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COUNTRIES: HAITI: United States.
The Library of Congress.
Country Studies.
A Country Study: Haiti
The Library of Congress.
Country Studies.
A Country Study: Haiti
<http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/httoc.html>
Library of Congress Call Number
F1934 .D64 2001
Please note: The current Country Study was previously in a multi-country
volume. Chapter numbers reflect those used in the printed book.
Haiti
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Preface
Introduction
Country Profile: Haiti - Visit new updated Profile (PDF)
Country
Geography
Society
Economy
Transportation and Communications
Governemtn and Politics
National Security
Chapter 6 - Haiti: Historical Setting (Anne Greene)
Spanish Discovery and Colonization
French Colonialism
French Settlement and Sovereignty
Colonial Society: The Conflicts of Color and Class
The Haitian Revolution
The Slave Rebellion of 1791
Toussaint Louverture
Independent Haiti
Christophe's Kingdom and Pion's Republic
Boyer: Expansion and Decline
Decades of Instability, 1843-1915
The United States Occupation, 1915-34
Politics and the Military, 1934-57
Franis Duvalier 1957-71
Jean-Claude Duvalier, 1971-86
Chapter 7 - Haiti: The Society and Its Environment (Glenn R. Smucker)
Geography
Population
Demographic Profile
Migration
Fertility and Family Planning
Social Structure
The Upper Class
The Middle Class
Peasants
Urban Lower Class
Gender Roles and Family Life
The Language Question
French and Creole
Changes in Language Use
Creole, Literacy, and Education
Religious Life
Voodoo
Roman Catholicism
Protestantism
Education
Primary Schools
Secondary Education
Higher Education
Health
Nutrition and Disease
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
Health Services
Welfare
Chapter 8 - Haiti: The Economy (Boulos A. Malik)
Growth and Structure of the Economy
Economic Policy
Fiscal Policy
Expenditures
Revenues
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies
Labor
Agriculture
Land Tenure and Land Policy
Land Use and Farming Technology
Crops
Cash Crops
Food Crops
Forestry
Livestock and Fishing
Industry
Manufacturing
Assembly Manufacturing
Domestic Manufacturing
Construction
Mining
Energy
Services
Banking and Financial Services
Transportation and Communications
Tourism
Foreign Economic Relations
Foreign Trade
Balance of Payments
Foreign Debt
Foreign Assistance
Chapter 9 - Haiti: Government and Politics (Robert E. Maguire)
Background: From Duvalier to Avril, 1957-89
The Constitutional Framework
The Governmental System
Governmental Institutions
The Functions of the State
Urban Dominance, Rural Stagnation
Political Dynamics
Power Maintenance
Army Politics: Force and Counterforce
The President as Strongman
Perceptions of Democracy
The Mass Media
Interest Groups
The Tonton Makout Network
Political Parties
The Upper and the Middle Classes
Other Groups
Foreign Relations
Chapter 10 - Haiti: National Security (Jean Tartter)
The Military in Haitian History
Army Politics in the 20th Century
Franis Duvalier, 1957-71
Jean-Claude Duvalier, 1971-86
The Post-Duvalier Period
The Role of the Armed Forces
Military Spending and Foreign Assistance
Armed Forces Organization Structure
The Judicial System and Public Order
The Legal Framework
Public Order
Appendices
Appendix A. Tables
Appendix B. Caribbean Basin Initiative
Bibliography
Glossary
Section 1 of 1
Haiti
Foreword
This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by the Federal
Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country
Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the Department of the Army. The
last two pages of this book list the other published studies.
Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of
those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural factors. The
authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society,
striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular
attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins,
dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on
which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with
national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward
their social system and political order.
The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be
construed as an expression of an official United States government
position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to
accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, additions, and
suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future
editions.
Louis R. Mortimer
Chief
Federal Research Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540-5220
Data as of December 1989
Section 1 of 1
Haiti
Preface
Like its predecessors, these studies represent an attempt to treat in a
compact and objective manner the dominant contemporary social, political,
economic, and military aspects of the Dominican Republic and Haiti.
Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, monographs;
official reports of governments and international organizations; numerous
periodicals; the authors' previous research and observations; and
interviews with individuals who have special competence in Dominican,
Haitian, and Latin American affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the
end of the book; brief comments on sources recommended for further reading
appear at the end of each chapter. To the extent possible, place-names
conform with the system used by the United States Board on Geographic
Names (BGN). Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion
table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric measurements
(see table 1, Appendix A). A glossary is also included.
