Joe asked me to check the SEP entry on property dualism. It confirms my definition of property dualism as pertaining to non-physical properties: "Genuine property dualism occurs when, even at the individual level, the ontology of physics is not sufficient to constitute what is there." Dualism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ Searle agrees with the property dualist that we ought to refrain from doing an ontological reduction of mental phenomena, i.e., that we ought not completely reduce such common sense notions as thoughts, beliefs, desires, pains, semantic understandings of Chinese symbols, and so on. Such intentional states really can exist in their own right. But unlike the property dualist who sees such phenomena as non-physical and somehow over and above the brain processes that realize them, Searle sees them as having a *physical* ontology, where physical does not imply non- mental. The arise as higher order physical features of the physical brain. Because these phenomena have a physical ontology, (even if a first-person one), neuroscience can reduce them epistemically to their neurological causes even while we also preserve them ontologically. Some materialists, especially eliminativists like Dennett, seem to accept the dualistic mind/matter dichotomy of Descartes in order to argue for the physical nature of the mental. They hope in so doing to exorcise the unwanted Cartesian non-physical ghost from the physical machine, not realizing that they accept the false Cartesian categories in the process. I think Searle sees the problem rightly: he consciously and completely rejects the failed mind/matter dichotomy of Descartes and affirms both the mental and the physical. -gts ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/