In a message dated 4/10/2015 10:11:49 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
t this raises a similar point - where does Gombrich say that he loves
"eiconic", or say anything from which this could rightly be inferred? It
strikes me as a very un-Gombrich thing for him to have said. But, otoh, a very
JLS thing to say.
Well, if I would have to place this in a scale it would go:
i. Speranza loves 'eiconic' best.
ii. Then, Peirce (i.e. loves 'eiconic', second-best)
iii. Then Grice.
iv. And THEN Gombrich -- only he would use the German: Ikon.
----
Talking of icons, Mona Lisa is one.
"You're the smile, on the Mona Lisa",
goes a line by Cole Porter. He is referring to his aristocratic wife.
It's suppose to be a metaphor -- Porter is possibly quoting from Grice,
whose example of metaphor as conversational implicature is:
"You're the cream in my coffee".
The gloss would go: a smile does not have ears, so what would be the point
of Porter's singing to a smile (which doesn't have ears) something that
the smile cannot understand. On top, to tell the smile of the Mona Lisa that
it is the smile of the Mona Lisa is uninformative, even under the
assumption that the smile of the Mona Lisa could _hear_ the remark. It could
be
argued that the smile of the Mona Lisa doesn't know that it is the smile of
the
Mona Lisa, in which case it might be informative, but the irrelevancy of
talking to something without ears to listen TRUMPS the overinformativeness
of the remark. Therefore, Porter is being metaphorical, i.e. COMPARING Mrs.
Porter and saying that she is LIKE the smile of the Mona Lisa, and then
dropping the 'like' to turn the 'conversational contribution' a literally
false one, and exploiting the maxim of truthfulness.
The Mona Lisa has become an _icon_.
In a message dated 4/10/2015 10:35:12 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx writes:
Omar K. proposed a distinction between
i. I think Mona Lisa is beautiful but I don't like it (+> the picture by
Da Vinci)
ii. I think Mona Lisa is beautiful but I don't like her (+> Da Vinci's
sitee).
His analysis is causal in that there is something in the object of the
aesthesis. It provokes or causes a pleasurable sensation in the perceiver --
and Omar drops in Kant's Critique of Judgement, which may be understood as a
development from Baumgarten.
----
In a message dated 4/10/2015 10:11:49 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
t this raises a similar point - where does Gombrich say that he loves
"eiconic", or say anything from which this could rightly be inferred? It
strikes me as a very un-Gombrich thing for him to have said. But, otoh, a very
JLS thing to say.
Well, Grice did not like 'icon' THAT much, since it's not
'ordinary-language', and he was an ordinary language philosopher. On
occasions, he realised
that his students were not as ordinary as he thought they were, and so he
started to use 'icon', which he had originally characterised as a
krypto-technicism by Peirce. Thus, in the William James lectures, Grice speaks
of an
utterer meaning that p, by uttering 'x', where the mode of correlation
between 'x' and 'p' is iconic, as when Geary says "Ach!", thereby meaning that
p.
As a matter of fact, Grice loved 'icons' at least four times.
i. The first was when he taught Peirce's theory of signs at Oxford -- e.g.
'icon', and surely a University lecturer, as Grice was, rather than a mere
don or tutor, at Oxford, has to LOVE what he teaches.
ii. In the William James lectures, he speaks of an iconic mode of
correlation, when providing his sufficient and necessary conditions for
'signification' or meaning.
iii. In "Meaning revisited", he provides an 'evolutionary' approach to
language, and surely thinks, with Plato's Cratylus, that the first stages must
have been 'iconic'.
iv. When providing a "Retrospective Epilogue" to his long-awaited "Studies
in the Way of Words", he talks of 'represent' (his example, "England was
represented by this cricket team; but I must admit that the cricket team that
represented Australia was better, at least in those matches that involved
England v Australia"). He notes that the prior type of representation is
iconic.
Gombrich, being Austrian, would use the Austrian spelling "Ikon", as he
said, "I'm not English".
The Greek was a very malleable language, and full of diphthongs, hence
'eikon'. In Latin, the 'ei' diphthong was considered too 'refined', and it was
turned to a long 'i'.
The noun is for the old Romans, feminine: īcon, ŏnis, f..
and being a Graecism, it was used with caution, to mean 'imago' (iimage --
cfr. Scruton, "Art and imagination") but also "figura" figure. Thus Plinio
in Book 8, 54, 80, § 215, speaks of 'fictae cera icones'.
