Fw: [quickphilosophy] Re: 1.21 Continued
- From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- To: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2010 08:57:07 -0700 (PDT)
--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Martin N Brampton <martin.lists@...>
wrote:
>
> How are we able to have a distinction or any kind of relationship
> between "the constituents of thought" and "objects in the world" without
> reference to the questions that are raised about realism and idealism?
> Is such a distinction possible?
Well, as you know, he ends up holding that much of what is in the TLP must be
also thrown out as nonsense. So I guess he'd say there isn't actually any such
distinction.
>
> I've heard more convincing arguments than "because they must".
>
His argument seems to have been that without atoms no prop could be understood
without knowledge that some other prop was true or false. That is, that
determinate thoughts require atoms. It all seems so Leibnizian to me.
W
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