[lit-ideas] shoyn genug
- From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2014 10:47:32 +0200
dear Mrs McEvoy, what shows it is an inference. No body bears any
responsibility for the failure to infer. It can be treated, philosophy
helps. logics heals
On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 10:04 AM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
> It is not that I disagree with everything Palma says in his "last try"
> but, sadly, nothing in that "last try" validly shows that -
> >For W. the opposite is the case [and] "the tree is growing" is a fact
> ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.>
>
> What Palma writes does not come close to showing this is W's claim, valid
> or not.
>
> We may agree that, in TLP, W takes language and reality as isomorphic - as
> having the same underlying structure. And W takes this isomorphism as the
> explanation for how language can have purchase on reality.
>
> But it does not follow from this isomorphism that
> >For W. the opposite is the case [and] "the tree is growing" is a fact
> ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.>
>
> The whole notion of "ontologically prior" here deployed is not shown to be
> derived from W's text.
>
> And here we may bear in mind the question has been asked whether, given
> the "isomorphism", W has a view on whether this isomorphism is a result
> of the nature of language or of the nature of reality (or both in
> combination): various people have speculated on this question, but it seems
> clear it is speculation in that there is no textual evidence expressing
> W's view. We might say then that there is clearly no textual evidence
> showing whether, "[f]or W" in TLP, language or reality are "ontologically
> prior" to each other.
>
> In the light of this, it might seem very mistaken that Palma thinks a
> claim of this "ontologically prior" sort can be read into what Palma quotes
> from TLP.
>
> And there are reasons to suggest that a claim of this sort is, for W in
> TLP, cobblers - because such a claim attempts to go beyond not only what
> can be said with sense but also what can be shown (where what can be
> shown is itself limited in a way indicated by TLP).
>
> Dnl
> Ldn
>
>
>
> On Friday, 20 June 2014, 8:02, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> One of the interesting facts about Wittgenstein is that he was acutely
> aware of the problems of his fact-philosophy.
> E.g. not ‘words’ are units of ontology but facts, for instance he has no
> theory of the copula, he inherited the view that a definite article
> dissolves into quantificational devices (this Russell circa 1904/1905.)
> In that sense Wittgenstein is almost responsible for inventing the notion
> of reference (a proposition refers to truth values etc.)
> His having studied Frege (above all) and Russell, who was obsessed by
> epistemology is rather clear
>
>
> *From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
> lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *Adriano Palma
> *Sent:* 20 June 2014 08:51
> *To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] last try
>
> As the passages testify the world is the totality of what is conceivable.
> A subset of the world is what is the Fall (“what is the case”.)
> Hence by instantiation, take a single fact.
> Arbitrarily select the fact that one (the/def descry) is growing.
> The case is (or is less opaque terms, it is true that the tree is growing)
> that the tree is growing.
> Question: entities involved in the fact are
> An “object” (the tree) and a second “object” (the staged event of growing,
> or if one prefers events, the single event of the growth of the tree), call
> it G
> Hence G(t) is true.
> The question asked makes reference to the claim that there is a priority
> of the fact over the components of the fact.
> Components
> a. The two objects above mentioned
> b. The copula
> c. The definite descriptor
>
> Wittgenstein makes the claim neither trivial (not on the face of it
> idiotic) that what the world is is what can be true or false, hence a Satz
> (a “proposition”.) A tree is not true or false hence it secondary in being
> a component of the fact, by itself it is *not* the world since it does
> compose (via truth tables.)
> As for the idiocy of the taunts on the bible, it is purely the
> responsibility of the writer, luckily not of Wiggenstein that was wrong &
> not that idiotic.
> Regards
>
>
>
> *From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [
> mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>] *On
> Behalf Of *Donal McEvoy
> *Sent:* 19 June 2014 19:04
> *To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: Some Wittgenstein passages
>
> The "full section" quoted does not explicitly make the claim attributed
> to W, nor is any explanation supplied so we might see how this claim might
> be derived from the section quoted.
>
> I mean surely if Palma says so then the Bible claims that London hotel
> rooms can tonight be had for as little as £3.99, and this is shown by the
> "full section" "In the beginning was the light..."
>
> Dnl
> Ldn
>
> On Thursday, 19 June 2014, 15:50, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> a full section was quoted for the delight of the upset reader who
> finds anything "cobblers"
>
> On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 3:48 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
> >For W. the opposite is the case "the tree is growing" is a fact
> ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.>
>
> This sounds to me like just the kind of cobblers that both the early and
> later Wittgenstein were dead against. In case I am mistaken about this, and
> this is in fact what is claimed as "the case" "For W.", please could
> someone explain how _from Wittengenstein's writings_ we arrive at the claim
> '"the tree is growing" is a fact ontologically prior to the alleged "thing"
> called growth or tree."
> If this claim is in W's writings I appear to have missed it.
>
> DnlLdn
>
> On Thursday, 19 June 2014, 7:56, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> the point can be read, easily, as being non trivial.
> For, consider that the realm of the expressible is the realm of the
> real, give or take some fluff about the unsayable etc.
> what is expressible is propositionally structured, hence it is a
> *thought *(see G. Frege Gedankefuge, in LU.)
> It follows that things, independently from how ro who refers to
> "things", are not the what the totality of the world is.
> Whether this is true or false, lemme know. By my counts most people
> think there are things (they have in mind pens, trees, cars, houses,
> sometime even stars and atoms) and believe that "facts" are mental
> constructs of some sort.
> For W. the opposite is the case "the tree is growing" is a fact
> ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 12:19 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
> I will try to post in the coming days some W. passages with questions /
> comments. I apologize that the comments will likely be brief, as I am in a
> rather gloomy mood these days. The passages will probably be from the
> Tractatus and the PI. (I haven't got access to the Blue Book.)
>
> Tractatus 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
>
> First, it is not entirely clear what is meant by the facts/things
> opposition, but I suppose that what is meant is mental facts, as opposed to
> material things. If so, where is the argument for this ? I mean, the
> materialist / idealist debate has been going on in philosophy since the
> pre-Socratics, so what makes W. think that we should accept his take on the
> matter just on his say-so ? It is not given as an axiom, as in Spinoza for
> example, instead it is pronounced by fiat.
>
> O.K.
>
>
>
> --
> palma, e TheKwini, KZN
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> palma
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> cell phone is 0762362391
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> *only when in Europe*:
> inst. J. Nicod
> 29 rue d'Ulm
> f-75005 paris france
>
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> --
> palma, e TheKwini, KZN
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> palma
>
> cell phone is 0762362391
>
>
>
> *only when in Europe*:
> inst. J. Nicod
> 29 rue d'Ulm
> f-75005 paris france
>
>
>
>
>
--
palma, e TheKwini, KZN
palma
cell phone is 0762362391
*only when in Europe*:
inst. J. Nicod
29 rue d'Ulm
f-75005 paris france
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