Not satisfied with a feminine noun, the Romans adopted the adjective: īcŏn
ĭcus, a, um -- as when we say that the Mona Lisa has become 'iconic'.
"Iconicus" is used by the Romans to mean "of, or belonging, to an image",
but also "imitating a figure", and "copied from life" (as the Mona Lisa
was). Thus Plinio again, in Book 35, 8, 34, § 57, speaks of 'duces iconicus',
of the size of life. simulacrum aureum, Svetonio, in his Life of Caligola,
22, of an iconic 'simularcum aureum'.
But this was yet not enough. Thus, Seneca the Elder, who wrote many
letters. In his Epistle 97, section 67, he tells a friend that he came across
an "
īcŏnismus"; this would be like an icon, but masculine, and it's best
translated as "an imaging", or "representation by an image".
Back in Greece, the "εἰκών" was also feminine. But in poetic and the
Ionic dialect a nominative "εἰκώ" is implied (though not found) in gen. A.
“εἰκοῦς” E.Hel.77, acc. “εἰκώ” A.Th.559, E.Med.1162, Hdt.7.69.
But again it is “εἰκόνα” 2.143, both εἰκόνα and εἰκώ in Plato,
Ti. 37d) -- Maiist.15: acc. pl. “εἰκούς” E.Tr.1178, Ar.Nu.559: (Εἴκω,
ἔοικα, ϝεικ-Inscr.Cypr.151 H.).
The 'eikon', for the Greeks, was the abstract idea of a "likeness", an
"image", whether a "picture" or a "statue" (as in Herodotus .2.130, 143,
A.Th.559, etc.; “εἰ. γεγραμμένη” Plutarch 2.1117c; “εἰ. γραπτά”
IG4.940.23, cf. 3.1330; of needlework, E.IT223 (anap.); bust, Luc.Alex.18; εἰ.
βασιλικαί,
The Latin equivalent of 'eicon' would be "imago" as in "imagines
imperatorum" (i.e. figures of the emperor, representations of them, or images
of
him, as per a dream -- Lib. Or.56.13: generally, “εἰ. τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς
αἰσθητός” Pl.Ti.92c.
It can also mean a image in a mirror, E.Med.1162, Plato, Republic, 402b.
And it can also mean a personal description, PTeb.32.21 (ii B. C.), etc.
Metaphorically, an icon is a "living image", a "representation", “εἰ.
ζῶσα τοῦ Διός” OGI90.3 (Rosetta, ii B. C.); “τοῦ θεοῦ” 2 Ep.Cor.4.4.
It can also mean a "semblance", or a "phantom", E.HF1002; “οὐ γὰρ
ἐκεῖνος τέθνηκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ ἡ εἰ. αὐτοῦ” Luc.DMort.16.1;
Or an "imaginary form", Plato, Republic, 588b. Also an "image in the mind"
“εἰκοὺς πατρός” E.Tr.1178; “δοξῶν καὶ λόγων” Pl.Phlb. 39c,
etc.; εἰκόνας σῆς ἀρετῆς
:thy virtue's counterparts", of children, Epigr.Gr.435.4; “περίβολον
ἔχειν δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα” Pl.Cra.400c; “ἐν εἰκόνι
βασιλείας” Hdn.7.9.10.
An icon is a "similitude", a "comparison", Ar.Nu. 559, Ra.906, Pl.Phd.87b,
Men.80c, Men.536.1; “δι᾽ εἰκόνος λέγεσθαι” Pl.R.487e, cf.
Arist.Rh.1407a11, Lib.Ep.8.1. Finally, it can also mean a "pattern", an
"archetype", “ποτὶ τὰν εἰκόνα [κόσμος] ἀπειργασμένος” Ti.Locr.99d.
Gombrich perhaps didn't like an icon. But when he had to leave Austria,
and Kris found him a post at the Warburg, 'icon' was all the rage. Gombrich
had then less prestige than Panofsky, and Gombrich kept quoting Panofsky for
_ages_. But Panofsky's idea of an icon is different from Gombrich.
Aby Warburg and Fritz Saxl, and not just Gombrich use "iconology"
(iconologia) in the broad sense of an interpretative study of images with the
implication that such a study included an iconographic collation of sources.
