Investigation of the Chicago Police Department
United States Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
and
United States Attorneys Office
Northern District of Illinois
January 13, 2017
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1
I.
BACKGROUND
16
A. Chicago, Illinois
16
B. Chicago Police Department
17
C. Chicagos Accountability Systems
18
D. Historical Background of Reform in Chicago
18
E. Federal Involvement in Chicago
20
F. Investigation of the Chicago Police Department
21
II. CPD ENGAGES IN A PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USE OF FORCE
22
A. CPD Uses Deadly Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment and
Department Policy
25
B. CPD Uses Less-Lethal Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment and
Department Policy
32
C. Video Evidence Suggests a Broader Pattern or Practice of
Unconstitutional Use of
Force
36
D. CPD Does Not Effectively Use Crisis Intervention Techniques to Reduce
the Need for Force
37
E. CPDs Failure to Accurately Document and Meaningfully Review Officers
Use of Force Perpetuates a Pattern of Unreasonable Force
41
F. CPDs New De-escalation Training and Proposed Policy Revisions Should be
Expanded and Sustained
45
III. CHICAGOS DEFICIENT ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTE TO
CPDS PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT
46
A. Chicagos Systems for Investigating Police Conduct
48
B. The City Has Put in Place Policies and Practices that Impede the
Investigation of Officer Misconduct
50
C. Investigations That CPD Does Conduct Are Neither Complete Nor
Fair
56
D. Insufficient Staffing Contributes to IPRAs Investigative Deficiencies
71
E. Investigations Lack Timely Resolutions, Undermining the Quality of
Investigations and Credibility of the Process
72
F. CPD and the City Do Not Take Sufficient Steps to Prevent Officers
from Deliberately Concealing Misconduct
74
G. The Citys Discipline System Lacks Integrity and Does Not Effectively
Deter Misconduct
80
H. Chicagos Police Board
84
ii
I. The Citys Police Accountability Ordinance and Similar Efforts to
Correct the Problems Our Investigation Identified
92
IV. CPD DOES NOT PROVIDE OFFICERS WITH SUFFICIENT DIRECTION,
SUPERVISION, OR SUPPORT TO ENSURE LAWFUL AND EFFECTIVE
POLICING
93
A. Training
93
B.
Supervision
105
C. Officer Wellness and Safety
118
D. Data Collection and Transparency
124
E.
Promotions
129
V. CPD MUST BETTER SUPPORT AND INCENTIVIZE POLICING THAT IS LAWFUL AND
RESTORES TRUST AMONG CHICAGOS MARGINALIZED COMMUNITIES
134
A. CPDs Move to Restore True Community Policing Will Be Difficult But Is
Promising
136
B. CPD Must Change Practices to Restore Trust and Ensure Lawful
Policing
139
C. A Trust-Building, Community-Focused Approach to Policing Will Better
Promote Lawful Policing and Public Safety
150
VI.
RECOMMENDATIONS
150
A. Use of Force
151
B. Accountability
154
C. Training
156
D.
Supervision
156
E. Officer Wellness and
Safety
157
F. Data Collection and Transparency
158
G.
Promotions
159
H. Community
Policing
160
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On December 7, 2015, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), Civil
Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, and the United States
Attorneys Office for the Northern District of Illinois, jointly initiated
an investigation of the City of Chicagos Police Department (CPD) and the
Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA). This investigation was
undertaken to determine whether the Chicago Police Department is engaging
in a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct and, if so, what systemic
deficiencies or practices within CPD, IPRA, and the City might be
facilitating or causing this pattern or practice.
Our investigation assessed CPDs use of force, including deadly force, and
addressed CPD policies, training, reporting, investigation, and review
related to officer use of force. The investigation further addressed CPDs
and IPRAs systems of accountability both as they relate to officer use of
force and officer misconduct, including the intake, investigation, and
review of allegations of officer misconduct, and the imposition of
discipline or other corrective action. We also investigated racial,
ethnic, or other disparities in CPDs force and accountability practices,
and assessed how those disparities inform the breakdown in community
trust.
We opened this investigation pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. 14141 (Section 14141), Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (Title VI), and the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3789d (Safe Streets
Act). Section 14141 prohibits law enforcement agencies from engaging in a
pattern or practice of conduct that violates the Constitution or laws of
the United States. Title VI and its implementing regulations and the Safe
Streets Act prohibit law enforcement practices that have a disparate
impact based on protected status, such as race or ethnicity, unless these
practices are necessary to achieve legitimate, non-discriminatory
objectives.
This investigation was initiated as Chicago grappled with the aftermath of
the release of a video showing a white police officer fatally shooting
black teenager Laquan McDonald. This aftermath included protests, murder
charges for the involved officer, and the resignation of Chicagos police
superintendent. The McDonald incident was widely viewed as a tipping
pointigniting longstanding concerns about CPD officers use of force, and
the Citys systems for detecting and correcting the unlawful use of force.
Over the year-plus since release of that video, and while we have been
conducting this investigation, Chicago experienced a surge in shootings
and homicides. The reasons for this spike are broadly debated and
inarguably complex. But on two points there is little debate. First, for
decades, certain neighborhoods on Chicagos South and West Sides have been
disproportionately ravaged by gun violence. Those same neighborhoods have
borne the brunt of the recent surge of violence. And second, for Chicago
to find solutionsshort- and long-term for making those neighborhoods safe,
it is imperative that the City rebuild trust between CPD and the people it
serves, particularly in these communities. The City and CPD acknowledge
that this trust has been broken, despite the diligent efforts and brave
actions of countless CPD officers. It has been broken by systems that have
allowed CPD officers who violate the law to escape accountability. This
breach in trust has in turn eroded CPDs ability to effectively
2
prevent crime; in other words, trust and effectiveness in combating
violent crime are inextricably intertwined.
The aim of this investigation was to conduct a thorough, independent, and
fair assessment of CPDs and IPRAs practices. To accomplish this goal, we
relied on several sources of information.
First, we reviewed thousands of pages of documents provided to us by CPD,
IPRA, and the City, including policies, procedures, training plans,
Department orders and memos, internal and external reports, and more. We
also obtained access to the Citys entire misconduct complaint database and
data from all reports filled out following officers use of force. From
there, we reviewed a randomized, representative sample of force reports
and investigative files for incidents that occurred between January 2011
and April 2016, as well as additional incident reports and investigations.
Overall, we reviewed over 170 officer-involved shooting investigations,
and documents related to over 425 incidents of less-lethal force.
We also spent extensive time in Chicagoover 300 person-daysmeeting with
community members and City officials, and interviewing current and former
CPD officers and IPRA investigators. In addition to speaking with the
Superintendent and other CPD leadership, we met with the command staff of
several specialized units, divisions, and departments. We toured CPDs
training facilities and observed training programs. We also visited each
of Chicagos 22 police districts, where we addressed roll call, spoke with
command staff and officers, and conducted over 60 ride-alongs with
officers. We met several times with Chicagos officer union, Lodge No. 7 of
the Fraternal Order of Police, as well as the sergeants, lieutenants, and
captains unions. All told, we heard from over 340 individual CPD members,
and 23 members of IPRAs staff. Our findings were also significantly
informed by our conversations with members of the Chicago community. We
met with over ninety community organizations, including non-profits,
advocacy and legal organizations, and faith-based groups focused on a wide
range of issues. We participated in several community forums in different
neighborhoods throughout Chicago where we heard directly from the family
members of individuals who were killed by CPD officers and others who
shared their insights and experiences. We also met with several local
researchers, academics, and lawyers who have studied CPD extensively for
decades. Most importantly, however, we heard directly from individuals who
live and work throughout the City about their interactions with CPD
officers. Overall, we talked to approximately a thousand community
members. We received nearly 600 phone calls, emails, and letters from
individuals who were eager to provide their experiences and insights.
In addition to attorneys, paralegals, outreach specialists, and data
analysts from the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of
Justice and the United States Attorneys Office for the Northern District
of Illinois, 11 independent subject-matter experts assisted with this
investigation. Most of these experts are current or former law enforcement
officials from police departments across the country. Accordingly, these
experts have decades of expertise in areas such as the use of force,
accountability, training, supervision, community policing, officerinvolved
domestic violence and sexual misconduct, officer wellness, and more. These
experts
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accompanied us on-site, reviewed documents and investigative files, and
provided invaluable insights that informed both the course of this
investigation and its conclusions.
During the year it took us to complete this investigation, the City of
Chicago took action of its own. Following the release of dashboard-camera
video capturing the death of Laquan McDonald, Mayor Rahm Emanuel
established the Police Accountability Task Force (PATF).
