the clifton school never said that the 21st October of 1805 was Monday,
thereby showing how dumb they were, or are if these laughable institutions
are around.
palma, apgs
On Mon, Aug 7, 2017 at 3:30 AM, Redacted sender jlsperanza for DMARC <
dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
McEvoy writes:
“A number of issues arise re: this point about "detail" (or alleged lack
of detail), including the role of detail in philosophical argument. What
kind of "detail" is going to settle matters philosophically? E.g., whether
there are three worlds W1-W2-W3 alla Popper, or just two W2-W1 alla most
philosophers since Descartes, or just one W1 alla Quine (and perhaps some
other materialists like Armstrong, or perhaps Davidson with his 'anomalous
monism')? We could write an essay in favour of each position that had much
detail, but how much of that detail would rationally support our position
as against the alternatives? Consider: (a) it is possible that the
experience of reading, of getting information from visual decoding of
physical marks, is a purely physical or W1 (electro-chemical-physical)
process; (b) it is also possible the only non-W1 aspect of reading is some
W2 mental processing, that cannot be reduced to or identified with W1
processes; (c) it is also possible that the 'physical marks' represent W3
content, and that reading involves a mental W2 in interaction with this W3
content. What "detail" could decide which is the correct metaphysics here?”
Well, I think Mackie (who of course was influenced by Grice) would think
that, first things first – I am referring to the Mackie who reviewed the
Schlipp volume on Popper – one need to give a detailed analysis of ‘world’.
Consider one-world positions, like Quine’s and Armstrong – that’s
physicalism. What is a physicalist thesis or tenet – call it “p” – what
prongs is that tenet analysed into? Consider a two-world position alla
Descartes. Ryle’s “ghost-in-the-machine” argument may be seen as having
provided a refutation of Descartes’s dualism by noting, in great detail,
how English (or ordinary language) is embedded in a view that is
non-Cartesian in nature. Consider, finally the trialism of Popper. Here
Mackie would ask what it means to say that the ‘objective knowledge’ world
(Popper’s W3) is “nowhere”. What detailed analysis are we providing such
that it DEFINES ‘world 3’. In other words, detail is necessary for
clarificatory and definitional issues. Lewis used to say, “Clarity is not
enough”. But philosophers like Grice and Mackie noted that, by clarifying
issues we have half of the cake baked. Example: a good detailed analysis of
‘w3’ may give an analytic philosopher reason to believe that Popper might
have been right have he given more attention to detail.
McEvoy: “The main way this question might be settled by "detail" would be
if scientific developments provided a detailed testable theory that
accounted for 'reading' purely in W1 terms: but we appear far from there
scientifically, and the kind of materialism that promises we shall
eventually get there is merely 'promissory materialism'. This kind of
promise is a rationally weak argument (though it preaches well to those
converted to a materialist programme of explanation). Such a scientific
explanation as promised would have the effect of revealing an underlying W1
set of processes that underpin and determine what we might otherwise take
as processes involving an autonomous consciousness and autonomous W3
content. It is rational to reject such 'promissory materialism' on the
basis that our experience is more consonant with our having autonomous
consciousness and access to autonomous W3 content (though we may admit that
our experience here may be deceptive). Popper here provides a framework in
which our ordinary experience may be held of central importance and as a
bulwark against philosophical dogma (using a different framework, the same
may be said of the later Wittgenstein).The idea that that a W3-2-1
metaphysics might be converted into a testable scientific theory is surely
more far-fetched than the idea that W2-1 metaphysics could be vindicated by
a testable scientific theory, and the latter more far-fetched at present
than the idea of 'promissory materalism'. In providing a W3-2-1 framework,
Popper avoids spurious "detail".”
We should distinguish PHYSICALISM (the monism of theory that there is only
w1) qua philosophical theory and physicalism qua scientific theory. Some
philosophers, admittedly, have confused issues: the Churches, for example.
