[net-gold] Changing the Culture of Science Education at Research Universities #3
- From: "David P. Dillard" <jwne@xxxxxxxxxx>
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- Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2011 11:13:56 -0400 (EDT)
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Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2011 16:53:33 -0800
From: Richard Hake <rrhake@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reply-To: Net-Gold@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To: AERA-L@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Net-Gold@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [Net-Gold] Changing the Culture of Science Education at Research
Universities #3
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ABSTRACT: In response to "Changing the Culture of Science Education
at Research Universities" [Hake (2011a)], PhysLrnR's Bill Goffe wrote
(paraphrasing) "I agree that teaching should be more valued, but
economists Martin & Gillen (M&G) (2011) do a nice job in explaining
why this seems unlikely in the near future."
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M&G observe that there's a thriving market for senior scholars in
higher education but not for world-class teachers. The reason for
this imbalance, they suggest, is that "potential employers of
professors have sufficient information to judge scholarly
productivity, but virtually no information that would allow them to
judge teaching productivity."
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In commenting on M&G's article, "teaching postdoc" wrote:
(paraphrasing): "How do we know when a teacher is 'good'? Students
know if they like or dislike a teacher; if they enjoyed or did not
enjoy a course. But accurately assessment one's own progress is a
very difficult task, and there's no evidence that course evaluations
are meaningful. Really, one needs pre- and post-testing to
quantitatively compare student abilities at the beginning vs end of
the course. Almost no one actually does that. . . . . Scholarship is
measured in papers and citations. Teaching is not measured at all."
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Regarding pre/post testing, Bill Goff asked: ". . . . do any
physicists use their students' Force Concept Inventory (FCI) results
when on the job market?" As far as I know, the answer is (thankfully)
"NO." If pre/post testing were to be used for high-stakes summative
purposes, then Campbell's and Dunkenfeld's Laws [Hake (2010a,b)]
would probably rear their ugly heads so as to distort and corrupt the
testing.
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In response to my post "Changing the Culture of Science Education at
Research Universities" [Hake (2011a)], PhysLrnR's economist Bill
Goffe (2011) wrote my insert at ". . . . . [[insert]]. . . . ."]:
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"I agree 100% that teaching should be more valued, but 'Holy Grail of
Reform'. . . . . [[by economists Martin & Gillen (2011) in "Inside
Higher Ed"]. . . . . does a nice job of explaining why this seems
unlikely in the near future.
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Martin & Gillen wrote [bracketed by lines "M&G-M&G-M&G-. . . . ."]:
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M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G
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There is a thriving market for senior scholars in higher education -
a market that brings plenty of release time from teaching, along with
high salaries and fame. There is no corresponding market for
world-class teachers.
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No one in higher education becomes famous or well-compensated for
exceptional teaching. How could this happen, since the students,
parents, and taxpayers (those who pay the bills) have only a passing
interest in research, but an abiding and personal stake in
high-quality teaching?. . . . . . . . . . . .why [do] we have a
market for scholars and no market for teachers?
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The critical reason why one market exists and the other does not is
the information available to potential employers. Potential employers
of professors have sufficient information to judge scholarly
productivity, but virtually no information that would allow them to
judge teaching productivity.
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Institutions seeking to hire exceptional scholars can identify
productive scholars at other institutions. . . . . . information
comes from the journals where the scholar publishes, books they've
written, citations by other scholars, and their reputation among
other scholars in the field. None of this information exists for
gifted teachers, and as a consequence, a potential employer seeking
gifted teachers cannot identify those candidates . . . . . .
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If the potential employer makes an offer to a candidate and that
candidate is in fact a gifted teacher, the home institution will make
a counter offer. If the candidate is in fact a poor or average
teacher, the home institution will not make a counter offer and the
potential employer is likely to hire a poor or average teacher. This
leads to what economists call "adverse selection" . . . . . .
[[<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adverse_selection>]]. . . . . for job
offers to potential teachers. Since the prospective employer knows it
is likely to hire a poor or average teacher rather than an
exceptional teacher, it does not make offers designed to attract
exceptional teachers, and the market for exceptional teachers does
not exist. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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The "holy grail" of higher education reform should be the creation of
a market for exceptional college teachers. The vigorous market for
scholars provides the keys to this project. First, the information
required does not have to be perfect in order for the market to be
efficient (the information about scholars is not perfect). Second,
the source of this information should be independent of the
individual teachers, their home institutions, and their potential
employers. There is great hope that the Web will be the requisite
outside platform. Intercollegiate teaching tournaments are another
possibility, as are digital course offerings.