The Mayor charged the PATF with assessing the Police Department and making
recommendations for change in five areas: community relations; oversight
and accountability; de-escalation; early intervention and personnel
concerns; and video release protocols. In April 2016, the PATF issued a
report with over a hundred recommendations for improving transparency and
accountability. In December of 2016, the City issued a progress report
outlining the steps it has taken since April to meet the recommendations
made by the PATF. Perhaps most significantly, the City passed an ordinance
creating the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), which is
scheduled to replace IPRA in 2017. The ordinance also establishes a Deputy
Inspector General for Public Safety, who is charged with auditing the
entire police accountability system and identifying patterns that violate
residents constitutional rights.
In June of 2016, the City issued a new transparency policy mandating the
release of videos and other materials related to certain officer
misconduct investigations. CPD also pledged to establish an anonymous
hotline for CPD members to report misconduct; began an ambitious process
to develop an early intervention system; and developed a draft
disciplinary matrix to guide CPD in assigning appropriate discipline for
various misconduct violations.
The City embarked on other initiatives during our investigation that are
intended to improve policing in Chicago. In early 2016, the City began a
pilot program for body-worn cameras, and reported recently that the
expansion of the program will be accelerated so that all officers will be
wearing these cameras by the end of 2017. In the last few months, CPD
began an important force mitigation/de-escalation training course for
officers, and revised several policies related to use of force. The City
also committed to providing additional training on how officers and
emergency dispatchers respond to individuals in mental health crisis, and
to improving CPDs training more broadly. As part of its efforts to engage
community members and improve police-community relations, the City
established a Community Policing Advisory Panel that will help develop a
new strategic plan for community policing.
The City is also undertaking recruitment efforts aimed at increasing CPDs
diversity, and recently retained a consultant to complete a staffing
analysis to inform deployment decisions Department-wide.
Many of these planned or implemented reforms are discussed in detail in
this Report, alongside our assessment of their impact on the problems our
investigation found, and whether CPD and the City need to go further. As
noted, while our investigation was underway and the City moved forward
with some reforms, Chicago experienced an unprecedented surge in shootings
and homicides. In 2016, there were 762 homicides, nearly 300 more than the
previous year and, according to the draft of a new study from the
University of Chicago Crime Lab, the largest single-year homicide increase
of the last 25 years among the five most populous United States cities.
Overall, there were 3,550 shootings, with 4,331 shooting victims, in
Chicago in 2016, approximately 1,100 more than in 2015. While shootings
and homicides occurred in all parts of the City, they were largely
4
concentrated in Chicagos South Side and West Side neighborhoods. Homicide
clearance rates, the rate at which police identify the suspected killer,
continued their years-long slide, with CPD clearing only 29% of all
homicides, less than half the national clearance rate.
During our investigation, DOJ has enhanced its assistance with CPDs reform
and violence-reduction efforts. DOJ has allocated additional funding to
CPD to support its efforts, provided technical assistance, and continued
and expanded its cooperation through DOJs Violence Reduction Network
(VRN), an innovative approach to support and enhance local violence
reduction efforts. Since December 2014, CPD and DOJ, through the United
States Attorneys Office in Chicago, have hosted nine Community Trust
Roundtables across Chicagos most violence-plagued neighborhoods. These
recent efforts build on the foundation of DOJs longstanding collaborative
initiatives with CPD.
It has never been more important to rebuild trust for the police within
Chicagos neighborhoods most challenged by violence, poverty, and
unemployment. As discussed below and throughout our Report, Chicago must
undergo broad, fundamental reform to restore this trust. This will be
difficult, but will benefit both the public and CPDs own officers. The
increased trust these reforms will build is necessary to solve and prevent
violent crime. And the conduct and practices that restore trust will also
carry out an equally important public service: demonstrating to
communities racked with violence that their police force cares about them
and has not abandoned them, regardless of where they live or the color of
their skin. That confidence is broken in many neighborhoods in Chicago.
At the same time, many CPD officers feel abandoned by the public and often
by their own Department. We found profoundly low morale nearly every place
we went within CPD.
Officers generally feel that they are insufficiently trained and supported
to do their work effectively. Our investigation indicates that both CPDs
lawfulness and effectiveness can be vastly improved if the City and CPD
make the changes necessary to consistently incentivize and reward
effective, ethical, and active policing. While it will take time and
concerted focus to implement all of the necessary changes, a strong sign
of a genuine and unalterable commitment to such change could increase
officer morale more quickly, especially among the countless good officers
within CPD who police diligently every day, and who disapprove of some
officer conduct they seeand many of whom quietly told us how eager they
are for the kind of change that can come only from an investigation like
the one we have just completed. It is within this current climate, and
with these challenges in mind, that we conducted our investigation and
make the following findings.
Force We reviewed CPDs force practices mindful that officers routinely
place themselves in harms way in order to uphold their commitment to serve
and protect the people of the City of Chicago, and that officers regularly
encounter individuals who may be armed and determined to avoid arrest. We
likewise recognize that officers have not only a right, but an obligation,
to protect themselves and others from threats of harm, including deadly
harm, which may arise in an instant.
5
But even within this context, we, in consultation with several active law
enforcement experts, found that CPD officers engage in a pattern or
practice of using force, including deadly force, that is unreasonable. We
found further that CPD officers force practices unnecessarily endanger
themselves and others and result in unnecessary and avoidable shootings
and other uses of force.
As discussed throughout this Report, this pattern is largely attributable
to systemic deficiencies within CPD and the City. CPD has not provided
officers with adequate guidance to understand how and when they may use
force, or how to safely and effectively control and resolve encounters to
reduce the need to use force. CPD also has failed to hold officers
accountable when they use force contrary to CPD policy or otherwise commit
misconduct. This failure to hold officers accountable results in some
officers remaining with the Department when they should have been relieved
of duty. These officers often continue their misconduct including, at
times, again using unreasonable deadly force. More broadly, these failures
result in officers not having the skills or tools necessary to use force
wisely and lawfully, and they send a dangerous message to officers and the
public that unreasonable force by CPD officers will be tolerated. We found
further that CPDs failure to meaningfully and routinely review or
investigate officer use of force is a significant factor in perpetuating
the practices that result in the pattern of unlawful conduct we found.
Each of these causal factors is discussed further in this Summary and the
accompanying Report.
Our finding that CPD engages in a pattern or practice of force in
violation of the Constitution is based on a comprehensive investigation of
CPDs force practices and a close analysis of hundreds of individual force
incidents. We reviewed CPDs policies related to the use, reporting, and
investigation of force, including older versions of polices that were
effective during our review period, and CPDs proposed revised policies. We
spoke with officers at all ranks, including the Superintendent and the
Chief and Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Patrol, to understand how officers
are trained to use force, their view of when force is appropriate, and how
the policies are interpreted in practice throughout CPD. We also did an
in-depth review of officer reports of force, civilian complaints of force,
and CPDs and IPRAs review of force, and investigations of allegations of
excessive force. We reviewed all documents we were provided related to
over 425 incidents of less-lethal force, including representative samples
of officers own reports of force, and of investigations of civilian
complaints about officer force between January 2011 and April 2016. We
also reviewed over 170 files related to officer-involved shootings.
The pattern of unlawful force we found resulted from a collection of poor
police practices that our investigation indicated are used routinely
within CPD. We found that officers engage in tactically unsound and
unnecessary foot pursuits, and that these foot pursuits too often end with
officers unreasonably shooting someoneincluding unarmed individuals. We
found that officers shoot at vehicles without justification and in
contradiction to CPD policy. We found further that officers exhibit poor
discipline when discharging their weapons and engage in tactics that
endanger themselves and public safety, including failing to await backup
when they safely could and should; using unsound tactics in approaching
vehicles; and using their own vehicles in a manner that is dangerous.
These are issues that can and must be better addressed through training,
accountability and ultimately cultural change.
6
Among the most egregious uses of deadly force we reviewed were incidents
in which CPD officers shot at suspects who presented no immediate threat.
CPDs use of less-lethal force also contributes to the pattern of unlawful
conduct we found. We reviewed instances of CPD using less-lethal force,
often Tasers, including in drive-stun mode, against people who posed no
threat, and using unreasonable retaliatory force and unreasonable force
against children. We found also that CPD officers use force against people
in mental health crisis where force might have been avoided. These issues
are further discussed, along with specific examples, in the Force Section
of this Report. CPD does not investigate or review these force incidents
to determine whether its responses to these events were appropriate or
lawful, or whether force could have been avoided. The City is currently
taking steps to improve its response to persons in mental health or
behavioral crisis, in part in response to the tragic shootings deaths of
Quintonio LeGrier and Bettie Jones. While we applaud the steps the City
has taken, as discussed in our Report, there are important additional
steps the City needs to take. The City must do more to ensure that
effective, well-trained crisis intervention officers respond to these
events, and that mentalhealth or similar crises are analyzed to determine
whether changes to the program or CPDs crisis response are warranted.
