[nasional_list] [ppiindia] FEER: High Stakes in post-tsunami Aceh
- From: rahardjo mustadjab <bapakjewel@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: apakabar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, ppiindia@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2005 08:53:53 +0000 (GMT)
** Mailing List Nasional Indonesia PPI India Forum **
(Fareastern Economic Review)
High Stakes in Post-Tsunami Aceh
by James Van Zorge
Aceh is now officially on the world?s radar screen.
During most of the decades-long separatist war between
the Aceh Freedom Movement (otherwise known as GAM, or
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and the Indonesian military, the
media either took little interest in Aceh or were
forbidden to enter the province. The Boxing Day
tsunami changed that overnight.
Hundreds of international print and electronic
journalists are filing daily stories from the
provincial capital, Banda Aceh. Then there are the
foreign military: 1,300 soldiers, naval ships,
aircraft and military helicopters have been deployed
from the United States, France, Australia, Singapore,
Malaysia and Japan, assisting the Indonesian armed
forces with distributing emergency food supplies,
clearing debris and providing survivors with medical
assistance. Finally, there are the international
organizations. Under the umbrella of the United
Nations alone, there are more than 1,100 relief
workers representing 60 organizations in Aceh.
There is no doubt that Indonesians in general and the
Acehnese in particular are grateful for what will
prove to be the largest relief effort in history.
Public and private aid pledged for the countries hit
by the tsunami now exceeds $10 billion in cash
donations, debt relief and low-interest loans; a large
portion of the global aid package is expected to be
channeled towards Aceh, whose tsunami victims
constitute more than two-thirds of the total.
However, the Indonesian government and military, or
TNI, have already started to send mixed signals about
tolerating the presence of foreigners on Aceh?s soil.
At first overwhelmed by the magnitude of the crisis,
Indonesia?s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his
cabinet quickly went to work in earnest with the
international community. Now, Jakarta is telling aid
workers that they must register with the government
and obtain permission to go outside the confines of
Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, in some cases with TNI
escort, ostensibly to protect them from GAM.
Likewise, foreign military personnel are required to
report their whereabouts to government officials, or
face expulsion. Vice President Jusuf Kalla told the
media, in no uncertain terms, that he wants foreign
troops out of Aceh as soon as possible: ?I think three
month are enough, and the sooner they leave the
better.?
Almost immediately, international NGOs and foreign
governments started posing questions about Jakarta?s
ulterior motive in asserting strict controls over the
movements of foreign aid workers. Government officials
say that such restrictions are necessary for the
safety of its guests, but human rights organizations
familiar with the TNI?s dealings in Aceh in the past
are suspicious that military hardliners are using
security concerns as an excuse to keep prying eyes
away from its operations in the field. Of immediate
concern is that restrictions could impede the flow of
aid to the more remote areas of Aceh. Relief
organizations also worry that the TNI wants to resell
aid on the black market.
These doubters have a legitimate point. Logically, GAM
as a separatist movement would have little to gain and
much to lose by attacking aid workers. With worldwide
media attention now on Aceh, the GAM leadership must
be anxious to bolster its credibility with the foreign
community; undermining relief efforts would be a
disaster for the guerrillas, and only strengthen
Western support for TNI to wage its war in Aceh. Hence
the efforts by GAM to stitch together a cease-fire
agreement.
Since this is one of the world?s forgotten wars, most
outsiders are not aware of the TNI?s terrible
reputation in Aceh. Besides numerous instances of
gross human rights abuses against Acehnese civilians,
TNI has also reportedly been involved in war
profiteering: Car smuggling, illegal logging,
marijuana trading and protection rackets aimed against
foreign companies have been part of the TNI
black-market business portfolio in Aceh for many
years. For senior military officers, a posting in Aceh
is considered to be one of the more lucrative
assignments. Knowing this, fears of corrupt officers
making designs on humanitarian aid are well-founded,
and could partly explain why dishonest players inside
TNI are anxious to reassert control.
Finally, there is the radical Muslim part of the
calculus. Not long after relief workers started
appearing, there have been reports of extremist
Islamic organizations starting to mass their cadres in
Banda Aceh. Two groups in particular? the Islamic
Defender?s Front and Laskar Mujahidin?are known to
have anti-Western sentiments and a track record of
violence. Although there have been no clashes yet with
the foreign community, this possibility can?t be
discounted.
As much as hardliners inside the TNI would feel more
comfortable with the exit of foreigners, so the
Islamic extremists would like to take a leading role
in filling the void left by the collapse of local
governments and have greater influence in the
province. In fact, there should be little doubt that
Islamic extremists would prefer Western aid efforts to
fail. Whereas the Bush administration sees its work in
Aceh as a grand opportunity to improve its image in
the Muslim world, extremists view Washington?s success
as a threat in the war for co-religionists? hearts and
minds.
Following a resounding victory in last year?s
presidential elections, President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono is now facing his first critical test of
leadership. Should he manage the Aceh crisis
skillfully, he will be assured of an even stronger
mandate to lead and enjoy considerable prestige on the
international stage. If he fails, however, not only
will Indonesia?s reputation suffer, but the president
will find himself cornered by his political opponents
at home, and find it difficult to deliver on his
pledges of political and economic reform.
Handling the Aceh crisis will not be easy. But a
couple of steps can be taken to enhance the national
government?s chances of success:
* President Yudhoyono must sideline the military
hardliners based in Aceh and replace them with officer
diplomats to lead the troops. Preferably, the
Indonesian president would also rotate soldiers who
were based in Aceh during the separatist conflict?who
mostly come from the Army?and replace them with the
more highly respected and professional troops of the
Marines, Navy and Air Force. By doing so, President
Yudhoyono would not only lessen the chances of
corruption and improve the delivery of aid, but also
send the signal to GAM that the national government is
serious about seeking a cease-fire.
* The government should use this opportunity to
negotiate not only a cease-fire but a lasting peace
accord with GAM, as well.With their homeland in
tatters, GAM should now be more accommodating at the
negotiating table and be willing to forsake their
demands for an independent state. On Jakarta?s side,
the leadership should realize that what the Acehnese
need most now is to rebuild their province and get
back to earning a livelihood. It is estimated that the
destructive forces of the tsunami have thrown one
million Acehnese into poverty. If the government takes
positive steps towards ensuring Aceh a better future,
then the entire local community?GAM included?will
surely embrace a formula for peace.
* Measures should be taken to expel radical Muslim
groups from Aceh as soon as possible. Although they
purport to have a humanitarian mission, their history
suggests otherwise. Nor is their presence necessarily
welcomed by the Acehnese or GAM. In the worst-case
scenario, they will prove to be a spoiler in the
government?s efforts to stabilize Aceh, and will mar
Jakarta?s reputation with its Western allies. For its
own political interests and the future of Aceh,
Indonesia should realize that the stakes are simply
too high in taking a soft line towards these extremist
groups that represent only a tiny fraction of the
Muslim population.
Mr. Van Zorge runs an independent political and risk
consultancy in Jakarta.
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