Although there are numerous variations, Spanish surnames generally consist
of two parts: the patrilineal name followed by the matrilineal one. In the
instance of Joaqu Balaguer Ricardo, for example, Balaguer is his father's
surname and Ricardo, his mother's maiden name. In nonformal use, the
matrilineal name is often dropped. Thus, after the first mention, just
Balaguer is used. A minority of individuals use only the patrilineal name.
Creole words used in the text may be presented in forms that are
unfamiliar to readers who have done previous research on Haiti. The Creole
orthography employed in this volume is that developed by the Institut
Pagogique National (IPN--National Pedagogic Institute), which has been the
standard in Haiti since 1978.
Data as of December 1989
Section 1 of 1
Haiti
INTRODUCTION
Since the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick between the kingdoms of Spain
and France in 1697, the island of Hispaniola (La Isla Espala) has played
host to two separate and distinct societies that we now know as the
nations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. At first encounter, and
without the benefit of historical background and context, most students or
observers find it incongruous that two such disparate nations--one
speaking French and Creole, the other Spanish--should coexist within such
limited confines. When viewed in light of the bitter struggle among
European colonial powers for wealth and influence both on the continent
and in the New World, however, the phenomenon becomes less puzzling. By
the late seventeenth century, Spain was a declining power. Although that
country would maintain its vast holdings in mainland North America and
South America, Spain found itself hard pressed by British, Dutch, and
French forces in the Caribbean. The Treaty of Ryswick was but one result
of this competition, as the British eventually took Jamaica and
established a foothold in Central America. The French eventually proved
the value of Caribbean colonization, in an economic as well as a maritime
and strategic sense, by developing modern-day Haiti, then known as
Saint-Domingue, into the most productive colony in the Western Hemisphere,
if not the world.
Although the other European powers envied the French their island jewel,
Saint-Domingue eventually was lost not to a colonial rival, but to an
idea. That idea, inspired by the American Revolution and the French
Revolution, was freedom; its power was such as to convince a bitterly
oppressed population of African slaves that anything--reprisal,
repression, even death-- was preferable to its denial. This positive
impulse, liberally leavened with hatred for the white men, who had seized
them, shipped them like cargo across the ocean, tortured and abused them,
and forced women into concubinage and men into arduous labor, impelled the
black population of Saint-Domingue to an achievement still unmatched in
history: the overthrow of a slaveholding colonial power and the
establishment of a revolutionary black republic.
The saga of the Haitian Revolution is so dramatic that it is surprising
that it has never served as the scenario for a Hollywood production. Its
images are varied and intense: the voodoo ceremony and pact sealed in the
Bois Cayman (Alligator Woods) in anticipation of the slave revolt of 1791;
the blazing, bloody revolt itself; foreign intervention by British and
Spanish forces; the charismatic figure of Franis-Dominique Toussaint
Louverture, his rise and fateful decision to switch his allegiance from
Spain to France, his surprisingly effective command of troops in the
field, the relative restraint with which he treated white survivors and
prisoners, the competence of his brief stint as ruler; the French
expedition of 1802, of which Toussaint exclaimed, "All France has come to
invade us"; Toussaint's betrayal and seizure by the French; and the
ensuing revolution led by Jean-Jacque Dessalines, Henri (Henry)
Christophe, and Alexandre Pion.
Given the distinctive and auspicious origins of the Haitian republic,
there is some irony in that the Dominicans commemorate as their
independence day the date of their overthrow of Haitian rule. The
Dominican revolt, however, came as a response to annexation by a Haitian
state that had passed from the promise of orderly administration under
Toussaint to the hard-handed despotism of Dessalines and had then
experienced division, both racial and political, between the forces of
Christophe and Pion. By the time of its conquest of Santo Domingo (later
to become the Dominican Republic), Haiti had come under the comparatively
stable, but uninspired, stewardship of Jean-Pierre Boyer. Although viewed,
both at the time and today, by most Dominicans as a crude and oppressive
state dominated by the military, the Haiti that occupied both eastern and
western Hispaniola from 1822 to 1844 can itself be seen as a victim of
international political and economic isolation. Because they either
resented the existence of a black republic or feared a similar uprising in
their own slave-owning regions, the European colonial powers and the
United States shunned relations with Haiti; in the process, they
contributed to the establishment of an impoverished society, ruled by the
military, guided by the gun rather than the ballot, and controlled by a
small, mostly mulatto, ruling group that lived well, while their
countrymen either struggled to eke out a subsistence-level existence on
small plots of land or flocked to the banners of regional strongmen in the
seemingly never-ending contest for power. To be sure, the French colonial
experience had left the Haitians completely unprepared for orderly
democratic self-government, but the isolation of the post-independence
period assured the exclusion of liberalizing influences that might have
guided Haiti along a somewhat different path of political and economic
development. By the same token, however, it may be that Western
governments of the time, and even those of the early twentieth century,
were incapable of dealing with a black republic on an equal basis. The
United States occupation of Haiti (1915-34) certainly brought little of
lasting value to the country's political culture or institutions, in part
because the Americans saw the Haitians as uncivilized lackeys and treated
them as such.