We found many circumstances in which officers accounts of force incidents
were later discredited, in whole or part, by video evidence. Given the
numerous use-of-force incidents without video evidence, discussed further
in Section II.C. of this Report, the pattern of unreasonable force is
likely even more widespread than we were able to discern through our
investigation.
In light of these incidents and many more like them, we support the Citys
decision to accelerate its plan to ensure that all CPD officers have body
cameras so that all officers have them by the end of this year. While we
urge the City to go forward with this plan, we hope the City will also
heed the concerns set out later in our Report that it work with police
unions and community groups on policies and protocols for body-camera
usage, and that it develop the supervisory and accountability supports
necessary to ensure that body cameras are effective, both at preventing
misconduct and exonerating officers where they are wrongfully accused.
Our review further determined that CPD and IPRA do not adequately respond
to incidents in which officers used unreasonable or unnecessary
forceincluding force that resulted in a persons death and the officers
stated justification was at odds with the physical evidence. Although
IPRAs deficienciesdiscussed in the Accountability Section of our
Reporthave played a central role in allowing patterns of unconstitutional
force to persist, IPRA cannot eliminate the pattern of misconduct we found
unless CPDs force reporting and investigations change fundamentally as
well. As an initial matter, formal and functional gaps in IPRAs
jurisdiction mean that many incidents are inadequately investigated or not
investigated at all. Where IPRA does act on its jurisdiction, we found
that IPRAs ability to fairly investigate force pursuant to its mandate is
compromised by deficiencies in how CPD reports force and gathers related
evidence immediately after a force incident.
CPD policy requires officers to report force but, in practice, officers
are not required to provide detail about the force they used that is
sufficient for an adequate review, and most officer
7
force is not reviewed or investigated. Although shootings where a person
is struck are investigated, as discussed in the Accountability Section,
those investigations are inadequate. As a result of so few force incidents
being even nominally investigated, and the low quality of the force
investigations that do occur, there is no meaningful, systemic
accountability for officers who use force in violation of the law or CPD
policy. Nor is there any opportunity for meaningful assessment of whether
policies, training, or equipment should be modified to improve force
outcomes in the future for officers or civilians. The failure to review
and investigate officer use of force has helped create a culture in which
officers expect to use force and not be questioned about the need for or
propriety of that use. In this way, CPDs failure to adequately review
officer use of force on a regular basis has combined with CPDs failure to
properly train and supervise officers to perpetuate a pattern of unlawful
use of force within CPD.
The City has acknowledged and begun to correct a number of deficiencies
related to how officers use and are held accountable for force. In March
2016, CPD began a review of its force policies in an effort to provide
clearer direction to officers on the appropriate use of force. CPD
released the draft force policies in October 2016 for public comment. The
proposed revisions address core force principles such as the sanctity of
life; ethical behavior; objective and proportional use of force; use of
deadly force; de-escalation; and force mitigation. CPD is reviewing the
public feedback and, at the time of this drafting, will in the very near
future incorporate suggestions and improvements to prepare final versions
of the policies. CPD also has begun providing all officers with
force-mitigation training designed to better equip officers to de-escalate
conflicts safely; recognize the signs of mental illness, trauma and crisis
situations; and respond quickly and appropriately when force is necessary.
These steps are meaningful and important. But to fulfill their promise,
this new approach to CPD use of force must be supported by leadership and
enforced by supervisors. Moreover, they must be accompanied by changes to
how force is reported and reviewed, not only so that officers can be held
accountable when they misuse force, but so that CPD can learn from force
incidents and make the policy, training, and equipment changes necessary
to make officers and the public safer and more secure.
Accountability
Police accountability systems are vital to lawful policing. In combination
with effective supervision, a robust accountability system helps identify,
correct and ultimately prevent unreasonable and unnecessary uses of force.
We also investigated the Citys police accountability systems and their
effectiveness in identifying police misconduct and holding officers
responsible.
The City received over 30,000 complaints of police misconduct during the
five years preceding our investigation, but fewer than 2% were sustained,
resulting in no discipline in 98% of these complaints. This is a low
sustained rate. In evaluating the Citys accountability structures, we
looked beneath these and other disconcerting statistics and attempted to
diagnose the cause of the low sustained rates by examining the systems in
place, the resources, and leadership involved with the Citys
accountability bodies, including CPDs Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA),
IPRA, and the Chicago Police Board. We reviewed their policies and
practices, interviewed many current and former supervisors, investigators,
and other members involved,
8
and we reviewed hundreds of force and misconduct investigative files from
an accountability standpoint. We discovered numerous entrenched, systemic
policies and practices that undermine police accountability, as described
below. We also took into account that the City has taken many steps during
our investigation to address many of these accountability deficiencies,
including creating COPA, which will replace IPRA as the independent agency
responsible for investigating serious police misconduct. Although we
commend the City for these and other recent reforms, they do not
sufficiently address many of problems we discovered in the Citys deeply
flawed investigative system. The City does not investigate the majority of
cases it is required by law to investigate.
Most of those cases are uninvestigated because they lack a supporting
affidavit from the complaining party, but the City also fails to
investigate anonymous and older misconduct complaints as well as those
alleging lower level force and non-racial verbal abuse. Finally, and also
contrary to legal mandates, IPRA does not investigate most Taser
discharges and officerinvolved shootings where no one is hit. Some of
these investigations are ignored based on procedural hurdles in City
agreements with its unions, but some are unilateral decisions by the
accountability agencies to reduce caseloads and manage resources. And many
misconduct complaints that avoid these investigative barriers are still
not fully investigated because they are resolved through a defective
mediation process, which is actually a plea bargain system used to dispose
of serious misconduct claims in exchange for modest discipline. Regardless
of the reasons, this failure to fully investigate almost half of all
police misconduct cases seriously undermines accountability. These are all
lost opportunities to identify misconduct, training deficiencies, and
problematic trends, and to hold officers and CPD accountable when
misconduct occurs. In order to address these ignored cases, the City must
modify its own policies, and work with the unions to address certain CBA
provisions, and in the meantime, it must aggressively investigate all
complaints to the extent authorized under these contracts.
Those cases that are investigated suffer from serious investigative flaws
that obstruct objective fact finding. Civilian and officer witnesses, and
even the accused officers, are frequently not interviewed during an
investigation. The potential for inappropriate coordination of testimony,
risk of collusion, and witness coaching during interviews is built into
the system, occurs routinely, and is not considered by investigators in
evaluating the case. The questioning of officers is often cursory and
aimed at eliciting favorable statements justifying the officers actions
rather than seeking truth. Questioning is often marked by a failure to
challenge inconsistencies and illogical officer explanations, as well as
leading questions favorable to the officer. Investigators routinely fail
to review and incorporate probative evidence from parallel civil and
criminal proceedings based on the same police incident. And consistent
with these biased investigative techniques, the investigators summary
reports are often drafted in a manner favorable to the officer by omitting
conflicts in testimony or with physical evidence that undermine the
officers justification or by exaggerating evidence favorable to the
officer, all of which frustrates a reviewers ability to evaluate for
investigative quality and thoroughness.
Investigative fact-finding into police misconduct and attempts to hold
officers accountable are also frustrated by police officers code of
silence. The City, police officers, and leadership within CPD and its
police officer union acknowledge that a code of silence among Chicago
police officers exists, extending to lying and affirmative efforts to
conceal evidence. Officers who may be inclined to cover up misconduct will
be deterred from doing so if they
9
understand that honesty is the most crucial component of their job and
that the Department will aggressively seek to identify dishonest officers
and appropriately discipline them. However, our investigation found that
IPRA and BIA treat such efforts to hide evidence as ancillary and
unexceptional misconduct, and often do not investigate it, causing
officers to believe there is not much to lose if they lie to cover up
misconduct. Investigators employ a higher standard to sustain claims
against officers for making false statements under what is known as a Rule
14 charge and they rarely expand their investigations to charge accused
and witness officers with lying to cover up misconduct. Nor, until
recently, has the City focused much attention on officers efforts to
conceal by mishandling video and audio equipment or by retaliating against
civilians who witness misconduct. The Citys failure to prioritize Rule 14
investigations must change. When it is aware of information that an
officer lied or otherwise covered up misconduct, the City must actively
and aggressively investigate and consistently seek to discipline officers
who do so.
We found that inadequate staffing contributes both to these investigative
flaws and to the Citys decisions to forego or short-circuit so many of the
investigations it should be handling.
