[Wittrs] Re: Searle, Dennett and Wittgenstein

  • From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 16 May 2010 02:01:36 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>

>  >"In this book, I have been investigating the structure and
>  >interrelations of mind, language and society -- three interlocking
>  >frameworks. The methods are not those of the empirical sciences, where
>  >one would perform experiments or at least conduct opinion surveys. The
>  >methods I employ are more adequately described, at least in the first
>  >stages, as logical or conceptual analysis. I try to find constitutive
>  >elements of consciousness, intentionality, speech acts and social
>  >institutions by taking them apart and seeing how they work.
>

>  >Sometimes the results of the investigations are to reject the existing
>  >conceptual apparatus altogether. Thus, I claim we will not understand
>  >the relation of the mental to the physical as long as we continue to
>  >take seriously the old conceptual apparatus of dualism, monism,
>  >materialism and all the rest. Here I am proposing a conceptual revision
>  >on the grounds that the old concepts are not adequate to the facts as
>  >we can understand them, given a century of work on the brain. . . "
>

> the quote is a good one; and, should suffice to show that Searle is not
> using 'conceptual truth' as a synonym for 'analytic truth'.
>

I never claimed he was. My point was that he said of something that it was 
"conceptually true" and that by that he meant it is true by examination of the 
concepts, what the terms, themselves, mean.

> unfortunately, despite finding some good material, your commentary is
> not entirely insightful; for example, ...
>

>  >[Note here that he explicitly rejects a metaphysical approach based on
>  >arguing for or against dualism, monism, etc. His explicit position
>  >seems to be a pox on all such houses. Unfortunately, his CRA relies on
>  >a dualist presumption and this is made somewhat clearer when we
>  >consider his argument that consciousness is ontologically IRREDUCIBLE,
>  >even while granting "causal" reducibility; thus he creates all sorts of
>  >problems by separating ontological from causal questions (a rather
>  >idiosyncratic move, it seems to me) while introducing new questions by
>  >focusing on a use of "cause" which, as we have seen, lots or people
>  >seem to have a hard time agreeing to.
>

> you could learn two things from Searle:
>

> [1] the CRT/CRA is not about dualism.
>

So you assert and, no doubt, he would agree -- the problem is what is embedded 
in its assumptions which I have pointed out many times already.

> [2] a causal explanation (where 'cause' indicates 'true', cause and
> effect causation) can be interpreted as a causal reduction; but, is
> incompatible with an ontological reduction; because, (by Leibniz's Law)
> a cause cannot be identical to its own effect. hence, by emphasizing the
> ontological irreducibility of consciousness despite causal reducibility,
> Searle is one of the few philosophers of consciousness to get it right.
>

And still uses "cause" in his claims about water and wetness, thus recognizing 
the quite proper ordinary use of the term. It is this usage that matters here 
because it is perfectly conceivable that consciousness is causeable in this 
way, even if it isn't causeable in some other way. Moreover, it is at least 
arguable that at a sufficiently basic level all causes and effects are parts of 
the same systems. Thus, the wetness of water is the result of the combination 
and behavior of certain molecules on the atomic level AND the cue ball striking 
the eight ball and thereby causing it to roll into the corner pocket are also 
phenomena that are seen to be the result of the combination and behavior of 
certain molecules on the atomic level. On this view, the constitutive function 
is what underlies the causal and constitution, of course, is a form of identity.

Of course the A=A identity of logic is a different kind of concept, even if we 
use the word "identity" for both.

But anyway, this is by now an OLD argument here and I am tired of it.

SWM

> Joe
>
> --
>
> Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
>
> @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
>        http://what-am-i.net
> @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
>
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