Cayuse wrote: >Joseph Polanik wrote: >>Cayuse wrote: >>>It would be helpful if you could provide a few examples of things >>>that qualify as a "metaphenomenal realities". you're often saying >>>that we don't know what is or isn't 'beyond experience'; so, for you >>>this should be easy. what is experiential is phenomenal. what is >>>beyond experience is metaphenomenal. >>consider the moon illusion. when low over the horizon, it appears to >>be larger than when it is high in the sky. the moon-as-perceived >>appears to change its size. that's as aspect of the phenomenology of >>experience. that's phenomenal reality. the moon-as-measured by >>astronomers does not vary in size. it is a metaphenomenal reality. >>it is a physical object that is 'beyond' experience. it exists >>independently of experience; meaning, that it existed before I was >>born and will continue to exist after I am gone. >>phenomenal realities have correlated metaphenomenal realities that, in >>some sense, generates, produces or otherwise 'accounts for' that >>phenomenal reality. the moon-as-measured is the metaphenomenal reality >>that, in conjunction with our nervous systems, generates or produces >>the moon illusion, a phenomenal or phenomenological reality. >If I understand you correctly, you're using the term "metaphenomenal >reality" to denote a conceptual entity that has been conjectured in >order to account for certain regularities in the way things appear >(what you call "phenomenal realities"). As a conceptual entity, a >"metaphenomenal reality" is also part of the data of experience rather >than being "beyond experience". a metaphenomenal reality is beyond experience even though an idea about or a or concept of a metaphenomenal reality is itself an aspect of experience. the physical universe and all physical objects are metaphenomenal realities. immaterial objects (minds, souls, ideal mathematical objects), if there are any, would also be metaphenomenal realities even though there are also concepts of each of these, which concepts are themselves phenomenal or experiential realities >Metaphysical realism rests on a further step -- the claim that such >conceptual entities "really exist" in some putative domain "beyond >experience". assuming that there is a physical universe that exists independent of our experience of it would, in my terminology, be metaphenomenal realism. in Kantian jargon, it would be transcendental realism. I know of no reasonable basis for defining 'metaphysical realism' as the assumption that there is a physical universe independent of our experience of it. >This is an unnecessary step, it is untestable in principle, and it >contributes nothing. perhaps; but, like most people, I assume that there is a physical universe even though I can not prove that, as a matter of logical necessity, there is a physical universe. Joe -- Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ http://what-am-i.net @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ ========================================== Manage Your AMR subscription: //www.freelists.org/list/wittrsamr For all your Wittrs needs: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/