The City has recently committed to providing more funding to IPRA when it
becomes COPA, and the agency has already begun to hire additional staff.
But COPAs range of responsibilities will also be much broader than IPRAs,
and there has not been sufficient analysis to determine whether COPA will
have the capacity to do any better than IPRA. We also found that poor
training accounted for some of these investigative deficiencies.
Investigators and leadership at IPRA acknowledged investigative training
was inadequate, and IPRA/COPA is developing plans to revamp and increase
training for all staff, especially investigators.
While we commend IPRA for this reform, improved training is likewise
necessary for BIA investigators as well. Such enhanced training is an
important step towards improving the quality of misconduct investigations
handled and changing the culture to one that is more determined to resolve
investigations and reliably determine whether an officer committed
misconduct. However, the depth and breadth of that training is unclear. It
should not only cover general investigative techniques, but should include
training to eliminate biased investigative techniques as well as training
in specific areas, including unlawful entry and seizure, domestic violence
and sexual assault, and false statement charges under Rule 14. In the rare
instances when complaints of misconduct are sustained, we found that
discipline is haphazard and unpredictable, and is meted out in a way that
does little to deter misconduct. Officers are often disciplined for
conduct far less serious than the conduct that prompted the investigation,
and in many cases, a complaint may be sustained, but the officer is not
disciplined at all. The police discipline system, including the Citys
draft disciplinary matrix, fails to provide clear guidance on appropriate,
fair, and consistent penalty ranges, thus undermining the legitimacy and
deterrent effect of discipline within CPD.
Finally, we also found deficiencies with the Chicago Police Boards
systems, which impair its ability to be an effective component of CPDs
accountability structure. The Board should focus on improving its civil
service commission function of providing due process to officers accused
of misconduct and relinquish its role of providing community input into
CPDs accountability system to the Community Oversight Board that the City
has committed to creating. The fairness of Police Board hearings can be
improved by modifying current rules that bar the officers negative
disciplinary history but allow the officers complimentary history
10
as well as favorable character evidence offered by the accuseds
supervisors. The City can further level the playing field by providing
more experienced advocates to represent CPD before the Board and by
offering better training for Board members. Allowing Board members to hear
evidence directly, instead of a second-hand summary from the hearing
officer, and increasing the Boards transparency will further instill
community confidence in the Police Board.
Training and Supervision
CPDs pattern of unlawful conduct is due in part to deficiencies in CPDs
training and supervision. CPD does not provide officers or supervisors
with adequate training and does not encourage or facilitate adequate
supervision of officers in the field. These shortcomings in training and
supervision result in officers who are unprepared to police lawfully and
effectively; supervisors who do not mentor or support constitutional
policing by officers; and a systemic inability to proactively identify
areas for improvement, including Department-wide training needs and
interventions for officers engaging in misconduct. Both at the outset and
through the duration of their careers, CPD officers do not receive the
quality or quantity of training necessary for their jobs. Pre-service
Academy training relies on outmoded teaching methods and materials, and
does not equip recruits with the skills, knowledge, and confidence
necessary to serve Chicago communities. For example, we observed an
Academy training on deadly forcean important topic, given our findings
regarding CPDs use of forcethat consisted of a video made decades ago,
which was inconsistent with both current law and CPDs own policies. The
impact of this poor training was apparent when we interviewed recruits who
recently graduated from the Academy: only one in six recruits we spoke
with came close to properly articulating the legal standard for use of
force. Post-Academy field training is equally flawed. The Field Training
Officer (FTO) Program, as currently structured, does not attract a
sufficient number of qualified, effective leaders to train new
probationary police officers (PPOs), has an insufficient number of FTOs to
meet demand, and fails to provide PPOs with appropriate training,
mentorship, and oversight. Finally, in-service training is not provided
pursuant to any long-term training plan or strategy. Instead, CPD provides
only sporadic in-service training, and does not think proactively about
training needs Department-wide. Without a long-term training plan, CPD is
often called upon to deliver ad-hoc trainings on tight timelines in
response to crises. Consequently, in-service trainings are often
incomplete and ineffective at teaching officers important skills and
information. The recentlymandated Department-wide Taser training
exemplifies CPDs problematic approach to in-service training. Large
numbers of officers were cycled through this important training quickly in
order to meet a deadline set by the City, without proper curriculum,
staff, or equipment. This left many officers who completed the training
uncomfortable with how to use Tasers effectively as a less-lethal force
optionthe very skill the training was supposed to teach. The City
recognizes the need for comprehensive reform of its training program. Its
plans for reform are discussed in this Report. While laudable, these plans
are still preliminary and amount to verbal commitments with uncertain
dates for completion. Academy curriculum revisions, restructuring of the
field training program, and development of a proactive, wellplanned
in-service training program are all needed. CPD must also evaluate whether
it has the staff, equipment, and physical space to meet the training
demands of the Department, and if not, proactively plan for how to meet
training needs going forward. CPD must identify the resources
11
necessary to make these changes, and obtain commitment from the City to
provide what is needed.
We found that deficiencies in officer training are exacerbated by the lack
of adequate supervision CPD provides to officers in the field, which
further contributes to CPDs pattern or practice of unconstitutional
policing. CPD does not sufficiently encourage or facilitate supervisors to
provide meaningful supervision to officers. Overall, CPD does not hold
supervisors accountable for performing certain basic supervisory tasks,
including guiding officer behavior or reporting misconduct. Additionally,
structural deficiencies in how CPD organizes supervision prevent effective
oversight of officer activities. CPD requires supervisors to engage in
non-supervisory tasks and manage too many officers at a time. CPD also
structures its shift system in such a way that supervisors do not
consistently work with the same groups of officers, which inhibits
supervisors from learning the needs of officers under their watch. And,
much like the deficiencies in CPDs officer training, CPD does not
adequately train supervisors on how to provide appropriate supervision.
Compounding its supervision problems, CPD does not have a meaningful early
intervention system (EIS) to effectively assist supervisors in identifying
and correcting problematic behavior. CPDs current behavior intervention
systems are underused and inadequate, putting both officers and the public
at risk.
Providing robust, meaningful supervision would not only better prevent
officer misconduct, it would help CPD better prevent crime in the
community. The City and CPD leadership must make the necessary reforms to
supervision to protect public and officer safety.
Officer Wellness and Safety Policing is a high-stress profession. Law
enforcement officers often are called upon to deal with violence or crises
as problem solvers, and they often are witnesses to human tragedy. In
Chicago, this stress is particularly acute, for several reasons.
Increasing levels of gun violence and neighborhood conditions take their
toll on officers as well as residents. At the same time, the relationship
between CPD officers and the communities they serve is strained; officers
on the street are expected to prevent crime, yet they must also be the
face of the Department in communities that have lost trust in the police.
This makes it particularly difficult to police effectively. And these
stresses animate the interactions officers have with the communities that
they serveboth positively and negatively. As one CPD counselor explained,
it is the stress of the job thats the precursor to the crisis.
Our investigation found that these stressors can, and do, play out in
harmful ways for CPD officers. CPD deals with officer alcoholism, domestic
violence, and suicide. And as explained elsewhere in this Report, CPD
officers engage in a pattern or practice of using force that is
unjustified, disproportionate, and otherwise excessive. Although the
pressure CPD officers are under is by no means an excuse for violating the
constitutional rights of the citizens they serve, high levels of
unaddressed stress can compromise officer well-being and impact an
officers demeanor and judgment, which in turn impacts how that officer
interacts with the public. Some officers are able to manage the stress by
shifting their focus to working even harder to do their jobs well. For
others, it is more difficult. As these officers struggle with the stress
of the job, they can close off and push away those they serve and those
who want to help. As noted by the Presidents Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, an officer whose capabilities,
12
judgment, and behavior are adversely affected by poor physical or
psychological health not only may be of little use to the community he or
she serves but also may be a danger to the community and to other
officers. For precisely these reasons, law enforcement agencies can and
should do everything they can to support officers physical and
psychological well-being.
Because of how officer wellness can impact officer behavior, and the
uniquely tense circumstances facing CPD officers each day, CPD officers
need greater support from the City and CPD leadership. CPD and the City
should think meaningfully about how to better address the stressors CPD
officers face, and how to create an overarching operational plan that
includes robust counseling programs, comprehensive training, functioning
equipment, and other tools to ensure officers are successful and healthy.
CPD should move away from traditional strategies that fail to fully
address the issue of officer wellness and react to the changing nature of
policing in Chicago and the demographic changes in CPDs police force. CPD
needs to transform its officer support system so that officer wellness is
an integral part of the Departments operations and reinforces the values
of wellness and a culture that encourages officers to seek assistance when
needed. CPD also should work to overcome officers concern that using
officer wellness services will negatively impact their career, and to
educate officers on the value of these services. In this way, CPD can
better support its officers success, personally and professionally.
