Coming soon
EXAMPLES OF WHY WITTGENSTEIN WAS RIGHT ON WHAT MAKES PEOPLE STUPID, E.G. A DIET
OF A SINGLE STAPLE OF EXAMPLES
For those who care the principle is taken seriously by Dennett & Davidson.
Popper states the principle in the 50 years old writing in “objective
knowledge” (1972? 1973?0
The version of popper is far less interesting since it is commonsensical, that
is what makes it so apt to be used pedagogically, having no content.
The text that summarizes well what the problem is in the ‘intentional stance’
by D Dennett
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On ;
Behalf Of Donal McEvoy
Sent: Sunday, June 4, 2017 11:51 PM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: (on how best to criticise)
Adriano's formulation is different to the version attributed to Davidson in the
wiki entry.
In wiki the suggestion is that Davidson said:-We make maximum sense of the
words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimises
agreement.
Whatever similarities, this is very different to the following:
in order to understand what p means, one should assume the maximal possible
consistency of the holder of p and that the holder has a maximal set of true
beliefs
Both formulations focus on meaning/interpretation rather than truth/validity
(though the second brings in truth/validity in its assuming of "maximal...true
beliefs").
Otherwise they appear quite different - the first appears to be about
interpreting in a way that "optimises agreement" with us 'the interpreter', the
second with interpreting in a way that optimises the truth and consistency of
the position being interpreted.
The first is hardly a commendable 'principle' at all (where the second may be):
it is obvious that there are great dangers in over-emphasising agreement and
misinterpreting a position by way of underplaying its differences with our own
(a classic example is the view that Popper is, despite protests, actually a
positivist - a view promulgated by positivist interpreters of Popper's critique
of logical positivism). In fact, this 'principle' can lead to downright
distortion. We may even consider there is a cognitive bias to sometimes wrongly
assimilate other's positions to our own (just as there may be an opposed
cognitive bias to sometimes wrongly treat other's views as different from our
own). In this formulation, the supposed 'principle' may hinder, not help, the
rational pursuit of truth.
The second formulation is much better but can be greatly simplified and
improved. We can simplify and improve it by stripping out its apparent reliance
on 'meaning-analysis' or even 'true belief'. Stripped down it can be put as the
following principle - we should criticise positions in their strongest and not
weakest form.
To what end? To the end of getting an accurate estimate of their worth in
rational or critical terms. In other words, because we are engaged in the
rational pursuit of truth and are evaluating any given position in the light of
that aim.
In this version, which is the version I think Popper endorses, the principle is
not so much one of 'charity' as of rationality - it is, of course, not rational
to think a position has less rational worth than it has in its best rational
form.
As to exactly where Popper endorses this version in his writings, I don't know
off the top of my head. What I do recall is that Bryan Magee attributes this
'principle' to Popper - as one that consciously underpins Popper's best
writings, which are of course determinedly 'critical' and avowedly based on
'the critical approach'.
Magee does this in his short book on Popper that has been published in the
Fontana Modern Masters series. FWIW, I have a more developed memory of Magee
emphasising the importance and centrality of this 'principle' to Popper's work
than I have of Popper making such claims in his writings.
Yet in this version it is a very deeply 'Popperian' principle - as said, one
central to rationality and not one adopted as a supererogatory act of charity.
Though deeply 'Popperian' I do not suggest the principle originates with Popper
or is unique to him (for example, good judges in the law use this principle
constantly when weighing cases against each other). However, Popper was more
conscious than some other thinkers that criticising a position, in respects in
which it could be remedied, is much less effective than criticism that can only
be remedied by abandoning the position altogether, and the quality of Popper's
work is immeasurably improved as a result of applying the 'principle'.
Recently, I have been looking again at Popper's book with Eccles _The Self And
Its Brain_, and one its abiding strengths is not engaging in criticism that is
based on taking a 'worst version' of a position. In fact, among the book's
central contentions is that Descarte's version of dualism has been wrongly
taken by many philosophers as representing dualism (when it is closer to a
'worst version'), who then argue (mistakenly) as if rejection of Cartesian
dualism must mean rejection of mind-body dualism.
As noted, in Popper's version, the 'principle' does not invoke notions of "true
belief" or of "meaning" a la the second formulation (attributed to Davidson):
it's all about examining positions or 'cases' in their best and not worst
versions.
Commonsense really. Logical too.
Donal
London