Both nations of Hispaniola share--along with much of the developing
world--the strong tendency toward political organization built upon the
personalistic followings of strongmen, or caudillos, rather than on more
legalistic bases, such as constitutionalism. This similarity in political
culture helps to explain the chronologically staggered parallels between
the brutal regimes of Rafael Leidas Trujillo Molina (1930-61) in the
Dominican Republic and that of the Duvaliers--Franis Duvalier (1957-71)
and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-86)-- in Haiti. Both regimes
lasted for approximately thirty years; both were headed by nonideological
despots; both regimes sustained themselves in power by employing terror
and ruthlessly suppressing dissent; both drew the ire of an international
community that ultimately proved incapable of directly forcing them from
power; and both left their countries mired in political chaos and internal
conflict upon their demise. One may only hope that the unstable situation
in Haiti after the fall of the Duvalier regime will resolve itself without
further analogy to Dominican history--that is, without a civil war. As of
late 1990, however, the outcome of the situation remained extremely
unpredictable.
Lieutenant General Prosper Avril took power in Haiti in September 1988,
ousting the highly unpopular military regime led by Lieutenant General
Henri Namphy. Avril, a product of the Haitian military tradition and the
Duvalierist system, initially gave assurances that he would serve only as
a transitional figure on the road to representative democracy. Whatever
his personal feelings or motivations, however, Avril by his actions proved
himself to be simply another corrupt Haitian military strongman. Having
scheduled elections for 1990, he arrested and expelled leading political
figures and declared a state of siege in January of that year. These
actions triggered demonstrations, protests, and rioting among a population
weary of exploitation and insincere promises of reform. Despite his public
rhetoric, Avril presided over a military institution that perpetuated the
Duvalierist traditions of extortion, graft, and price-gouging through
state-owned enterprises. At the same time, the military made no
substantive effort to address the problem of political violence. By early
1990, Haitians had had enough of promises; many decided to take action on
their own, much as they had during the uprising of 1985 that swept
Jean-Claude Duvalier from power.
Violent demonstrations began in earnest in early March 1990, ostensibly in
response to the army's fatal shooting of an eleven- year-old girl in Petit
Goe. Streets blazed across Haiti as demonstrators ignited tires and
automobiles, chanted anti-Avril slogans, and fought with army troops.
Avril soon recognized the untenable nature of his position; the United
States ambassador reportedly influenced the general's decision to step
down in a private meeting held on March 12. Avril's flight from Haiti on a
United States Air Force transport added his name to a long list of failed
Haitian strongmen, and it left the country under the guidance of yet
another military officer, Major General (subsequently promoted to
Lieutenant General) Hard Abraham.
Consultations among civilian political figures produced a provisional
government headed by a judge of the Court of Cassation (supreme court),
Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, a woman little-known outside legal circles. Judge
Pascal Trouillot reportedly accepted the post of provisional president
after three other supreme court judges declined; she was sworn in on March
13. Appointed along with her was a nineteen-member Council of State, made
up of prominent civic and political leaders. Although the new government
announced no clear definitions of the powers of the council vis-vis the
provisional president, some reports indicated that the president could
exercise independent authority in some areas. The most compelling reality,
however, was that all powers of the provisional government had been
granted by the Haitian Armed Forces (Forces Arms d'Hai--FAd'H), which
would provide the government's only mandate--and perhaps its major
political constituency--until valid popular elections could be held.
The Conseil Electoral Permanent (Permanent Electoral Council- -CEP)
scheduled local, legislative, and presidential elections for sometime
between November 4 and November 29, 1990. The prospects for their
successful implementation, however, appeared highly problematical at best.