Data Collection and Transparency
A lack of transparency regarding CPDs and IPRAs activities has contributed
to CPDs failure to identify and correct unlawful practices and to distrust
between CPD and the public. Since the start of our investigation, the City
and CPD have instituted steps aimed at increasing transparency regarding
CPDs and IPRAs work. For example, the current IPRA Chief Administrator
significantly improved IPRAs public reporting by expanding the amount of
information regarding misconduct investigations that is regularly posted
on IPRAs website.
And, following the PATFs recommendation, the City adopted a transparency
policy, which created a portal on IPRAs website where video and other
evidence of certain types of police misconduct investigations are posted.
These steps go beyond the measures many other agencies put in place.
Our investigation found that additional steps are necessary to ensure the
City is as transparent as possible and uses its data to adequately address
the patterns and practices identified in this investigation. The City and
CPD must improve the ways in which they collect, organize, analyze, track,
and report on available data and data trends. Currently, CPDs data
collection systems are siloed and do not allow for meaningful cross-system
data collection, evaluation, and tracking. As a result, CPD is unable to
easily use the data at its disposal to identify trends, including trends
in misconduct complaints, training deficiencies, and more. Improving these
systems will allow CPD to better understand its operations, and more
easily report CPD activities to the public.
The data that is collected and publicly reported by the City is also
incomplete, and at times, inaccurate. IPRA reports only on how
investigations are resolved by that agency; but, as discussed in this
Report, the findings of IPRA investigators can be set aside, and its
discipline recommendations greatly reduced. IPRAs reporting, therefore,
does not give a full picture of how misconduct investigations are
ultimately resolved. Independent evaluation of IPRAs
13
publicly reported data regarding use of force found that the data was, at
least historically, inaccurate. And, even though IPRAs public reporting is
far more comprehensive now than it was before, CPD does not aggregate or
publish the same information for investigations handled by BIA and the
districts. Currently, very little information is published about those
investigations, even though those entities handle roughly 70% of all
misconduct complaints. Finally, the City should also release more
information regarding settlements of officer misconduct lawsuits; publicly
available data is, at present, limited to the general nature of the
allegation (e.g., excessive force or false arrest) and the settlement
amount.
Finally, the City should actively engage the public in crafting solutions
in this area. Recent public engagement efforts, such as soliciting public
feedback on the video release policy, COPA ordinance, and new use-of-force
policies, were important steps toward increasing solicitation of public
input into contemplated reforms. Improving and expanding upon these recent
initiatives will ensure that the public understands and supports, to the
greatest extent possible, the additional reforms currently being
considered by the City.
Promotions
Dedicated, highly qualified supervisors are vital to ensuring CPD officers
are able to police safely while valuing and respecting the rights of all
community members. Under CPDs current promotions system, officers can be
promoted to detective, sergeant, or lieutenant based on test scores or
evaluation of other merit-based criteria. The merit-based promotion track
was created following several lawsuits challenging CPDs promotional exams
as discriminatory. The merit promotions system was then later challenged,
as part of larger litigation regarding City hiring practices, as unfairly
promoting individuals based on political connections rather than true
merit. All of these legal battles resulted in several important reforms,
including the creation of a City Hiring Plan and corresponding policies
intended to organize and structure the merit promotion process.
Despite these important reforms, however, officers we spoke with continue
to express skepticism about CPDs promotions system. Much of this is
because CPD does not effectively communicate the details of its promotions
process to the rank-and-file, and does not provide sufficient transparency
following promotional decisions to allay officer concerns. For example,
officers are unaware of the metrics used to evaluate individuals who are
nominated for merit promotions, or why the officers receiving those
promotions were selected. By not sharing this information publicly, and
not ensuring Department-wide understanding of the promotions system, CPD
has perpetuated an atmosphere of doubt around the promotions process as a
whole.
CPD can and should do several things to restore officer and public
confidence in its promotions system, and to ensure that the best-qualified
candidates are promoted in a fair, lawful, and transparent manner.
Promotional exams must be reviewed regularly to ensure they are fair and
lawful, and offered often enough to ensure well-qualified candidates have
the opportunity to be promoted. Monitoring and oversight of compliance
with
CPDs merit
promotion policies are also necessary to ensure those systems are working
as intended, and that merit promotion decisions are as transparent as
possible. Without regular review and increased transparency, CPDs
promotion processes will continue to be viewed as unfair and ineffective.
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Community-Focused Policing
A contributing factor to CPDs unreasonable use of force is CPDs approach
to policing. CPD as a whole needs to support and provide incentives to
policing practices that are lawful and restore trust among the Citys
marginalized communities. Within the past several months, CPD and the City
have announced ambitious plans to revive community policing in Chicago.
Superintendent Johnson has formed a Community Policing Advisory Panel to
develop strategies for enhancing community policing within CPD. The
Superintendent has pledged to remake the Departments Chicago Alternative
Policing Strategy (CAPS), and the Department recently issued a directive
expanding community involvement programs in several districts. CPD has
several additional community policing-related initiatives underway. We
commend CPD for these efforts. This policing approach, when implemented
with fidelity to all its tenets, has been shown to be effective at making
communities safer while incentivizing a policing culture that builds
confidence in law enforcement. Notwithstanding this recognition, community
policing as a true CPD value and driving force fell away in Chicago many
years ago, and past attempts to restore it have not been successful. To be
successful this time, CPD must build up systems to support and bolster
this community-focused approach to policing.
CPD has the officers it needs to make community policing work. During our
investigation we observed many instances of diligent, thoughtful, and
selfless policing, and we heard stories of officers who police this way
every day. We know that there are many dedicated CPD officers who care
deeply about the community, are affected by the violence they see, and
work hard to build trust between the community and the Department. We
heard about officers and command staff who are well-respected and beloved
in the neighborhoods they patrol.
But for community policing to really take hold and succeed in Chicago, CPD
must ensure that its supervision, training, promotions and accountability
systems incentivize and support officers who police in a manner that
conveys to community members that CPD officers can be a trusted partner in
protecting them, their families, and their neighborhoods. Community
policing must be a core philosophy that is infused throughout the
Departments policing strategies and tactics.
In recent years, community policing in Chicago has been relegated, through
CAPS, to a small group of police officers and civilians in each district.
We were told by CAPS staff that CAPS offices were understaffed, and that
CAPS officers receive little training on how to accomplish their mandate.
Community policing efforts are also poorly funded and institutionally
neglected.
In addition to infusing the tenets of community policing throughout the
Department, and creating support for community policing beyond the CAPS
program, CPD must also change its policing practices so that it can
restore trust and ensure lawful policing. The Department has to do more to
ensure that officers police fairly in neighborhoods with high rates of
violent crime, and in vulnerable communities. A striking feature of our
conversations with members from Chicagos challenged communities was the
consistency with which they expressed concern about the lack of respect in
their interactions with police, whether those interactions come when
15
they are targets of police activity or when they or their family members
are the victims of crime. Advocates and members of the Latino, Muslim, and
transgender communities each separately raised concerns with us about the
Departments response to potential or apparent hate crimes against members
of their communities. There was also a sense that CPD relies too heavily
on specialized units, such as Tactical (TACT).
This may not be how CPD intends policing to be conducted or perceived in
these neighborhoods, but these experiences impact individual dignity and
residents willingness to work with law enforcement, and should not be
ignored. CPD must ensure that it is creating incentives and rewarding
policing where building community trust is central to all crimeprevention
efforts, whether this policing is done by specialized units, beat
officers, or CAPS staff.
Additionally, the City must address serious concerns about systemic
deficiencies that disproportionately impact black and Latino communities.
CPDs pattern or practice of unreasonable force and systemic deficiencies
fall heaviest on the predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods on the
South and West Sides of Chicago, which are also experiencing higher crime.
Raw statistics show that CPD uses force almost ten times more often
against blacks than against whites. As a result, residents in black
neighborhoods suffer more of the harms caused by breakdowns in uses of
force, training, supervision, accountability, and community policing.
Our investigation found also that CPD has tolerated racially
discriminatory conduct that not only undermines police legitimacy, but
also contributes to the pattern of unreasonable force.
