[nasional_list] [ppiindia] The general and the Ayatollah
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- Date: Sun, 19 Feb 2006 22:16:55 +0100
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Issue No. 782
Region
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875
The general and the Ayatollah
Following a historic accord struck between Hizbullah and Lebanon's
Christians, Michel Aoun speaks to Omayma Abdel-Latif about the new moment in
Lebanese politics
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Click to view caption
Marking the first anniversary of Al-Hariri's assassination in a
mass gathering in central Beirut
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Following a historic accord struck between Hizbullah and Lebanon's
Christians, Michel Aoun speaks to Omayma Abdel-Latif about the new moment in
Lebanese politics
The scene was unprecedented in the history of post-war Lebanon. Hassan
Nasrallah, leader of Hizbullah, traditionally Syria's long-time ally, shaking
hands with Michel Aoun, Syria's arch enemy for almost 15 years and who
championed a war from his position in exile in France against the Syrian
presence in Lebanon.
Mar Mekhayel Church in Haret Hureek, originally the birthplace of Aoun
and the Shia heartland in Beirut played host to the signing of what came to be
known as "a declaration of understanding", a document comprised of 10 points
which tackled the most ticklish issues in today's Lebanese politics, from
Hizbullah's arms to the relationship with Syria, passing through the efforts to
bring back the Lebanese state and put an end to political corruption.
Many analysts described the event as "a political coup", from a
historical point of view. An "earthquake", suggested others, which shattered
the political traditions in Lebanese politics of organising along sectarian
lines.
It also came at a time when sectarian tension is at an all time high.
It was the latest in a string of events unleashed by Aoun's homecoming from
exile last May. The general's return has been received with mixed reactions
from varied political forces.
Despite attempts by opposition forces then to isolate Aoun and
marginalise his contribution in the political process, Aoun remained a key
player in the reshaping of the political landscape following the Syrian
withdrawal from Lebanon. His landslide victory in the parliamentary elections
-- he leads a bloc of 21 seats -- anointed him and his movement the Free
Patriotic Movement ( Tayyar ) as representing the Christian street par
excellence.
Although Aoun boasts that 20 per cent of his constituency are Muslims,
yet many believe that the significance of his return lies in the fact that he
has been crowned as the leader of Lebanon's Christians.
A year after Rafik Al-Hariri's assassination, and as Lebanon stands at
a historic juncture, Aoun is one of the few Lebanese politicians who read
events well, as proven by his deal with Nasrallah; that both have a
constituency that cannot be ignored by the 14 March team which rule Lebanon
today. At his office in Al-Rabiya, Aoun spoke to Al-Ahram Weekly about the
current political situation and implications of the deal with Hizbullah on the
future of the political process in Lebanon.
How do you assess the situation a year after the assassination of
former Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri?
No doubt Al-Hariri's assassination has been a catalyst accelerating
efforts towards the implementation of Resolution 1559 in respect to the Syrian
withdrawal. It also led to my homecoming after years in exile and the release
of Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese militia. Holding the parliamentary
elections was yet another important development but it exposed the acute
political crisis the country was facing when the political elite failed to
establish a new elections law. This meant that the election results did not
reflect correctly the present political scene. This distortion was also present
in the composition of the new government and parliament. In the meantime, we
have witnessed a surge in the role played by the media in inciting hatred and
sectarian tension in a way that goes against a basic code of ethics.
Do you think the high levels of sectarian tension can lead to civil war
in Lebanon?
There are wise men in Lebanon today who remain in control of the
situation. I don't think there is a will to initiate sectarian strife. I
believe that those who control the situation on the ground don't want to have
war, and those who have the will to start a war don't have the power to do so.
They keep the levels of tension high through fiery discourses but they cannot
change the situation on the ground because those able to start a war don't want
it.
Do you mean Hizbullah and your Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)?
I cannot comment on this.
You said that the current composition of parliament does not reflect
the true weight of political forces on the ground; so you agree with
Nasrallah's description of the majority which is in power as a "false
majority"?
We can explain this through the number of votes each of the three
political forces that comprise the bulk of the assembly gained during
elections. There are now three axes within the assembly: Al-Mustaqbal and its
allies which has 72 seats -- it has gained the third of the votes; the second
is the Hizbullah-Amal axis, and it also gained a third of the votes with 34
seats; and the third is the FPM and its allies, and it also got the last third
of the votes with 21 seats. In terms of numbers, Hizbullah and FPM both
represent one third of the assembly, but in reality they became the majority
thanks to the number of seats.
Seven months after the opposition came to power how do you read their
performance, particularly regarding the security situation?
Their political discourse shows that they run the affairs of the
country in an amateurish way. They were made politicians under the gaze of the
Syrians. Today they have proved a disastrous failure in handling security in
Lebanon, particularly in such a volatile situation as that following the Syrian
withdrawal. They lack the technical abilities and the leadership to run a
proper security establishment.