Qua _philosophical theory_, physicalism is not without problems, and
testability by a scientific theory since neither here nor there. In his
“Pilgrim’s Progress,” Grice lists Physicalism as a bete noire on the way to
the City of Eternal Truth. He is thinking of J. C. C. Smart-type of
materialism. Interestingly, in the heyday of Oxford’s early philosophy,
physicalism, qua key term, was usually opposed to PHENOMENALISM, which is
another bete noire, almost. So it’s PHILOSOPHICAL DETAIL we are
interested in as philosophers.
McEvoy: “In this [Popper] is not lagging behind but being more rational
than philosophers who lard their work with detail that actually does not
rationally support their position as against its alternatives. It is
apparent that Popper presents his W123 theory not as a mere ideologue for
human rationality (i.e. he would not hold to his theory if he thought
rationally a W2-W1 or just W1 were preferable to a W3-W2-W1 metaphysics).
Nevertheless defending human rationality is a central concern of this
metaphysics. Popper does not think a genuine human rationality could exist
merely in W1 terms, and his later philosophy is clear that neither can
human rationality be defended only in terms of W2 processes: what human
rationality requires is a form of 'objective knowledge' and W3 standards,
such as of 'truth'. Why then has a W3-type theory the appearance of
far-fetched or outlandish metaphysics (to many people - but not perhaps
Saul Kripke, who thinks materialism radically mistaken)? The answer is
complex but two strands may be summarised. One is the materialism or
physicalism that seems so promising a programme of explanation, given the
dazzling advances in the natural sciences, and which leads to the view that
everything may be explained in W1 terms.”
I don’t think Smart was into ‘the dazzling advances of natural sciences’
when he opposed Descartes’s dualism. I think physicalist philosophers have
to be distinguished from scientists of a reductive type. It is true that at
Oxford the Chair of Metaphysical Philosophy was meant to supervise the
Chair of “Natural” philosophy, by which Oxonians then meant anything from
Newton onwards!
McEvoy:
“The other is that Western philosophy since Descarte became embedded in a
JTB view of knowledge, where knowledge was regarded as a particular kind of
subjective mental state, and this leads to the view everything may be
explained in W2-W1 terms (I understand, from this list, that Walter has
taught a course, and may even still be teaching it, where knowledge is only
considered in these terms). Both these strands have surprisingly weak
bases, when critically examined, and are often taken up as a result of
inculcation in a certain line of thought (Walter's JTB course might be an
example of this). It is at least to Popper's credit that his approach
(which has difficulties of its own) reveals that much of what passes for
philosophical thought on these matters is often just beholden to a set of
uncritically held assumptions.”
Well, the JTB theory was analysed in some detail by Plato, and Gettier,
another philosopher, proved him sort of wrong in serious respects. Did
Gettier proceed ‘by the method of detail’? His short essay concerns
detailed scenarios, but merely, they provide a refutation of a rather
undetailed view of knowledge proposed by Plato (and Ayer, Gettier thinks):
K = JTB
It may be thought that Gettier’s convoluted scenarios (where
‘justification’ is thought of ‘independent’ of the belief that becomes
‘knowledge’), full of detail, are accidentail. Gettier DOES NOT famously
produce an alternative theory. It is up to Grice to do that! Grice notes
that Gettier fails to recognise CAUSATION. In Grice’s detailed analysis:
A knows that the Battle of Trafalgar was fought on Oct. 21 1805 iff
A BELIEVES that the Battle of Trafalgar was fought on Oct. 21 1805 AND
The Battle of Trafalgar was fought on Oct. 21 1805 AND
The fact that the Battle of Trafalgar was fought on Oct. 21 1805 CAUSES A
to BELIEVE that the Battle of Trafalgar was fought on Oct. 21 1805.
Thus, a pupil at Clifton (Grice’s alma mater) may KNOW this. The pupil
does not need conclusive evidence (which Grice thinks involves us in a
regressus ad infinitum).
McEvoy: “But then Popper is a genius-level theorist of knowledge, as most
honest and capable students of his work would admit, whereas most
professional philosophers are well below this level.”
Well, Grice’s obituary in THE TIMES read, “Professional philosopher and
amateur cricketer,” but I thought that Popper was a professional
philososopher, too, if not an amateur cricketer.
Cheers,
Speranza