Seemingly unchecked political violence, which conjured up for many the
horrible images of the bloody election day of November 1987, presented the
major obstacle to free and fair balloting. Negotiations between the FAd'H
and the CEP sought to establish security mechanisms that would prevent a
recurrence of the 1987 tragedy. Popular confidence in these efforts,
however, did not appear to be very great.
In a larger sense, the utter absence of any democratic tradition, or
framework, in Haiti stacked the odds heavily against a smooth governmental
transition. Economist Mats Lundahl has referred to Haiti as a hysteretic
state, "not simply one where the past has shaped the present, but also one
where history constitutes one of the strongest obstacles to change."
Several conditions prevailing in Haiti gave substance to this definition.
Among the wide array of personalistic political parties, only three--Marc
Bazin's Movement for the Installation of Democracy in Haiti (Mouvement
pour l'Instouration de la Docratie en Hai-- MIDH), Serge Gilles's National
Progressive Revolutionary Haitian Party (Parti Progressiste Rolutionnaire
Haien--Ponpra), and Sylvio C. Claude's Christian Democrat Party of Haiti
(Parti National Chrien d'Haiti--PDCH)--displayed any semblance of coherent
programs or disciplined party apparatus. The odyssey of the Haitian
military, from dominant power before the Duvaliers to subordinate status
under the dynastic dictatorship, left uncertain the intentions of the
FAd'H under Abraham's leadership. The return of such infamous Duvalierist
cronies as former interior minister Roger LaFontant and persistent rumors
that Jean-Claude himself was contemplating a return to the nation he had
bled dry for fifteen years provoked outrage among a population that wanted
nothing so much as to rid itself of the remaining vestiges of that
predatory regime. According to some observers, internal conditions had
approached, by the late summer of 1990, a sort of critical mass, which, if
not defused by way of fair and free elections, could explode into
generalized and ultimately futile violence.
In July one of the more responsible political leaders, Sylvio Claude,
exhorted Haitians to block the return of undesirables by seizing the
international airport outside Port-au-Prince. In a speech on Radio
Nationale, he declared, "Instead of letting [the army] go kill you later,
make them kill you now." Among the figures targeted by Claude for such
action was former president Leslie F. Manigat, not previously considered a
controversial figure by most observers. Perhaps in response to such
rabble- rousing, the provisional government announced on August 1 that
Manigat would be barred from returning to his native Haiti.
In late July, the Council of State issued a communiqu laying down four
conditions that it deemed necessary for holding successful elections.
First, effective legal action had to be initiated against those who had
participated in the November 1987 attacks and other political murders;
second, a general climate of public security needed to be established in
order to encourage voters to go to the polls; third, the public
administration should be purged of entrenched, corrupt bureaucrats; and
fourth, some checks had to be established over the powers of the rural
section chiefs (chefs de section), so that the rural population could vote
in an atmosphere free of coercion and intimidation. It was not clear what
action the Council would take if these conditions had not been met by
November.
In the Dominican Republic, events unfolded along a much more predictable
path. Although Dominican politics were boisterous, and physical
clashes--occasionally punctuated by gunfire--between the members of
contending political parties were not unusual, the democratic system
established after the 1965 civil war and the United States intervention
continued to function with comparative efficiency (especially when
compared with that of Haiti). The elections of May 16, 1990, however,
demonstrated the manifold weaknesses of this system. The most glaring
example of the lack of institutionalization in Dominican politics was that
the major contenders for the presidency were the same two men who had
opposed each other in the elections of 1966, namely, Juan Bosch Gavi and
incumbent Joaqu Balaguer Ricardo. Despite almost a quarter of a century of
relatively free political organization and competition, the two modern-day
caudillos, both octogenarians, still sallied into the arena flying their
own personalistic banners rather than those of truly established parties.
The one party that had displayed some level of institutionalization, the
Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano--PRD),
had split into antagonistic factions--each with its own caudillo--and
never presented a serious challenge to the two elder statesmen.
The elections themselves, like most during the post-civil war era, were
lively, controversial, and bitterly contested. Despite debilitating
national problems, such as a chronic shortage of electricity, rising
inflation, and persistent poverty, President Balaguer retained enough
support in a presidential race contested by sixteen political parties
(some running in coalition) to eke out a narrow victory over Bosch. The
final tally showed Balaguer with 678,268 votes against Bosch's 653,423.
