It's been pointed out, rather obnoxiously, I might add, that I put the P
before the R. Ha! Still correctly me!!!
Mike Geary still self-satisfied
Actually, I think it's RP.
Ooooooh,
Erin TO
Quoting Mike Geary <atlas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
PR: > My reading of Kant, on the other hand, while open to criticism, is, of > course, correct.
There you go. A man after my own heart!
You go, guy.
Mike Geary still correctly me
----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Paul" <robert.paul@xxxxxxxx>
To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2005 5:02 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Ye Modern Dialectic
> Walter wrote:
>
>> Robert does identify a problem in Kant's ethics, though I do not >> believe
>> it is as severe as he renders it. (My reading of Kant is open to
>> criticism. What an odd thing to say. A case of "one thought too
>> many"?)
>
> My reading of Kant, on the other hand, while open to criticism, is, of
> course, correct.
>
> Briefly, here's where Walter and I may disagree. I can't extract from > Kant
> any such fine-grained parsing of the descriptions of actions as he > seems
> able to. A maxim, for all practical purposes either just is, or has as > its
> essential component, the description of an action. Kant cannot see the
> difference between the lying-to-save case, and the lying-for-gain case: > to
> him they're just lying. This seems clear from his insistence, which > Walter
> notes, that lying is always 'categorically forbidden.' Yet > lying-to-save
> is different from lying-for-gain, in pretty much the same way that > running
> to catch a bus and running while taking part in a marathon are > different.
> They are different actions; and if someone wants to say that au fond, > they
> both reduce to 'just running,' he have a somewhat mechanical view of > the
> world. Yet if Kant were to rely in such reductionism ('Well, when you > get
> right down to it, they're no different, being in the one case both just
> lying and in the other both just running,' he would have shot himself > in
> the foot, for he would be unable to say what Walter has pointed out he
> _does_ say, about the role of motives, intentions, purposes, and the > like,
> in assessing actions, or proposed actions.
>
> As I'm puzzled, in the good sense, about how an action can just be done
> for (as I'll put it) no reason, except pure duty, I'll stop and try to
> think about this for awhile.
>
> Robert Paul
> Reed College
>
>> I think we can safely claim that Kant was very much attuned to the
>> importance of motive and purpose in assessing the moral worth of >> actions
>> and maxims. This is why Kant typically provides these aspects of a >> maxim
>> in his discussions of them. His "maxim schema" is more accurately
>> represented by: "In circumstances C, I will do A for the purpose of >> P."
>> The lying promise discussion is the best known of Kant's maxims. It is
>> through such a structure that any action is defined as the kind of >> maxim
>> it is - i.e., prudential, morally permissible, forbidden, etc.. As I >> see
>> it, a maxim *expresses* the motive and purpose of the agent and the
>> action
>> comes to be *defined* as the particular action it is through the
>> relationship between motive, purpose and act expressed in the maxim.
>> I think that an action on its own is not open to moral assessment on
>> Kant's terms. (It's legal status is a different matter.) This despite
his
>> claim near the end of his life, that the act of lying is always
>> categorically forbidden. (I believe Kant at times errs in applying >> his
>> theory to specific circumstances.) In his prime though, Kant >> recognized
>> that motive and purpose are indispensible ingredients of moral worth.
The
>> examples in the Groundwork all ride on this recognition. In the case >> of
>> duties of wide latitude, judgment is required and, yes, Kant could >> have
>> said more about the kind of judgment that interested Aristotle. I >> think
>> he
>> simply had other fish to fry.
>>
>> We have good grounds for attributing to Kant
>> a perspicuous recognition of the differences involved in performing >> the
>> act of C: giving to charity (acting benevolently):
>> 1. Cing from the motive of augmenting (or in W's case, restoring) >> one's
>> reputation
>> 2. Cing because one wants to help others in need and this from a love >> of
>> mankind
>> 3. Cing from the motive in 2 where C is morally permissible (promotes
the
>> dignity, moral worth, of agent and recipient and is thus
>> universalizable.)
>> 4. Cing in order to soothe one's conscience (i.e., I murder Paul Stone
>> and
>> then make a huge donation to the Evangelical Society for the >> Elimination
>> of Terror in the World.)
>>
>> I hope most of this is right.
>>
>> Cheers, Walter
>>
>> On Wed, 7 Sep 2005, Robert Paul wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Walter is right: this is a poorly defined (or expressed) maxim: but >>>such
>>>vagueness and generality in the formulation of maxims never seems to
>>>have given Kant much pause. He seems not to have realized that the
>>>specificity of maxims can change the outcome of their tests against >>>the
>>>Procrustean illusion of the CI: given the maxim schema 'do x,' the
>>>generality or specificity of the substitution instances of x obviously
>>>matter. But Kant never distinguishes between the maxim 'tell a lie,' >>>and
>>>the maxim 'tell a lie in order to save the life of an innocent >>>person,'
>>>except to deny that the latter is a different action from the former, >>>as
>>>if 'lying' were all one thing and instances of it all the same >>>'action.'
>>>What one might propose to do is seldom fine-grained enough in Kant's >>>own
>>>account to allow for such distinctions. It as if he were blind to the
>>>distinction between 'feed a child' and 'feed a starving child.'
>>>
>>>Robert Paul
>>>The Reed Institute
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>>
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Erin
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