Do you believe that the situation will escalate under this government?
Yes, things are only getting worse.
In your view, why is there fear among some Lebanese politicians of Arab
mediation between Syria and Lebanon?
Those who fear mediation efforts think that there is something that
they will lose if Arab mediation takes place. But the irony is that the
majority that is in power is the one that is rejecting any efforts for
mediation sponsored by Arab parties. This is why, when the situation in Lebanon
came to a standstill, I took the initiative and called for national dialogue
among different political groups and put all the issues on the table. When no
one responded to our call, we opted for a bilateral dialogue with Hizbullah,
and we reached an understanding on nearly all the controversial issues.
What needs to be done for this declaration to see light on the ground?
Both Hizbullah and the FPM cannot achieve all the points mentioned on
their own. There is an important role for the state. We only put forward a
draft paper in which we offered our views regarding key controversial issues,
and the ways in which they can be approached and resolved. Government
partnership is vital. We only established the framework. What is important is
the significance of the deal where two major powers in the country have opted
for dialogue and reached an agreement over the most sensitive of issues.
Do you expect other political forces, like the Future bloc ( Tayyar
Al-Mustaqbal), will join forces with FPM and Hizbullah?
The problem with the Future bloc is that there are two types of
discourses; the political discourse that is flexible and the media discourse
that incites hatred and is the more powerful on the ground.
You say that the government is essential. Do you think that the issue
of Hizbullah's decommissioning is one such issue where you will need the
partnership of the ruling powers?
We have offered our understanding of how the issue of Hizbullah arms
should be tackled. We have put conditions on the context in which Hizbullah
arms should be used in defence of the Lebanese land and until the Shebaa Farms
are liberated.
But signals coming lately from the government are perplexing. Some,
like Jumblatt, call for disarmament and accuse Hizbullah of being a Syrian or
an Iranian agent, while others have a different line.
Let them dare ask Hizbullah to decommission. I don't think this is a
proper way to deal with Hizbullah. We are one people; they are citizens of this
land as much as we are. They have made sacrifices to liberate the south and
their resistance was legitimate and holistic. These are the same people we are
dealing with today and who said they want to keep their arms forever. Our
mission is not to destroy Hizbullah but to allow it to enter the political
process to achieve the goals for which it took up arms. I believe that
Hizbullah's leadership has flexibility and there is a will to transform.
Walid Jumblatt insists that Shebaa Farms are not Lebanese territory and
that they are being used as a pretext by Hizbullah to keep its arms. What will
be the fate of the joint FPM-Hizbullah declaration in light of such comments?
Jumblatt's map is of no use. There are maps that show the farms in
Lebanon and there are others that show them belonging to Syria. There are
ownership documents which were issued from the Lebanese authorities and land
ownership is the only arbiter to decide where sovereignty lies.
A recent statement by the 14 March team -- an allusion to the
Hariri-Jumblatt-Geagea axis -- clearly stated that the national consensus over
Hizbullah's arms has eroded. What is your comment?
Yes, the national consensus might be like before, but resistance arms
are tied with the liberation of Shebaa Farms, the release of all Lebanese
prisoners and the issue of Palestinian arms outside the camps. These issues are
all related. We cannot ask a Lebanese group to put down its arms while
Palestinian groups remain armed. In other words, it is only natural that you
set some priorities before getting down to Hizbullah's arms.
Who deals with the larger issue of defending Lebanon's national
security against ongoing Israeli violations?
This should be the strategy of the state; and when there is first a
clear strategy as to how the state will protect national interests against such
violations we would reach the final stage where Hizbullah decommissions or
integrates within the national defence mechanism of the state.
To what extent was there a consensus inside the FPM over the deal with
Hizbullah? Some say that prospects of such a deal angered a number of your
constituency?
It took us six months of intense discussions to reach that level of
understanding with Hizbullah. Every word is carefully chosen. In the end, when
the FPM and Hizbullah reach an agreement it is not about who made concessions
more than whom. It is Lebanon that truly wins. We might indeed have lost some
of our undecided or neutral sympathisers, but we have definitely gained more --
particularly amongst Lebanese Muslims. We know that FPM popularity skyrocketed
in Akar, for example, where there is a dominant Sunni constituency. We wanted
to be forces of stability in the country.
US officials expressed concern over your deal with Hizbullah. The US
ambassador visited you. Did you discuss the issue with him?
We explained a few points. We also explained that this deal is not
against any party but rather an effort to start a dialogue amongst ourselves.
Do you consider it to be a new Taif agreement?
I cannot say it is a new Taif because there is no contradiction between
our agreement and Taif. On the contrary, it sought to resolve some of the
issues that were left unresolved in Taif.
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