Like most Dominican politicians before him, Bosch did not accept defeat
with magnanimity; he lashed out at Balaguer and the Central Electoral
Board, accusing both of fraud during balloting that impartial observers
had judged to be fair and orderly. Bosch's early public statements
exhorted his followers to stage public protests against the alleged
electoral fraud. Early fears of widespread street violence initiated by
disgruntled Bosch supporters proved unfounded, however, and Balaguer's
reelection was confirmed by the Board on June 12, 1990.
Although it traditionally bends a little around election time, the
Dominican democratic system showed few signs of breaking completely.
Economic developments, however, will exercise a decisive impact on the
nation's future stability. In that regard, Balaguer's reelection could
prove to be a storm warning for the republic. At eighty-one years of age,
Balaguer reportedly retained his enthusiasm for hands-on administration of
government policy. The major economic aspects of that policy, however, did
not promise a significant degree of improvement in the short term.
Balaguer, since his days as a protof Trujillo, has believed in the liberal
application of funds to public works projects--the construction of
schools, housing, public buildings--in order to boost employment and
purchase political support. Such gratuitous expenditures, however, largely
served to exacerbate the government's fiscal problems, while masking to
only a limited degree the consistently high levels of unemployment
prevailing in the republic. Another tenet of Balaguer's economic creed was
a refusal to submit to an economic adjustment program dictated by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF--see Glossary). By ruling out an
IMF-mandated program, Balaguer avoided further short-term austerity
measures, such as devaluation and price increases on subsidized items;
this enabled him to stand on a platform of economic nationalism and to
proclaim his opposition to economic hardship imposed from abroad (that is,
from the United States, which is strongly identified with the IMF
throughout Latin America). In the long run, however, his obstinacy
diminished Dominican standing with foreign creditors, and it limited any
new infusions of capital needed to sustain the impressive growth of
nontraditional exports achieved during the latter 1980s. This, in turn,
would hinder the accumulation of foreign exchange needed to finance the
imports required to sustain industrial development. Moreover, although an
austerity program undoubtedly would pinch still further an already
hard-pressed population, it might also help to balance the budget, to
stabilize domestic prices, and to boost exports, all highly desirable
potential results.
If the Dominican situation demonstrated anything to Haitians, it was that
democracy is not a panacea for domestic turmoil. As Winston Churchill
observed, it is the worst political system "except for all the others."
Since Trujillo's death, Dominicans have struggled to adjust to an
imperfect system, under less than ideal conditions; the final outcome of
this process is still in doubt. For Haitians, the small step represented
by valid elections could be their first lurch along a much longer road to
peace and stability.
August 21, 1990
***
In the months following completion of research and writing of this book,
significant political developments occurred in Haiti. On December 16,
1990, over 60 percent of registered voters turned out to elect political
neophyte Jean-Bertrand Aristide president of Haiti. Aristide, a Roman
Catholic priest and an advocate of liberation theology (see Glossary),
registered an overwhelming first-round victory against a number of
opponents. His popular identification as an outspoken opponent of the
regime of Jean- Claude Duvalier apparently moved some 67 percent of voters
to select Aristide as their leader. More traditional politicians such as
Marc Bazin, Louis Dejoie, and Silvio Claude trailed badly, reflecting
their lack of appeal beyond the upper and middle classes. Aristide's
victory came as a result of what was arguably the first free and fair
election in Haitian history.
Right-wing backlash against the election of the radical leftist Aristide
expressed itself in a coup attempt led by Duvalierist Roger Lafontant on
January 6, 1991. Assisted by a small contingent of army personnel,
Lafontant seized the National Palace, took prisoner Provisional President
Pascal-Trouillot, and announced his control of the government over the
state-run television station. Lafontant's pronouncement turned out to be
decidedly premature, however, as loyalist army forces stormed the palace
twelve hours later on the orders of FAd'H commander Abraham. Lafontant and
those of his fellow conspirators who survived the fighting were captured
and incarcerated. The coup also ignited violent street demonstrations in
which mobs lynched at least seven people they accused of Duvalierist ties
or sympathies. Violence continued in the interim between the elections and
the presidential inauguration on February 7, 1991. Particularly intense
anti-Duvalierist demonstrations took place on the night of January 26,
leaving more than a dozen dead. On the night of February 1, 1991,
suspected Duvalierists set fire to an orphanage in Port-au-Prince
administered by Aristide.