The pattern or practice of unreasonable force, coupled with the recurrence
of unaddressed racially discriminatory conduct by officers further erodes
community trust and police effectiveness. Our review of complaints of
racially discriminatory language found repeated instances where credible
complaints were not adequately addressed. Moreover, we found that some
Chicago police officers expressed discriminatory views and intolerance
with regard to race, religion, gender, and national origin in public
social media forums, and that CPD takes insufficient steps to prevent or
appropriately respond to this animus. As CPD works to restore trust and
ensure that policing is lawful and effective, it must recognize the extent
to which this type of misconduct contributes to a culture that facilitates
unreasonable force and corrodes community trust. We have serious concerns
about the prevalence of racially discriminatory conduct by some CPD
officers and the degree to which that conduct is tolerated and in some
respects caused by deficiencies in CPD's systems of training, supervision
and accountability. In light of these concerns, combined with the fact
that the impact of CPD's pattern or practice of unreasonable force fall
heaviest on predominantly black and Latino neighborhoods, restoring
police-community trust will require remedies addressing both
discriminatory conduct and the disproportionality of illegal and
unconstitutional patterns of force on minority communities.
Finally, during our investigation, we heard allegations that CPD officers
attempt to gain information about crime using methods that undermine CPD
legitimacy and may also be unlawful. In some instances, we were told, CPD
will attempt to glean information about gang activity or other crime by
arresting or detaining individuals, and refusing to release the individual
until he provides that information. In other instances, CPD will take a
young person to a rival gang neighborhood, and either leave the person
there, or display the youth to rival members, immediately putting the life
of that young person in jeopardy by suggesting he has provided
16
information to the police. Our investigation indicates that these
practices in fact exist and significantly jeopardize CPDs relationship
with the community. CPD must root out these practices that harm CPDs
interaction with the community.
Doing so will better support lawful policing, and allow CPD to gain
legitimacy in the eyes of the public and more effectively address crime.
With a community-focused approach that incentivizes and rewards officers
for policing actively and in a manner that builds strong, positive
community relationships, CPD will be better able to carry out its mission
lawfully and effectively.
* * *
Finally, we find that, notwithstanding the Citys recent efforts to address
the broad problems within the Chicago Police Department, it is not likely
to be successful in doing so without a consent decree with independent
monitoring. Fixing the problems our investigation found will be neither
easy nor quick. The root causes of these patterns of conduct and systemic
deficiencies are complicated and entrenched, which is why they have
persisted for so long despite repeated, concerted reform efforts by the
City and community members from all walks.
As Chicagos Mayor said in stating his intention to cooperate with our
investigation, We need a third party in this City because in the past
instances . . . weve never, ever as a City measured up with the changes on
a sustained basis to finally deal in whole cloth with that situation.
We applaud the City for this recognition and for agreeing to negotiate a
set of comprehensive reforms that will be entered as a federal court order
and assessed by a team of independent experts in policing and related
fields. Through this commitment, the City has signaled its willingness to
go further than any previous City administration to ensure that necessary
reforms to the Chicago Police Department are made and take root.
We agree that such an approach is necessary. Our investigation found that
the reforms the City already plans to implement, as well as the additional
reforms our investigation found necessary, will likely not happen or be
sustained without the reform tools of an independent monitoring team and a
court order. An independent team of policing and other experts will be
charged with assessing and publicly reporting on CPDs and the Citys
progress implementing reforms. A court-ordered, over-arching plan for
reform that is overseen by a federal judge will help ensure that
unnecessary obstacles are removed, and that City and police officials stay
focused on carrying out promised reforms. Together, an independent monitor
and court decree will make it much more certain that Chicago is finally
able to eliminate patterns of unconstitutional conduct, and can bolster
community confidence to make policing in Chicago more effective and less
dangerous.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Chicago, Illinois
snip
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Throughout this Report, we make several recommendations to the City and
CPD related to our findings. These recommendations are gathered and
offered in more detail below. Through the changes we have identified, CPD
will be better poised to police constitutionally and effectively, and
improve trust between officers and the communities they serve. We look
forward to working cooperatively with the City and CPD on how to best
craft and implement these recommendations.
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A. Use of Force
CPD should re-orient officers approach to the use of force to avoid using
force except when necessary, and should provide officers with the policy
guidance and training to develop and maintain proficiency in
de-escalation. CPD should also implement a system of force reporting and
investigation to better detect and respond to instances of unreasonable or
unnecessary force. Additionally, providing officers with the tools and
training to better respond to persons in physical or mental health crisis
and those with intellectual disabilities will help avoid injuries,
increase community trust, and make officers safer. CPD should:
1. Adopt use of force practices that minimize the use of force.
a. CPD has begun the process of revising its force policies to better
reflect the sanctity of human life, the need to avoid the use of force,
and de-escalation and force mitigation consistent with officer safety. CPD
should continue this process to ensure these concepts are incorporated
throughout CPDs force policies, including its canine and Taser policies,
and that policies provide sufficient guidance to officers;
b. CPD has begun training officers in safely using de-escalation methods
so that force may be avoided. CPD should continue this process and should
incorporate these concepts throughout CPD training;
c. Develop, train and implement a foot pursuit policy that makes clear
that foot pursuits are dangerous and that sets forth guidelines for foot
pursuits that balance the objective of apprehending the suspect with the
risk of potential injury to the officer, the public, and the suspect. The
policy also should address unsafe foot pursuit tactics to ensure the risks
of foot pursuits are not increased;
d. Ensure that officers are trained in sound tactics to avoid
unnecessarily exposing officers to situations in which deadly force may
become necessary;
e. Revise and reinforce policies against shooting at or from a moving
vehicle, and provide additional training on avoiding dangerous vehicle
maneuvers;
f. Revise Taser policies consistent with best practices, including
implementing restrictions on the use of Tasers in drive-stun mode;
limitations on Taser use in situations that pose inordinate risk to the
suspect; limitations on Taser use on vulnerable people (e.g., the elderly,
pregnant women, people in mental health crisis); restrictions on Taser use
to situations in which it is necessary and proportional to the threat or
resistance of the subject; and discouragement of the use of Tasers in
schools and on students, and requiring officers to factor into their
decision to use a Taser a childs apparent age, size, and the threat
presented for proportionality and appropriateness. CPD should emphasize in
training that Tasers are weapons with inherent risks that inflict
significant pain and should not be viewed as tools of convenience;
g. Prohibit the use of retaliatory force, force used as punishment, force
used in response to the exercise of protected First Amendment activities
(e.g., filming), and force used in response to speech only rather than in
response to an immediate threat;
152
h. Equip officers with appropriate first-aid supplies, train them in their
use, and require officers to render aid to injured persons consistent with
the officers training;
i. Equip all patrol officers and supervisors, and officers who regularly
interact with the public, including tactical officers, with body cameras,
and develop a body camera policy delineating officers responsibilities
regarding the consistent and appropriate use of body cameras and the
retention and review of body camera footage.
2. Change the reporting and review of force to accurately capture the
totality of the circumstances in force incidents.
a. Develop and implement use-of-force reporting requiring officers to
complete a narrative force report that describes with particularity the
force used and the circumstances necessitating that level of force,
including the reason for the initial stop or other enforcement action.
Witness officers should also complete reports for serious uses of force
(e.g., firearms discharges and other forms of deadly force). Injuries to
officers and persons against whom force was used should be photographed;
b. Develop and implement supervisory review of force that requires the
supervisor to conduct a complete review of each use of force, including
gathering and considering evidence necessary to understand the
circumstances of the force incident and determine its consistency with law
and policy, including statements from individuals against whom force is
used and civilian witnesses;
c. Develop and implement a system for higher-level, inter-disciplinary
review of incidents involving all types of firearms discharges, successful
canine deployments, Taser uses, use of chemical weapons, and force
resulting in injury to the person against whom force was used;
d. Discipline or otherwise hold accountable officers who fail to
accurately report their own uses of force, officers who fail to accurately
report another officers use of force when policy requires it, and
supervisors who fail to conduct adequate force investigations;
e. Collect and analyze data on uses of force to identify racial and other
disparities in officer uses of force.
3. Revise the initial response to officer-involved shootings to prevent
collusion and the contamination of witnesses.
a. Adopt a policy requiring that IPRA investigators participate in the
preliminary assessment during the immediate aftermath of an
officer-involved shooting to the same extent as the CPD commander in
charge and CPD investigators conducting administrative or criminal
investigations;
b. Adopt policies and practices that preclude involved and witness
officers from speaking with one another, or with civilian witnesses, about
the shooting incident until after they have been interviewed by IPRA
investigators, except to the extent necessary to ensure public safety. To
that end, require that, where possible, involved officers, witness
officers, and civilian witnesses be transported to the station
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separately and their conversations be monitored to avoid contamination
prior to interviews;
c. Except to the extent necessary to ensure public safety, prohibit
involved officers and witness officers from using cell phones before they
speak with the on-scene commander;
d. Consider prohibiting involved officers, witness officers, and civilians
from viewing footage from dashboard cameras, body cameras, surveillance
cameras, or cell phones before their interview with IPRA. In all cases,
inquire of witnesses and officers whether they have viewed any recordings
prior to the interview;
e. Require that interviews with involved officers and witness officers be
recorded and IPRA investigators be present (except that an officer may
speak with his or her attorney in private) and that interviews with
civilian witnesses be recorded unless it would interfere with
investigation. In cases where interviews are not recorded, the reason for
failing to record the interview should be documented;
f. Revise CBA provisions or other restrictions on how soon officers may be
interviewed following an officer-involved shooting; and
g. CPD and IPRA should develop appropriate protocols to conduct
concurrent, bifurcated investigations with specific measures to ensure
that the integrity of criminal investigations is not compromised.
