it's time we take the mystery
and magic and aura of unattainability from something that Wittgenstein
apparently took for granted as unproblematic. He spoke of "unsayability,"
true, but not *in this regard*. A lot of things are sayable in Wittgenstein
and EPs are among the most "sayable" (in Donal's usage--I prefer to say that
it's not the EP that's sayable or not, but the state of affairs it
expresses). "This spot is blue" (I'm talking about the dot between "www" and
"andreas" in the last line of this post) is sayable as long as "This spot is
green" (I'm talking about the dot between "www" and "andreas" in the last
line of this post) is not true. Only one of them can be an EP.]
As to Donal's concern about "breaking down" the word "here" into smaller
"heres" or more microscopic or subjective "heres," that's also not an EP
problem. The fact that Mike Geary can make light of Donal's thinking here by
comparing it to Clinton's "It depends on what you mean by 'is'" is evidence
enough that one has left EP-land (or at least that EP has left the
building).
>From the OED
'atomic'.
In modern philosophy: unanalysable, irreducible, ultimate, essential; also,
of a sentence: without conjunctions or other connective words.
Cites -- as it applies to 'proposition':
1912 L. WITTGENSTEIN Let. (to Russell) in Notebks. 1914-16 (1961) 120,
I believe that our problems can be traced down to the atomic propositions.
1918 B. RUSSELL in Monist 523
An atomic proposition is one which does mention actual particulars, not
merely describe them but actually name them.
1922 tr. Wittgenstein's Tract. Log.-Phil. 31
An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).
1929 WITTGENSTEIN in Knowledge, Exper. & Realism (Aristotelian Soc. Suppl.,
Vol. IX) 163
The propositions which represent this ultimate connexion of terms I call,
after B. Russell, atomic propositions.
1933 Mind XLII. 38
Similar to the species of geometry, we might have in logic â?~a logic of
atomic
propositionsâ?T and â?~a logic of molecular propositionsâ?T.
1948 B. RUSSELL Human Knowl. II. ix. 145 We give the name â?~atomic
sentenceâ?T
to one not containing logical words.
1956 G. RYLE in Ayer et al. Revol. Philos. 10
The analysis of compound propositions into their simple elements, the
conjunctionless or â?~atomicâ?T propositions.
Richard Henninge
University of Mainz
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