[nasional_list] [ppiindia] U.S., RI turning the corner
- From: "Ambon" <sea@xxxxxxxxxx>
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- Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2006 22:38:37 +0100
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U.S., RI turning the corner
James Van Zorge, Jakarta
For the most part, the history of relations between Washington and Jakarta has
been a positive and intriguing story. From 1965, when Soeharto came to power,
Indonesia was viewed as a reliable partner in the vein of Cold War politics.
With Cold warriors running foreign policy, the U.S. was willing to forgive
Soeharto for his excesses; containing the spread of communism necessarily
trumped moralist politics. Because of U.S. geopolitical interests in Southeast
Asia -- especially during the Vietnam War and the pervasive fear amongst the
policy elite of a domino effect should Ho Chi Minh prevail -- Soeharto's
Indonesia was treated as a strategic asset.
When the U.S. military departed Saigon in 1975, President Gerald Ford and his
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger had a lot to worry about the future of
Asia. It would be a safe bet that the specter of communists establishing a
foothold in Indonesia must have frightened them.
Initially, Soeharto was adamantly opposed to the idea of an invasion. His
stance changed, however, upon hearing that the Timorese leader Jose Ramos Horta
was contemplating an alliance with China after independence.
The rest is history. Ford and Kissinger visited Jakarta to discuss the fine
details of an invasion and how the U.S. was to cover its tracks. Soeharto and
Ford may have thought of East Timor as Indonesia's Cuba, yet what happened in
the following decades is that it became Indonesia's Little Vietnam, with
Jakarta taking all the blame and the U.S. denying everything.
Lying and cover-ups served both parties' interests. The end of the Cold War
meant, however, that it would be difficult for U.S. presidents to turn a blind
eye towards Indonesia and get away with it. Washington stopped military aid to
Indonesia by canceling the International Military Education Training (IMET)
program in October 1992; in 1994, it banned sales of small and light arms; in
1999, military joint exercises and commercial arms sales were banned. Finally,
in 2001, Senator Leahy sponsored an amendment to the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, which suspended all military assistance to Indonesia.
Just as the Cold War and its ending can explain U.S. policy towards Indonesia,
so can George Bush Jr.'s "war on terror". After 9/11, there was a rising chorus
of U.S. neoconservative policymakers who made the argument that Indonesia was a
key ally in the war against terror. Now, it was only a matter of time before
they would find a way to have national security interests trump human rights.
In late 2005 the Bush Administration finally decided to face off against
Senator Leahy. Using an executive waiver as allowed in the 2006 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act, the White House managed to lift restrictions on
U.S. military financing and the export of lethal equipment for Indonesia.
Leahy was surely incensed with Bush and his acolytes; but before he could
prepare for a counter-offensive, more nasty surprises were in store for the
senator.
Strike two against Leahy came in December 2005, when the U.S. National Security
Archive released previously classified documents on East Timor. In those
documents, there was clear evidence of U.S. support for the Indonesian invasion
of East which, effectively, made nonsense of Leahy's moralist stance and
insistence to punish Jakarta.
One might surmise that with Indonesia being touted as a reliable partner in the
war on terror and Leahy effectively sidelined -- at least temporarily --
U.S.-Indonesia relations have turned a corner for the better.
There is, however, one small problem remaining which, if not handled correctly,
could swing the pendulum back. The issue under scrutiny is the deaths of two
Americans in August 2002 during an ambush on an international school bus in the
province of Papua.
According to the Indonesian government and armed forces, the attacks were
carried out by separatists belonging to the Free Papua Movement, or OPM. There
are others who believe that, in fact, the ambush was carried out by the special
forces of the Indonesian military who, ostensibly, were making a bold statement
against U.S. mining company Freeport McMoRan for being delinquent on payments
to the TNI for providing it with security services.
Suspicions were raised about the credibility of the allegations made against
OPM when an autopsy on the Papuan who supposedly played a role in the attack
showed that he was not alive when the ambush took place. There were also leaks
from inside U.S. intelligence to the international media, suggesting that the
Indonesian military was involved.
Now, even after FBI investigations have been completed and suspects arrested by
Indonesian authorities, suspicions of a cover-up are rife. Our suspicions were
also raised after credible and well-placed sources inside Papua told us that
the arrested suspects are, in fact, not really suspects at all, but rather,
well-informed witnesses who could implicate parties other than OPM in the
shootings.
Apparently, there are also officials inside the U.S. Government who are also
apprehensive about taking the arrests at face value. This includes Senator
Leahy, who recently told the press that "...there are so many unanswered
questions in this case, including who these people are and what role they may
have had in these crimes."
Regardless, we do not feel qualified to lodge any accusations or pass judgment.
We would say that, if the Bush Administration wants to maintain closer ties to
Jakarta for the sake of national security, it should ensure that duplicitous
means are not being used to achieve those ends. Responsible decision-makers in
Jakarta and Washington would be well-advised to remember the lessons of the
East Timor saga, one of which is that the truth almost always emerges.
The writer is a senior partner of Van Zorge, Heffernan & Associates, a
government relations consulting firm based in Jakarta. He can be reached at
jvzorge@xxxxxxxxxx
.
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