4. Implement policies and develop training to improve interactions with
people who are in crisis.
a. Devote appropriate resources to improve CPDs existing CIT program.
Develop and implement policy and training to better identify and respond
to individuals with known or suspected mental health conditions, including
persons in mental health crisis and those with intellectual or
developmental disabilities (I/DD) or other disabilities;
b. Screen and designate volunteer officers who have expressed an interest
in becoming CIT specialists and are well-suited to this work. CPD should
continue to offer CIT training for officers who wish to develop crisis
intervention skills, but reserve participation in the CIT program to the
selected officers;
c. Provide crisis intervention training to CIT-designated officers, who
will respond to critical incidents involving persons in crisis. This
training should include how to identify and respond to common medical
emergencies that may at first appear to reflect a failure to comply with
lawful orders (e.g., seizures, diabetic emergencies);
d. Ensure that there are enough CIT officers on duty throughout the City
and throughout the day to help ensure a CIT officer is available to
respond to calls involving an individual in crisis;
e. Require that, wherever possible, at least one CIT officer will respond
to any situation concerning individuals in mental health crisis or with
I/DD where force might be used;
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f. Improve the quality of the current CIT 40-hour training program, which
will in turn require obtaining sufficient CIT training staff and resources
so that training can focus on requiring CIT candidates to demonstrate
competency in the necessary skills;
g. Collect data on CIT calls to allow CPD to make informed decisions about
staffing and deployment so that a CIT officer is available for all shifts
in all districts to respond to every CIT call;
h. Develop a CIT reporting system (apart from the use-of-force reporting
system) so that each deployment of a CIT officer is well documented. CIT
officers should submit narrative reports of their interactions with
persons in crisis so the appropriateness of the response can be evaluated
in an after-action analysis; and
i. Implement an assessment program to evaluate the efficacy of the CIT
program as a whole and the performance of individual CIT officers. A
portion of a CIT officers performance review should address skill and
effectiveness in CIT situations.
B. Accountability
A well-functioning accountability system (in combination with effective
supervision) is the keystone to lawful policing. The City and CPD must
create impartial, transparent, and effective internal and external
oversight systems that will hold officers accountable in a timely manner
for violations of law, CPD policy, or CPD training. To that end, the City
and CPD must:
1. Improve the City and CPDs accountability mechanisms for increased and
more effective police oversight.
a. Work with police unions to modify practices and procedures for
accepting complaints to make it easier for individuals to register formal
complaints about police conduct;
b. Adopt practices to ensure the full and impartial investigation of all
complaints, and assessment of patterns and trends related to those
complaints;
c. Revise IPRA/COPA mediation policies and procedures to: 1) require
complainant notification of and participation in mediation; 2) incorporate
principles of restorative justice; 3) create clear, objective standards
for referring cases to mediation; and 4) prohibit mediation for resolving
certain categories of complaints, including use of force and domestic
violence complaints;
d. Revise BIA policies and procedures to require that investigators record
interviews and include transcripts of all interviews with victims,
witnesses, or suspect officers in every file. CPD policy should dictate
that summaries of interviews will be accepted only where obtaining a
recorded or transcribed interview is not feasible;
e. Enforce CPD policies prohibiting officers from falsifying reports and
providing false information or testimony during interviews by providing
strict disciplinary penalties, up to and including termination, for those
officers who violate them; and
f. Put systems in place that ensure administrative charges are fully and
timely investigated, even where CPD and the States Attorneys Office are
investigating
155
potential criminal charges, or have decided not to pursue criminal
charges, for the same conduct.
2. Ensure investigative agencies have the appropriate resources, training,
and structure necessary to conduct investigations thoroughly, efficiently,
and fairly.
a. Conduct a staffing analysis, and create a staffing plan based on that
analysis, to ensure that both BIA and IPRA/COPA have the staffing and
resources to perform their responsibilities effectively;
b. Improve the timeliness and quality of BIA/IPRA/COPA investigations
through the creation of case management protocols, including streamlined
procedures and target deadlines for the completion of investigations; and
c. Develop and implement mandatory and comprehensive training for
BIA/IPRA/COPA investigators, Police Board members, and hearing officers on
police practices, civil rights law, evidence collection and assessment
techniques, interview techniques, and other pertinent issues. The training
for IPRA/COPA investigators should also include training on implicit bias
and proper witness interviewing techniques. Investigators tasked with
investigating domestic violence and sexual misconduct complaints should
receive specialized training on the dynamics of those incidents and
interview techniques for domestic violence and sexual misconduct victims.
3. Implement changes to the Citys discipline and discipline review
systems, including the Chicago Police Board, to ensure disciplinary
decisions are fair, timely, and transparent.
a. Revise how disciplinary decisions are made, including streamlining the
number of disciplinary decision makers and the layers of review of
disciplinary recommendations, to facilitate quicker final resolution of
complaints;
b. Revise CPDs disciplinary matrix to ensure that it provides meaningful
guidance to those making disciplinary recommendations and findings;
c. Consider moving the Police Boards police commission and civilian
oversight duties to another entity (such as a Community Oversight Board),
to allow the Police Board to focus on its critical function of reviewing
Superintendent/IPRA misconduct and disciplinary findings;
d. Create a cadre of trained and experienced attorneys within IPRA/COPA to
advocate before the Board;
e. Modify CPD and IPRA policy, and address related provisions in the CBAs,
to ensure that the Board has access to the information necessary to make a
fair and informed decisions;
f. Ensure selection criteria for Police Board members and hearing officers
include requisite competence, impartiality, and expertise;
g. Post all Police Board materials, including video recordings of
hearings, on the Boards website in a timely manner; and 156 h. Track and
publish more detailed case-specific and aggregate data about Police Board
decisions, and make this information available in a timely manner.
C. Training Training is the foundation for ensuring that officers are
engaging in effective and constitutional policing. To that end, CPD
should:
1. Provide training that is comprehensive, organized, based on
adult-learning principles, and developed with national best police
practices and community policing principles in mind.
a. Revise Academy curricula and lesson content to ensure consistency with
CPD policy and current law, particularly with respect to the use of force,
and revise lessondelivery methods to include lessons that are consistent
with adult learning principles and include more scenario-based trainings;
b. Revise end-of-course Academy evaluations to ensure recruits graduate
the Academy with sufficient knowledge and skill to police safely and
lawfully;
c. Revitalize CPDs Field Training Program by increasing incentives
provided to FTOs in order to ensure a sufficient number of high-quality
FTOs; improving the training provided to FTOs and, in turn, the quality of
supervision and guidance that FTOs provide; creating a standardized
curriculum for each FTO to use when training PPOs; increasing the rigor of
FTO evaluation of PPOs; creating better supervision of FTOs and regularly
evaluating the Field Training Program to identify areas in need of
improvement; and
d. Implement a mandatory in-service training program, based on a
comprehensive evaluation of Department needs, that includes high quality
training through live, scenario-based trainings; provides updates on law
and Department policy; and presents officers and supervisors with
opportunities to refresh important skills and tactics.
2. Take steps to ensure the creation of a well-planned, comprehensive
training program that is carefully tailored to Department needs and is
properly resourced.
a. Formalize CPDs creation of a training committee in CPD policies,
including outlining the committees goals, membership, responsibilities,
and deliverables;
b. Recruit, hire, and train additional instructors, and develop and
implement rigorous testing, evaluation, and training of all instructors to
ensure subject-matter competency and skill in instruction; and
c. Improve CPDs physical training facilities and equipment.
