-----Original Message----- From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Sent: 14 March 2015 12:50 To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Gettieriana In a message dated 3/13/2015 1:25:39 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes: Perhaps we can try something like this: "First we take a vague or ambiguous statement. Then we imagine a context in which it is believed to be true but it comes out false in the sense in which it was ostensibly intended in that imaginary context. Next, we imagine another context which has nothing whatsoever to do with what was ostensibly intended but in which the same statement can be read as true. For effect, we add one or two improbable turns to the story." Indeed. There are three other considerations one can give some attention to: (I) In his essa, Gettier challenges the "justified true belief" definition of knowledge that dates back to Plato's "Theaetetus" (He also quotes from Ayer's Penguin book on empirical knowledge). BUT the definition is TYPICALLY discounted at the end of that very dialogue. So we may want to revise the original Greek text to double-check if some justification is given to this 'discounting'. (II) A similar argument to Gettier was found in the papers of Bertrand Russell. Since Gettier also quotes from Ayer, a related point is whether Ayer was aware of this Gettier-type argument in Russell, and what he thought about it. (III) Grice. For Gettier competes with Grice. In "An introduction to the philosophy of language", Harrison calls Grice's definition of meaning as second only to rule-utilitarianism as having been the target of the maximum number of alleged counterexamples. Third must count Gettier. Grice got so infuriated when YET another counter-example was offered to his definition, that he decided that the best methodology for philosophy DOES NOT proceed by offering counterexamples (he was having a refutation of Popper in mind). The methodology should not be epagogic, but diagogic, which is surely to have an eirenic effect, Grice adds. The keyword here would be the role of COUNTER-EXAMPLE in CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (especially when, as in Grice and Gettier, the type of conceptual analysis is 'ordinary language philosophy, Oxford type of analysis'. Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Attachment:
ie-RORITrenero.pdf
Description: ie-RORITrenero.pdf