Hi Neil: Thanks for the confirmation & reference, Neil. I'll try to land a copy of "The Language of Thought" and read it in parallel with Locke, whom I've been mulling over lately. Locke seems to be right for the wrong reasons, and now I am finding Fodor to be wrong for the right reasons. If that makes any sense.... But the Cartesians and continental rationalism did not hold, as far as I know, concepts such as DOG, TREE, ROCK, HYDROGEN ATOM, and CELL PHONE to be innate. Rather, it was traditional Platonic concepts which we might identify as abstractions nowadays, such as elements of social being (JUSTICE, GOODNESS, EQUALITY) or religious notions (GOD, REDEMPTION, PUNISHMENT). So, it seems to be a problem for Fodor, given the science of his silly century, to come up with a way in which we might have concepts of things that are the ordinary furniture of the world--dogs, and rocks, and tulips, and corkscrews. Thanks again!--Ron --- On Thu, 8/19/10, iro3isdx <xznwrjnk-evca@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: From: iro3isdx <xznwrjnk-evca@xxxxxxxxx> Subject: [quickphilosophy] Re: Fodor on Concepts I: The set-up To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Date: Thursday, August 19, 2010, 8:53 PM --- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ron Allen <wavelets@...> wrote: > responding to http://groups.yahoo.com/group/quickphilosophy/message/139 > Ron: > For Fodor, how do we arrive at concepts? Fodor is well known for his nativism, his view that concepts are innate. He does allow that there are composite concepts that might not be innate, but he believes we start life with a rich set of innate concepts. This goes back at least as far as his 1975 book "The Language of Thought". > Ron: > And what exactly does it mean to think about a DOG as such? I am not sure that Fodor ever attempts to address quite that question. As best I can tell, he considers thinking to be an internal language activity, perhaps done in his presumed innate internal language of thought (or LOT). I think he sometimes refers to LOT as "semantic markerese" or something like that. In his 1980 "methodological solipsism" paper, he does say (if I recall), that thought is the use of logic applied to the formal properties of representations. Regards, Neil