Aristide's inauguration on February 7, 1991, was a gala event, befitting
its historic nature. As expected, the new president delivered a
spellbinding inaugural address. In it, he renounced his US$10,000 a month
salary as a "scandal in a country where people cannot eat." Although the
address was short on specifics of policy, its tone was one of gratitude
and support for the poverty-afflicted constituency that had provided such
a striking electoral mandate. The address was also conciliatory with
regard to the military. Aristide described a "wedding between the army and
the people," and hinted that the army would henceforth function as a
public security force in order to lessen the threat emanating from
right-wing forces such as those directed by Lafontant.
Beyond his rhetorical outreach to the rank and file, Aristide moved
quickly to shore up his rule in the face of possible opposition from
within the officer corps of the FAd'H.In his inaugural address, he called
on General Abraham to retire six of the eight highest-ranking generals as
well as the colonel who commanded the Presidential Guard. The appeal
reflected Aristide's surprisingly powerful position, based on his
overwhelming electoral victory and his demonstrated popular support, which
extended even to the ranks of the military. The fact that Abraham complied
with the request confirmed the already rather obvious disarray of the
FAd'H and the general unwillingness of the institution to reassume
political power in Haiti.
On February 9, Aristide proposed RenPral as Haiti's prime minister. Pral,
a Belgian-trained agronomist and close associate of the president, was
subsequently approved by the National Assembly. Although Aristide won a
smashing personal victory in his presidential race, no one party or
movement achieved a majority in the assembly. This fact promised a certain
degree of stalemate and inertia in the legislative process under the
Aristide administration. Such a situation did not seem conducive to the
development of programs to deal effectively with the country's many severe
problems. At the same time, however, an assembly based on coalition and
compromise should serve to check any temptation by the new government
toward heavy-handed or even authoritarian rule. In any case, the assembly
was a new institution in a new government in what many hoped would be a
new and democratic Haiti.
March 14, 1991
Richard A. Haggerty
Data as of December 1989
Haiti
GEOGRAPHY
Size: Approximately 28,000 square kilometers.
Topography: Defined by five mountain ranges, dividing country into three
regions: northern, central, and southern. Highest peak, the Morne de la
Selle, located in the south, reaches an altitude of 2,715 meters. No
navigable rivers. Largest lake is Etang Saumre, salt-water body located in
southern region.
Climate: Tropical climate influenced by northeast trade winds. Wet season
generally lasts from February through May, dry season from November to
January. Rainfall pattern irregular because of mountainous topography.
Temperature in lowland areas varies from 15C to 25C in winter, 25C to 35C
in summer.
Data as of December 1989
<snip>
Haiti
Chapter 6. Haiti: Historical Setting
Figure from a painting by Prosper Pierrelouis
HAITI FORMALLY RENOUNCED its colonial bond with France in January 1804, as
the result of the only successful slave rebellion in world history. The
country's longevity as an independent nation in the Western Hemisphere is
second only to that of the United States. Over this span of almost two
centuries, however, the country has never known a period free of tyranny,
repression, political conflict, racial animosity, and economic hardship.
Haiti, the first black republic in modern times, sprang directly to
self-governance from French colonialism, a system that had a profound
impact on the nation. Haiti's colonial origins had demonstrated that an
illiterate and impoverished majority could be ruled by a repressive elite.
The slaveholding system had established the efficacy of violence and
coercion in controlling others, and the racial prejudice inherent in the
colonial system survived under the black republic. A lightskinned elite
assumed a disproportionate share of political and economic power.
The chaotic and personalistic nature of Haitian political culture combined
with chronic underdevelopment to provide fertile ground for a succession
of despots, strongmen, and dictators. Even the few national leaders whose
election apparently reflected popular sentiment, such as Dumarsais
Estim(1946-50) and Franis Duvalier (1957-71), rejected constitutional
procedures in favor of retaining personal power. The popular revolt that
deposed President for life Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-86) demonstrated the
Haitian people's rejection of parasitic despotism. At the same time,
however, the revolt reaffirmed another lesson of Haitian history: violence
has often been the only effective route to change.
Data as of December 1989
Go to the website link above to read more.
Sincerely,
David Dillard
Temple University
(215) 204 - 4584
jwne@xxxxxxxxxx
<http://daviddillard.businesscard2.com>
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Bushell, R. & Sheldon, P. (eds),
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David P. Dillard
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Other related posts:
- » [net-gold] COUNTRIES: HAITI: United States. The Library of Congress. Country Studies. A Country Study: Haiti - David P. Dillard