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M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G-M&G
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On 12 March 2011 16:00-0800 there had been 11 lively comments at
<http://bit.ly/fwlVXt> on Martin & Gillen's (2011) piece, of which
the last three were by the anonymous:
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(a) "Mr Punch" who wrote: "I think this is right - if there were
credible metrics for teaching, there would be a market; and I believe
that if there were such a market, the buyers would include some
institutions that currently hire based largely on research."
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(b) "Chalkface" who commented: "I agree that teaching should be
valued more in higher education. However, one problem that I see is
excellence in teaching based heavily on student evaluations, which
are horrendously subjective and riddled with irrelevant opinion, and
often miss the mark on excellent teaching."
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(c) "teaching postdoc" who stated: "I agree with Chalkface and Mr.
Punch - having a market for teaching first requires that people know
good teaching (and bad teaching) when they see it, and I don't think
most people do. How do we know when a teacher is 'good'? Students
know if they like or dislike a teacher; if they enjoyed or did not
enjoy a course. But accurately assessment one's own progress is a
very difficult task, and there's no evidence that course evaluations
are meaningful. Really, one needs pre- and post-testing to
quantitatively compare student abilities at the beginning vs end of
the course. Almost no one actually does that. Certainly, departments
do not do that systematically for all teachers. Scholarship is
measured in papers and citations. Teaching is not measured at all."
.
Regarding the pre/post testing advocated by "teaching postdoc," Bill
Goffe (2011) asked: ". . . . do any physicists use their students'
Force Concept Inventory (FCI) results when on the job market?"
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As far as I know, the answer is (thankfully) "NO". In my opinion,
pre/post testing or posttesting alone with "concept inventories"
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concept_inventory> such as the FCI
[Hestenes et al. (1992)] and other concept inventories - see National
Academies (2008) - should be used only for FORMATIVE evaluation to
*improve* courses or teaching, not SUMMATIVE to *evaluate* courses or
teachers.
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If pre/post testing were to be used for high-stakes summative
purposes, then Campbell's and Dunkenfeld's Laws [Hake (2010a,b)]
would probably rear their ugly heads so as to distort and corrupt the
testing.
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These two laws are:
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"If a thing is worth winning,
it's worth cheating for" . . . . . . . . . . . Dukenfield's Law
[Kleiman (2010)]
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"The more any quantitative social indicator is
used for social decision making, the more subject
it will be to corruptionpressures and the more apt
it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes
it is intended to monitor". . . . . . . . . . .Campbell's Law [Campbell(1976)]
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Richard Hake, Emeritus Professor of Physics, Indiana University
Honorary Member, Curmudgeon Lodge of Deventer, The Netherlands
President, PEdants for Definitive Academic References which Recognize the
Invention of the Internet (PEDARRII)
<rrhake@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
<http://www.physics.indiana.edu/~hake>
<http://www.physics.indiana.edu/~sdi>
<http://HakesEdStuff.blogspot.com>
<http://iub.academia.edu/RichardHake>
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REFERENCES [All URL's accessed on 12 March 2011; some shortened by
<http://bit.ly/>.]
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Campbell, D.T. 1976. "Assessing the impact of planned social change,"
in G. Lyons, ed. , "Social research and public policies: The
Dartmouth/OECD Conference, " Chapter 1, pp. 3-45. Dartmouth College
Public Affairs Center, p. 35; online as a 196 kB pdf at
<http://bit.ly/hMsyUr>.
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Campbell, D.T. 1979. "Assessing the impact of planned social change,"
in "Evaluation and Program Planning" Volume 2, Issue 1, an abstract
is online at <http://bit.ly/aQ4iJU>. For a memoriam to the late
Donald Campbell see <http://bit.ly/bxyGfR>: "He was the founder of
the domain of 'evolutionary epistemology' <http://bit.ly/a9XGKV > (a
label he created), in which he generalized Popper's falsificationist
philosophy of science to knowledge processes at all biological,
psychological and social levels." See also
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_T._Campbell>.
