[Wittrs] Bogus Claim 2: Dennett Agrees With Mirsky on Defining Cartesian Dualism
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:06:20 -0400
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>clearly, you come along to rationalize as follows: Cartesian dualists
>>believe X. Searle believes X. therefore, Searle is a Cartesian
>>dualist.
>The claim is that Searle thinks of consciousness as ontologically
>basic
just to be clear, Searle's actual claim is that consciousness is not
ontologically reducible (even though causally reducible) to the brain
processes that cause it; and, we are both treating that position as a
sufficient basis for claiming that, for Searle, consciousness is an
ontological basicality.
>which I agree is equivalent ... with the idea of substance dualism
you *agree* that those are equivalent?? Ha! who are you claiming to
agree with? Dennett?
the issue in contention is whether you can establish an equivalence
between
[1] a claim that consciousness is causally but not ontologically
reducible to the brain processes that cause it; and,
[2] a claim that consciousness is or is caused by a second kind of stuff
-- what Dennett calls mind stuff --- that interacts with physical stuff.
I'll stipulate that [2] counts as Cartesian dualism; but, you've got a
long row to hoe before you establish that [1] is equivalent to [2].
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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