Warburg was the first to define "iconology".
But Panofsky goes on to provide a distinction between the iconographic and
the iconologic (cfr. W. J. T., Mitchell, "Iconology: Image, Text,
Ideology", Univ. of Chicago Press).
For Panofsky the study of an icon or image involves three levels.
The first level is the simple identification of an icon through
familiarity.
Looking at a painting of an historical battle scene, for example,
Waterloo, we can only identify and name weapons with which we are familiar,
and we
can also understand the expressions of pain and anguish on the faces of
wounded soldiers.
Panofsky explained this distinction at this first level as being a
distinction between the "factual" (the weapons) and the "expressional" (the
anguish).
Factual and expressional apprehension will vary greatly, depending on
experience.
Obviously, an expert on British weaponry during the Battle of Waterloo
will identify a great variety of motifs; just as viewer with experience of
battle (a war veteran, say) might react very differently to those without such
experience.
A second level deals with the domain of iconography.
That is, the linking of artistic motifs with themes, concepts and
conventional meaning.
For example, at this level a Renaissance image of a man struck in the
chest with an arrow from a crossbow might be apprehended beyond its horrific
expressional value as representational of, or an allegory for, the power of
linear perspective.
Such recognition would be made possible because of a knowledge of
Renaissance treatises on perspective and similar or related images.
Finally, a third, most contentious level of interpretation is the
iconological.
At this deepest level, the intrinsic meaning or content of the work is
apprehended as when Omar K. provides an analysis of why he does not consider
it a logical contradiction to say, "I find the Mona Lisa beautiful, but not
having met her in the flesh, can't say I would have LIKED her."
It is worth quoting Panofsky directly here as he explains this intrinsic
meaning (of stuff like the Mona Lisa)
"[This meaning] is apprehended by ascertaining those underlying principles
which reveal the basic attitude of a nation, a period, a class, a
religious or philosophical persuasion - qualified by one personality and
condensed
into one work" (p.30).
Quite a way from Baumgarten!
This privileging of individual personality may no longer read like a red
cape to a bull in the post-Marxist world of art history but it remains
problematic, if only for its distinct scent of popular psychology.
Importantly, Panofsky understood iconology to be more than a search for
symptoms, but an exhaustive interpretation from technical knowledge of art
production, through comprehensive iconographical knowledge to a final
underlying principle or conclusion.
After all, the symbolic interpretation of perspective as an arrow in the
eye by Renaissance artists almost demands a conclusion about the attitudes
to science in that age.
Such an interpretation of the "symbolical" values of the Renaissance would
make a perfect example of an iconological study as Panofsky conceived of
the term.
Iconological interpretation was not related to study of intentionality (or
what the artist intended to express, alla Grice), since few people were
more anti-Griceian tan Panofsky (but then Grice was anti-Panofskyan on
weekends).
Panofsky claims that "symbolical" values might, in fact, radically differ
from the conscious intention of the utterer (what Da Vinci MEANT by
painting the Mona Lisa, or her smile, in a sfumato background).
The first two levels of meaning, the natural and iconographical, are
phenomenal.
The third, intrinsic meaning, is beyond the sphere of conscious volition
for Panofsky.
In "Studies in Iconology", Panofsky provides a scheme, in terms of four
categories: the object of interpretation, the act of interpretation, the
equipment of interpretation, and the corrective principle of interpretation.
This yields the 'distinctive features' for the three levels involving an
icon:
I. Primary or natural subject matter - (A) factual, (B) expressional -
constituting the world of artistic motifs Pre-iconographical description (and
pseudo-formal analysis) Practical experience (familiarity with objects and
events). History of style (insight into the manner in which, under varying
historical conditions, objects and events were expressed by forms).
II. ICONOGRAPHIC approach to the icon. Secondary or conventional subject
matter, constituting the world of images, stories and allegories.
Iconographical analysis Knowledge of literary sources (familiarity with
specific
themes and concepts). History of types (insight into the manner in which,
under
varying historical conditions specific themes or concepts were expressed
by objects and events).
