[Wittrs] Re: The Epiphenomenalism of Dennett-Consistent Philosophies of Consciousness
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2010 23:04:53 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
>
> > But then this gets at the problem of competing models (consciousness
> > as a monadic point of spiritual evanescence, light or what have
> > you on the one hand vs. consciousness as a physical process-based
> > system on the other).
>
> This is where I become impatient with philosophy. It seems to me that
> the problem to be solved is "what is the brain doing, and how does it
> do that?" So I see talk of "spiritual evanescence" as an unneeded
> mysticism.
>
The question you pose is the scientific one. The philosophical one is whether
science is equipped to answer this particular question. It's a different kind
of issue and it can be solved (at least theoretically) either by a straight
forward argument to which others will agree (the traditional philosophical
approach) or, in a more Wittgensteinian way, by showing why it is not a real
question at all, generally by showing that it can't really be asked so if it
can't, it can't be answered.
Some take the argumentative approach like Joe, on this list. In the
philosophical community more broadly, we can put Chalmers or Galen Strawson in
this camp. Bruce seems to me to want to have it both ways, by alowing that
science can do something along the way of addressing this kind of issue but
then insisting that what science can do is irrelevant to any meaningful talk
about minds.
It seems to me that Dennett makes a case (if not quite a traditional formal
argument) for science being the one and only venue for this and argues that
this hinges on a particular revision to our usual understanding of
consciousness (a position with which I am on record as agreeing).
Searle strikes me as more like Bruce here in that he argues that science not
only has a role but can likely succeed except that his conception of
consciousness appears to make that problematic because he insists on mixing
ontological issues.
> The problem for AI folk is that their ideas as to how to produce an
> artificial person do not seem to involve consciousness in any way at
> all. And that's why they tend to be epiphenomenalists.
>
Not all the AI folks I have encountered. Certainly not the guy over in
Switzerland we discussed off line who thinks that by replicating a brain in ALL
its particulars on a computer he will also replicate consciousness (replicate,
not merely simulate).
> The problem for Jerry Fodor is that he sees intentionality as very
> important. Yet his view of how the mind works (as discussed in his
> "Methodological Solipsism" paper and in his "Modularity of Mind" book
> does not actually depend on original intentionality at all. So he has
> to be either epiphenomenalist or mystical about intentionality.
>
I don't know enough of Fodor to speak to any of his positions but am interested
in reading your take on him.
> Searle's position is more complex, in that he rejects the
> representationalist views of Fodor and of the AI folk. But I don't
> think he is actually trying to explain what the brain is doing, so he
> probably isn't considering any worked through theory.
>
I agree on the matter of Searle and brains. While asserting that brains cause
consciousness he argues that no one knows how and he has no idea either so it's
a a kind of ongoing mystery and then he compounds this by presenting a picture
of consciousness that looks like it cannot be reduced, in which case the only
way brains can cause it is via a dualistic conjuring trick (an implication his
many supporters seem to want to fiercely deny).
> I suppose my own view is a bit closer to Searle's. That is, I reject
> the extreme representationalism of AI and of Fodor. That's why we got
> into that long disagreement about finding patterns in the world.
Yes we never resolved it to our mutual satisfaction and probably remain far
apart on that point.
> However, unlike Searle, I am interested in what the brain is doing and
> how it does it. Still, I am not trying to "design" consciousness. But
> as I look at what I believe the brain to be doing, I see that it is
> closely connected with consciousness.
>
That's why I marvel that you seem uninterested in Edelman or Hawkins. How about
Ramachandran (though he actually offers no overarching thesis)?
>
> > What about Dennett's claim of incoherence then? It's interesting I
> > think and might be right (it really might be all that needs to be
> > said about this question, as he seems to be saying in that interview)
> > but I need to think it through more.
>
> My best guess is that Dennett really is an epiphenomenalist (as most
> people use that term), and that he is attempting to construe
> epiphenomenalism very narrowly in an attempt to evade that. But I
> doubt that people will buy into his narrow construal.
>
> Regards,
> Neil
>
No, I certainly don't on the basis of the argument I've given about why it
makes no sense to presume epiphenomenalism on the basis of Dennett's model.
SWM
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