D. Supervision Patrol officers must receive proper supervision and
guidance in order to ensure that they are engaging in constitutional and
effective policing and that they are held accountable if they
157
engage in misconduct. This requires that patrol supervisors receive the
tools, training, and support they need to perform their supervisory duties
effectively. To that end, CPD should:
1. Reform CPDs supervisory structures and incentives to provide all
officers with meaningful direction and oversight.
a. Develop and implement policies that establish clear requirements and
provide specific guidance to ensure the appropriate supervision of all
officers;
b. Ensure that supervisors closely monitor officers under their command,
review officer uses of force, and direct and guide officers to use force
only where necessary, in a manner that is safe, and that comports with the
principles and values set forth in CPDs revised force policies;
c. Hold supervisors accountable if they fail to report misconduct that
they observe, fail to accept and refer to IPRA a misconduct complaint, or
otherwise fail to take appropriate steps to ensure officer accountability;
d. Implement appropriate span-of-control ratios in all districts and
reform shift scheduling to allow for unity of command;
e. Re-examine the responsibilities of supervisory staff at districts to
allow supervisors to maximize time spent providing mentorship, oversight,
and accountability of officer activities;
f. Provide new supervisors with adequate training on supervisory skills,
including leadership and management, and provide all supervisors with
regular training on issues relevant to their supervisory responsibilities;
and
g. Incentivize and reward supervisors who provide close and effective
supervision.
2. Ensure CPD supervisors have the appropriate tools and information
necessary to provide meaningful supervision.
a. Commit to putting in place a new and fully integrated EIS system that
will allow for early identification of problematic behavior trends and
appropriate interventions, and involve all relevant stakeholders in the
process early on to ensure its ultimate success; and;
b. Ensure that data collection and tracking systems are adequate
Department-wide to support this effort, and audit their use to ensure that
these systems are used consistently and appropriately.
E. Officer Wellness and Safety Officers must receive the support they need
from the Department to perform their policing responsibilities well and
safely, and to address the stressors related to their work. To better
support its officers, CPD should:
1. Evaluate and respond to the needs of CPD officers.
158
a. Conduct a needs assessment to determine what additional resources
officers desire or need to reduce the stressors of their jobs;
b. Expand the Employee Assistance Program by hiring additional counselors,
substance abuse specialists, and other staff with specialized training and
skills in certain topics, including post-traumatic stress disorder,
domestic violence, womens issues, and depression;
c. Coordinate a communication strategy to inform all CPD members of the
services available through the Employee Assistance Program and ensure that
references to the range of available counseling and support services are
included in Academy trainings, including the stress management and
wellness trainings;
d. Explore alternative methods for providing officer support, including
anonymous support hotlines and group meetings; and
e. Revise and implement new protocols for evaluation and treatment of
officers involved in, or who witness, traumatic events, not limited to
officer-involved shootings.
2. Incorporate officer wellness principles into all facets of CPD
operations.
a. Explore and evaluate other methods to increase officer access to
employee supports and services, including how using those services can
benefit CPD officers, and encourage officers to use these programs; and
b. Conduct a Department-wide technology and equipment audit to determine
what equipment is outdated, broken, or otherwise in need of replacement,
and develop a plan with timelines for repair or replacement of equipment
as needed.
F. Data Collection and Transparency To increase transparency and community
trust, it is critical that the City improve its data collection systems
and publicly report and release information relevant to its policing and
accountability efforts. Accordingly, the City, through CPD and IPRA/COPA,
should:
1. Improve City data collection systems.
a. Examine and evaluate current data collection mechanisms and technology
to determine where there are gaps and inefficiencies;
b. Create a plan to improve and synthesize City and CPD data collection
systems by dates certain; and
c. Develop systems to ensure that data is appropriately and timely
analyzed to identify trends or patterns in policing activities, including
officer use of force and police misconduct complaints. The City and CPD
should use data collection systems to track and identify patterns or
practices of constitutional violations, so that corrective action can be
taken where necessary.
2. Increase transparency regarding CPD and IPRA/COPA activities.
159
a. Seek input from community members regarding the type of data and
information they believe is important for CPD and IPRA to disseminate;
b. Develop and implement policies mandating regular public reporting of
crime trends and CPD policing activities;
c. Develop and implement policies mandating regular public reporting of
misconduct investigations, including investigations handled not just by
IPRA or COPA, but also BIA and the districts. These policies should cover
regular reporting on complaint patterns and trends, investigation
outcomes, and discipline (both recommended and imposed);
d. Finalize and formally adopt, as part of CPD and IPRA policy, the video
release policy, with consideration of expanding the universe of complaints
the policy covers; and
e. Develop and implement policies that would increase transparency related
to City settlements of police misconduct complaints.
G. Promotions To ensure constitutional and effective policing, CPD must
promote competent, capable leaders, and ensure confidence amongst officers
that deserving, well-qualified candidates will be selected for promotions.
CPD must review its promotions systems to ensure all qualified candidates
have a chance to be promoted, and improve transparency around the
promotions process to better inform officers of how promotional decisions
are made. To that end, CPD should:
1. Ensure promotions are fair.
a. Continue to review promotional exams to ensure they are valid and
fairly administered;
b. Schedule promotional exams with sufficient frequency to allow qualified
candidates frequent opportunity for promotion throughout their careers;
and
c. Review and revise, as necessary, the merit promotion process, to ensure
that policies and procedures are followed, and that the system is working
as intended.
2. Increase transparency around the promotions process.
a. Devise and implement mechanisms for teaching officers about the
policies and procedures guiding the merit promotion process;
b. Develop mechanisms for improving transparency regarding those who
receive merit promotions, and the reasons those candidates were selected;
and
c. Continue, and potentially increase, oversight of the merit promotions
process through the Chicago Office of the Inspector General, and ensure
that the OIGs role in overseeing this process is communicated to both
officers and the public.
160
H. Community Policing
CPD should adopt, and incorporate in its policing approaches, an ingrained
and permanent community policing philosophy that humanizes officers and
residents to each other and builds trust between the community and the
police; incentivizes police-community partnerships; and effectively uses
these partnerships to solve crime and address community concerns. To that
end, CPD should:
1. Develop community policing as a core component of CPDs policing
strategies, tactics, and training.
a. Develop and implement, with the help of community members from Chicagos
diverse groups, comprehensive recruit and in-service training to officers
on how to establish formal partnerships and actively engage with diverse
communities, to include understanding and building trust with minority
communities, Muslim communities, immigrant and limited English-proficiency
communities, persons with disabilities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender communities;
b. Incorporate community policing and problem-solving principles into
Academy training, and require regular in-service training on topics such
as procedural justice, de-escalation, bias-free policing, diversity and
cultural sensitivity;
c. Create liaison officers in each district that will be responsive to,
and specifically address, the concerns of minority communities, including
LGBTQ individuals, Muslims and other religious or ethnic minorities,
individuals with limited Englishproficiency, and individuals with
disabilities. District liaison officers should have monthly meetings to
coordinate Department-wide outreach efforts and strategies;
d. Develop systems that encourage and facilitate opportunities for
officers to actively engage with communities while on patrol and gain more
familiarity with residents through one-on-one interactions;
e. Increase opportunities for officers to have frequent, positive
interactions with people outside of an enforcement context, especially
groups and communities that have expressed a high level of distrust of
police; and
f. Measure, evaluate, and reward individual, supervisory, and agency
performance on community engagement, problem-oriented-policing projects,
and crime prevention.
2. Ensure that officers police fairly and compassionately in all
neighborhoods, including in those with high rates of violent crime and in
minority communities.
a. Develop and implement a policy that specifically and comprehensively
addresses and prohibits discriminatory policing and biased-based policing;
b. Provide initial and recurring training to all officers that sends a
clear and consistent message that bias-based profiling and other forms of
discriminatory policing are prohibited, and ensures that officers are
capable of interacting with and providing services to all communities;
161
c. Provide training to supervisors and commanders on detecting and
addressing biasbased profiling and other forms of discriminatory policing;
d. Provide safeguards for officers who report bias-based profiling and
other forms of discriminatory policing;
e. Provide training to supervisors, detectives, and officers on how to
detect and report potential hate crimes or hate incidents;
f. Work with community members from Chicagos diverse racial, religious,
ethnic, gender, and disability groups to create and deliver cultural
awareness training in partnership with CPD, and to inform and suggest the
development of additional measures that may improve police-community
relations;
g. Enforce Department rules regarding appropriate language, respect, and
social media use; h. Collect and analyze enforcement data (including use
of force data) to identify patterns of unequal enforcement on the basis of
race or ethnicity, and devise and implement operational changes based on
this analysis. Publish stop, search, arrest, and force data bi-annually
with the analysis of trends, and the steps taken to correct problems and
build on successes; and
i. Capture and track complaints alleging racial and other bias-based
profiling or discrimination, along with characteristics of the
complainants. Analyze this data to identify and correct any patterns of
discrimination.
Sincerely,
David Dillard
Temple University
(215) 204 - 4584
jwne@xxxxxxxxxx
http://workface.com/e/daviddillard
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