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Goffe, B. 2011. "Re: Changing the Culture of Science Education at
Research Universities," PhysLrnR post of 5 Mar 2011 01:43:09-0500;
online at <http://bit.ly/hmSeTM>. To access the archives of PhysLnR
one needs to subscribe :-(, but that takes only a few minutes by
clicking on <http://bit.ly/beuikb> and then clicking on "Join or
leave the list (or change settings)." If you're busy, then subscribe
using the "NOMAIL" option under "Miscellaneous." Then, as a
subscriber, you may access the archives and/or post messages at any
time, while receiving NO MAIL from the list!
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Hake, R.R. 2010a. "Dukenfield's Law & Campbell's Law," online on the
OPEN! AERA-L archives at <http://bit.ly/9FWI9n>. Post of 14 Aug 2010
20:52:11-0700 to AERA-L , EvalTalk, NetGold, & PhysLrnR.
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Hake, R.R. 2010b. "Dukenfield's Law & Campbell's Law #2," online on
the OPEN! AERA-L archives at <http://bit.ly/d3FrI8>. Post of 22 Aug
2010 15:31:31-0700 to AERA-L and Net-Gold. The abstract and link to
the complete post were also transmitted to various discussion lists
and are also on my blog "Hake'sEdStuff" at <http://bit.ly/f9Maey>
with a provision for comments.
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Hake, R.R. 2011a. "Changing the Culture of Science Education at
Research Universities," online on the OPEN! AERA-L archives at
<http://bit.ly/eqw6ow>. Post of 4 Mar 2011 08:04:14-0800 to AERA-L,
Net-Gold, and PhysLrnR. The abstract and link to the complete post
were transmitted to various discussion lists and are also online on
my blog "Hake'sEdStuff" at <http://bit.ly/hnkAuJ> with a provision
for comments.
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Hake, R.R. 2011b. "Changing the Culture of Science Education at
Research Universities #2," online on the OPEN! AERA-L archives at
<http://bit.ly/gZSf8W>. Post of 6 Mar 2011 15:16:50 -0800 to AERA-L &
Net-Gold. The abstract and link to the complete post were
transmitted to various discussion lists and are also online on my
blog "Hake'sEdStuff" at <http://bit.ly/dYSgww> with a provision for
comments.
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Halloun, I., R.R. Hake, E.P. Mosca, & D. Hestenes. 1995. "Force
Concept Inventory (1995 Revision)," online (password protected) at
<http://bit.ly/b1488v>, scroll down to "Evaluation Instruments."
Currently available in 20 languages: Arabic, Chinese, Croatian,
Czech, English, Finnish, French, French (Canadian), German, Greek,
Italian, Japanese, Malaysian, Persian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish,
Slovak, Swedish, & Turkish.
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Hestenes, D., M. Wells, & G. Swackhamer. 1992. "Force Concept
Inventory," The Physics Teacher 30(3): 141-158; online as a 100 kB
pdf at <http://bit.ly/foWmEb > [but without the test itself]. For the
1995 revision see Halloun et al. (1995).
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Kleiman, M. 2010. "Dukenfield's Law of Incentive Management," The
Atlantic, 13 August 2010; online at <http://bit.ly/bsRokM>.
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Labov, J.B., S.R. Singer, M.D. George, H.A. Schweingruber, & M.L.
Hilton. 2009. "Effective Practices in Undergraduate STEM Education
Part 1: Examining the Evidence," CBE Life Sci Educ 8(3): 157-161;
online at <http://bit.ly/cRc0JC>. This article includes a discussion
of the "Workshop on Linking Evidence and Promising Practices in STEM
Undergraduate Education" [National Academies (2008)].
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Martin, R. & A. Gillen. 2011. " 'Holy Grail' of Reform" Inside Higher
Ed, 28 January; online at <http://bit.ly/h1NTd6>.
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National Academies. 2008. "Workshop on Linking Evidence and Promising
Practices in STEM Undergraduate Education": (a) introductory sessions
are online at <http://bit.ly/ciNwjQ>; (b) commissioned Papers are
online at <http://bit.ly/ceg1Bx>. See also the commentary on this
workshop by Labov et al. (2009).
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