[Wittrs] Re: Stuart on Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 02 Nov 2009 16:22:11 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
> if your ontology (inventory of what there is) contains two kinds of
> 'stuff' (substances) it is substance dualism. if there is only one set
> of properties per substance; then, the substance dualism is *also* a
> property dualism. however, Descartes had a third set of properties,
> those produced by the interaction of mind and matter; and, thus, his
> interactive substance dualism is also a property trionism.
>
I'm not especially interested in the nuances of the variant kinds of dualism.
Only one thing concerns me: can we explain minds in terms of what is physical
or must we presume some other factor to be at work?
If minds (whatever makes up what we mean by "minds") are explainable entirely
in terms of what brains do, and what brains do is explainable in terms of
physics (and biology is presumed to be ultimately reducible to physical
factors), then there is no need to posit that mind is separate and distinct
from brains (though they are, presumably, conceptually different, i.e., we have
different things in mind by the two terms).
On the other hand, if minds are not explainable entirely in terms of what
brains do, then, to explain their occurrence in the world, we have to look
elsewhere. Dualism, the presumption that there is more than one ontological
basic in the universe, is the usual route (though this takes a variety of
forms).
Why do I use "ontological basic" instead of "substance" which you prefer?
Because my term is more neutral and generic. "Substance" carries with it
certain rather old fashioned notions, now out of vogue, as well as numerous
connotations that can mislead us. But insofar as "substance" is relevant, it is
just what I mean by "ontological basic". Such a "basic" would be something that
occurs in the world and is sui generis at its most basic level. It is not
reducible to anything beside itself.
In principle there doesn't look to be anything we can currently name as being
the basic that material things consist of because by "physical" we mean a whole
host of things that are part of our experienced world including atoms and
energy and various forces (gravity, magnetism, strong and weak nuclear energy).
Whether there is any one single "thing" from which all these are derived is
beside the point and above the pay grade of philosophy. That is best left to
theoretical physics. But it is enough to note that anything that is part of
these physical phenomena is "physical" and that if minds can be explained as a
function of these factors, there is no need to posit anything extra to the
known universe, i.e., anything that is ontologically basic and distinct from
anything physical.
> if your ontology contains only one kind of 'stuff' it is substance
> monism; but, if that one substance is physical 'stuff' and has two sets
> of properties, it is also a property dualism (eg Chalmers-style
> dualism).
>
See above. "Stuff" is a very fuzzy word in this context and not highly useful
here because of that since it is only a proxy for a more complex description
which can be given and which I, in fact, have given, above.
Chalmers' "property dualism" is explained by him as presuming the positing of
some kind of additional principle in the physical universe, on a par with
gravity, electromagnetism, etc. Thus the source of this "property" would be a
force not otherwise accounted for by the panoply of factors and forces that we
have in mind when speaking of the physical.
Such dualism in the end, while disguising itself as being only about
"properties", must, insofar as it insists that such properties are not
reducible to any of the already known factors and forces of the physical
universe, involve positing an added ontological basic (because it presumes that
consciounsess cannot be reducible to any of the factors and forces already
known to be part of the physical universe). Thus, at bottom, it IS about what
you would call "substances", even if that is not asserted by him.
As I note elsewhere, Walter on the Analytics list, argued that consciousness
could be described as a special "property" of some physical things (eventually
he noted that he meant physical events rather than things) but would not commit
to whether such a "property" could be reducible to other known physical factors
and forces or whether it was irreducible to them (in which case it would need
to be seen as either basic, itself, or reducible to some other basic that is
not the same as whatever lies at the bottom of the physical universe). Thus
nothing is gained by renaming the features of consciousness "properties"
because they could be so-called "system properties" (see Minsky) or they could
be basics or the outcome of other basics not otherwise accounted for. Unless
one goes the extra step to clarify what one has in mind (which Walter refused
to do) then the issue remains unclear. But once one does, one's choice is
either to treat "property" like we treat things like features or
characteristics OR to treat it like an ontological basic (what you apparently
prefer to call a "substance").
I would just note here that we have gone very far afield here from anything
Wittgensteinian but I would tend to think that one can apply Wittgenstein even
here, i.e., by using his approach one can see how the ambiguities in the
philosophical terms are what get us into trouble. A failure to resolve the
ambiguity with regard to "property" or with regard to "susbstance" can lead to
endless metaphysical argument with no end in sight.
Far better, it seems to me, simply to iron out the confusions that accrue to
these usages and, once having gotten clear on the terms, clear the brush away
for scientific investigation.
> >Recall that I have argued that dualism is, at least, possible but that
> >there is no reason to invoke it just to explain mind, absent either 1)
> >some evidence for it -- e.g., encounters with bodiless minds -- or 2)
> >an inability to explain the occurrence of minds in a physical way
>
> (1) would require substance (Descartes-style) dualism; but, (2) only
> rules out a substance monism that is also a property monism. as such it
> might only require a substance monism that is also a property dualism
> (eg Chalmers-style dualism) without requiring Descartes-style dualism.
>
None of which are of much interest so long as neither 1 or 2 are the case. That
is, presuming they're not, as I claim, then dualism itself is a false trail.
As noted, I think Chalmers' dualism reduces to the same thing as what you call
"substance dualism" even if he denies it and insists it is about properties
only. That, of course, is because the notions of "property" and "substance"
have been inadequately explicated. Once that is rectified, Chalmers' difference
is seen to be no difference in any substantive way at all.
> >I argued on that list that, if a claim is really dualism, it's no
> >different at bottom than what has been traditionally understood to be
> >substance dualism.