III. ICONOLOGIC approach to the icon. Intrinsic meaning or content,
constituting the world of "symbolical" values. Iconological interpretation
Synthetic intuition (familiarity with the essential tendencies of the human
mind), conditioned by personal psychology and "Weltanschauung" History of
cultural symptoms or "symbols" in general (insight into the manner in which,
under varying historical conditions, essential tendencies of the human mind
were expressed by specific themes
This separation of levels is only intended as an explanation of a process
which Panofsky understood would be fully integrated and ultimately shot
through with intuition or specifically "synthetic intuition" as he termed it.
Thus, Kosuth, citing Ayer, overreacted by claiming that what HE was doing
was displaying 'analytic' propositions, rather.
But back to Panofsky, the pre-iconographic description and iconographical
levels are important correctives or controls since every interpretation will
be subjective and to more or less degrees irrational, (for every intuitive
approach will be conditioned by the interpreter's psychology and
"Weltanschauung").
Nevertheless, iconographic knowledge is the core of Panofsky's method and
probably the only feature left untarnished by modern scholars.
Even the first stage of factual or natural apprehension has been made to
seem a naive concept.
In a recent critique of Panofsky's methodology, S. Bann quotes J. Crary's
theories on the changing role of the observer or addressee to dismiss
Panofsky's idea of an "innocent eye" (or 'an innocent ear', as Geary puts it
in
his "Elvis Presley's Iconography Revisited: Graceland and beyond" and more
recently in although he fails to acknowledge the inevitable fragility of
any theory when tested against time.
A test which Crary's theories have yet to pass. See: S/ Bann
Meaning/Interpretation (Chapter Seven) in Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff,
eds.
For the sake of balance, you might want to read a short essay by R.
Wittkower, a friend of Panofsky and enthusiastic follower of his iconological
approach.
The essay "Interpretation of Visual Symbols" extends Panofsky's three
levels of interpretation to a fourth: "literal representational, the literal
thematic, multiple and expressive meaning." See: Rudolf Wittkower "Allegory
and the Migration of Symbols", T&H.
In a collection of essays published as a Centennial Commemoration of Erwin
Panofsky, W. Steiner makes the telling observation that in the world of
photographic images it is virtually impossible to remove an image from its
particular social context.
Put another way: our interpretation of the photograph is so intertwined
with its "expressional" (to use Panofsky's term) relationships that we can
never abandon our emotional attachment to penetrate below the first level of
analysis. [
See: "The Vast Disorder of Objects: Photography and the Demise of
Formalist Aesthetics", in Irving Lavin ed., Meaning in the Visual Arts: Views
from
the Outside, Princeton.
For an intelligent brief summary of Panofsky's general art historical
methodology, see: Eric Fernie Art History and its Methods: a critical
anthology, (Phaidon Press) London. Also relevant, if you have a particular
interest
in the development of art historical methodology, is Christopher Wood's
introduction to his translation of Panofsky's 1927 essay on "Perspective as
Symbolic Form", (Zone Books) New York.
As S. Bann acknowledges, in the essay quoted above, the sustaining power
of Panofsky's writing was based on his skill and diligence in digging out
the iconographic and other sources that would unearth the meaning of a
picture.
This is a skill that every student must develop and it is built on the
acquisition of a comprehensive knowledge of the history of pictorial
representation.
Speculative fantasies about the meaning of a painting might seem more
poetic or interesting than a reasoned analysis based on iconographic and other
sources but such is not the case.
This is best illustrated by reading an extract from Erwin Panofsky's study
of the mythical symbol of Pandora's Box in which they analyze a drawing by
Rosso Fiorentino, in "Pandora's Box".
There is a reference to "the Erasmian pyxis" where Panofsky explains the
"Origin of the Box" since in the original classical version of the Pandora
story she opened a pithos or large vessel or storage vase, not a box.
Only in Italy, does the phrase "vaso di Pandora" exist today as it is now
taken for granted that Pandora opened a small box.
The origin of the box version, it was shown, was the publication by
Erasmus of Rotterdam of Adagiorum chiliades tres (1508) "one of the world's
most
popular and influential books".
Erasmus replaced the pithos with a pyxis or small container in his now
accepted version of the story.
In all versions of the story, when Pandora, or sometimes her husband
Epimetheus, opens the box or vessel to release upon humanity all forms of Vice,
the Virtues evaporate to the heavens and only Hope [Speranza, in Rosso
Fiorentino] is caught by the lid and remains.
After reading this extract you may wish to read more on the myth of
Pandora.
Cheers,
Speranza
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