>
> the strategic value of the 'dualism is dualism' principle is that it
> facilitates two tactical flourishes that give you a rhetorical
> advantage.
>
This isn't about "rhetoric" or "advantages" but about clarity. We either seek
it or we don't. If we do, the problem, like most problems, dissolves away and
we are left with the projects of science.
> in the first maneuver, you accuse someone like Bruce of dualism by
> pointing out that he has difficulty explaining the interaction of mind
> and brain. you've only alleged property dualism (Chalmers-style
> dualism);
No, I have pointed out that what Bruce is saying involves claims dependent
about ontological basics which is what YOU equate with so-called "substance
dualism" (an antiquated term on my view).
>but, because dualism is dualism, you expect people to reject
> Bruce-style dualism as they would Descartes-style dualism.
>
I don't suggest Bruce is a follower of Descarte but that he is caught in the
same picture that held Descartes and many of us, at one time or another, when
we first start thinking about these things. This isn't about subscribing to
particular doctrines (the fine points and tenets of particular systems) but
about what pictures hold us in thrall.
> in the second maneuver, you advocate your own position, a form of
> property dualism;
Again, insofar as all that is meant by "property" is feature in the sense that
there are "system properties", then I have no problem with that
characterization but would not consider it dualism. As I said, Walter argues
that THAT is all that is meant, contra Searle's argument, but he declined to
address the underlying question of whether such "properties" are reducible to
anything other than themselves. If YOU want to take up the cudgel for Walter
(since he hasn't graced us with his presence here) I would be interested in
going further with this. What is required is to clarify whether a "property" is
reducible to things that aren't that property but which are the underlying
factors and forces of all other experienceable properties in the universe.
If yes, then it is not dualism on my view (even if some wish to call it
"property dualism"). If no, then it is dualism at bottom and no different than
what you call "substance dualism". What's needed here is clarification, not
rhetoric.
> but, if anyone points that out, you defend your
> position by saying that dualism is dualism; so, if it's not substance
> dualism (Descartes-style), it's not dualism at all.
>
See above. The name isn't important. What is important is whether or not we
think that consciousness can only be explained by recourse to some ontological
basic that is separate from the rest of the forces and factors of the physical
universe.
> >My position is still the same. I agree that we can call what I have
> >called features of consciousness "properties" (as Walter and PJ and
> >some others wanted to do) however just asserting THAT does not imply
> >dualism by itself (to speak of properties is not necessarily to assert
> >"property dualism"). "Property" can just be another word for "feature"
> >or "characteristic", which terms are metaphysically neutral (even if
> >"property" in certain philosophical traditions isn't.) Here is where
> >our choice of terms can get us into trouble.
>
> many philosophers of consciousness use 'quale/qualia' to refer to
> qualitative aspects of experience. by avoiding the word 'property' they
> avoid creating the suggestion of or the appearance of property dualism.
>
I recognize at least two uses of "qualia" and on one use, I have no problem
with the term.
> in any case, you advocate that brains cause minds. hence, although you
> only have one type of 'stuff' (physical stuff) in your philosophy, there
> are two sets of properties.
You should have seen from the above that I do not have only "one type of
'stuff' (physical stuff) in [my] philosophy." In fact don't use "stuff" in this
context at all. My description of the physical universe is far more complex
(i.e., all the factors and forces which underly the physical universe we know
via experience) and I prefer "ontological basic" to "stuff" in any event.
> there are those properties that cause purely
> physical effects (physical phenomena); and, there are those properties
> that cause experiential effects (aka mental phenomena) either in
> addition to or instead of causing physical effects as well.
>
NO. That isn't what I am saying at all. This is why "property dualism" needs to
be adequately unpacked! I am saying that some things that some physical things
do cause mental phenomena, not that there are separate properties associated
with some physical things or events that do so. This is the Walter problem all
over again!
"Property" like so many words can be used to designate a range of things
including colors and shapes of physical objects as well as propensities to
behave in certain ways, etc. We could say that it is a property of some
physical systems to cause consciousness under certain circumstances, but such a
"property" would not be a discrete thing we can observe and is thus not to be
understood as being causal. It's merely a way of describing certain
propensities of certain systems, etc.
> an example of the former would be the property some objects have of
> absorbing light of certain wavelengths which explains a purely physical
> phenomenon: those objects reflect light of other wavelengths.
>
Insofar as by "property" you mean "propensity" I would agree. But if you mean
the physical factors about those objects that are responsible for that
particular propensity I would not agree because I am not talking about any
particular physical factors. On the view I have articulated, any physical
factors capable of doing the same thing could cause consciousness. Thus we have
to be clear what we mean by "property" in cases like this.
> an example of the latter would be the property that some part of the
> nervous system has of being able to cause the sensation of redness when
> stimulated by appropriate signals from the optic nerve.
>
> as long as you say the relation between brain and mind is causal
> (instead of the relation of identity); then, your theory is a property
> dualism (Chalmers-style dualism) even if it is not a Descartes-style
> dualism (because you do not have a second substance).
>
> Joe
>
The problem with "identity" is that this term, too, is ambiguous. I have
already said that if one accepts "identity" as referring to aspects of the same
thing (two sides of a coin) then I am fine with that. But as soon as someone
says "identity" the next thing I hear is: well how can the thought and the
electrical firing in the brain associated with it be the same?
But THAT is not the kind of identity I am talking about!
If your aim is to join me in an effort to get clear on these issues, then I am
more than willing to discuss this again here. But if your aim is to try to
pigeon hole what I am saying into some kind of logical box, you need to be
aware that we have already been there and I have refused to do that.
SWM
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